COLONIAL POLITICS OF AUSTRO-HUNGARY TOWARD BALKANIAN PROVINCES AT BEGINNING OF 20TH CENTURY

Abstract

When analyzing a relation „centre-periphery“ it is important to take into consideration, among other theories, also a theory of World Order by Immanuel Wallerstain. In this theory Wallerstain analyzed the concept “center-periphery” in a very elaborated form. The Wallerstain’s theory became popular, amongst all other fields, in the field of economic historiography, too. It was inspired, in addition to other theoreticians, by German historian Hans Heinrich Nolte and his research team and relying on it the theory revolved around inner periphery in Europe and its relation with center in different levels – not only on the world or international level, but also on regional or domestic (within a state) level. This theoretical approach could be applied in case of Habsburg Monarchy, too, in which case it is easy to discover several centers (in addition to Wien and Budapest there is also Prague in this context of the center with its significant role) and different inner peripheries, depending on a perspective angle and direction of its analysis. As a colonial metropolis, Austro-Hungary finished its preparations for war long time before 1914. The war could have easily started in 1908 or in 1910 for that matter. It is certain that there was some talk about the war against Serbian during a meeting of William and Franz Ferdinand in Konopiste in 1914 before Franz Ferdinand departed on great maneuvers in Bosnia. Up to 1914 probably there had been finished all the warrelated plans, because the assassination was used as a reason for making the war in such a rapid and reckless way that it became obvious that the sorrow and lament over Franz Ferdinand and revolt that a member of “one common people” raised his hand to assassin “a sanctified imperial figure” were only a cloud of dust thrown to the eyes of whole world. Recklessness and furiosity of the attack on Serbia and refusal of any intermediate attempt to resolve the conflict amicably presented an obstacle to defenders of Austria and Germany who were trying in all possible ways to prove that they were provoked and almost enforced to start the war even if they did not want to do it. People of Bosnia and Herzegovina resisted invasion of the mighty enemy during its occupation, but without success. It should not be omitted that at that time Serbia made great efforts to strengthen its military power and to put in order its state administration which surely did not very properly functioned in time of ruling Obrenovics. All these endeavors had caused extremely high expenditure which was unbearable ballast for the state budget which consisted of hardly 87.6 million dinars yearly. The state debt of that time was 461 million dinars with annual debt service of 23 million dinars. Prior to the end of reign of King Aleksandar Obrenovic there emerged very obvious signs of determination in public opinion in Serbia for a change of very strained relations within the state institutions. Great powers, too, understood that the change of government in Serbia was inevitable, because such state of affairs really was not capable of surviving anymore.