TRGOVINSKO-TEHNOLOŠKI RAT VAŠINGTONA PROTIV PEKINGA I POSLEDIČNA GEOEKONOMSKA FRAGMENTACIJA: POTENCIJALNE POSLEDICE I RIZICI ZA GLOBALNU EKONOMIJU

Autori

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.51738/Kpolisa2023.20.3r.195nzlz

Ključne reči:

geoekonomska fragmentacija, decoupling, trgovinsko-tehnološki rat, Kina, SAD

Apstrakt

Cilj rada je ocena mogućih posledica i rizika za globalnu ekonomiju usled sve izraženije geoekonomske fragmentacije, koja je dominantno uslovljena trgovinsko-tehnološkim ratom SAD protiv Kine. Oslanjajući se na nalaze referentnih studija, zaključujemo da bi se ,,decoupling’’ i trgovinska fragmentacija mogli manifestovati preko nekoliko glavnih kanala. To su, pored ostalog: usporavanje rasta globalne trgovine, smanjene migracije, redukovane SDI, zabrane transfera određenih visokih tehnologija. U nameri da ostvarimo primarni cilj rada, sugerisali smo pragmatične načine da se sačuva što veći deo benefita proistekao iz trgovinske otvorenosti, odnosno međunarodne ekonomske saradnje. Pre svega, pored intenzivnije komunikacije glavnih globalnih ekonomskih aktera u kojoj bi se uložio dodatni trud za kompromisna rešenja na liniji argumentacije akademske zajednice i eksperata u referetnim međunarodnim institucijama, treba revitalizovati rad vodećih multilateralnih organizacija davajući veći značaj u njihovom rukovođenju zemljama u razvoju, posebno Kini. Na kraju, argumentujemo da, i pored svih rizika, nije realno da će geoekonomska fragmentacija voditi znatnijem smanjenju većine vidova ekonomske saradnje na globalnom nivou, budući da nema valjanih (geopolitičkih) razloga zbog kojih bi zemlje Zapada prestale da uvoze cenovno i kvalitativno konkurentne proizvode iz Kine. Umesto toga, kooperacija će primarno biti redukovana u limitiranom broju visoko-tehnoloških sektora, koji su percipirani u Vašingtonu, Briselu i Pekingu kao strateški značajni.

##plugins.generic.usageStats.downloads##

##plugins.generic.usageStats.noStats##

Reference

Aiyar, S., Chen, J., Ebeke, C., Garcia-Saltos, R., Gudmundsson, T., Ilyina, A., Kangur, A., Rodriguez, S., Ruta, M., Schulze, T., Trevino, J., Kunaratskul, T. and Soderberg, G. (2023, January 15). Geoeconomic Fragmentation and the Future of Multilateralism. IMF. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Staff-DiscussionNotes/Issues/2023/01/11/Geo-Economic-Fragmentation-and-the-Future-of-Multilateralism-527266

Altman, S.A. and Bastian, C. R. (2022, November 25). DHL Global Connectedness Index 2022. DHL. https://www.dhl.com/content/dam/dhl/global/delivered/documents/pdf/dhl-globalconnectedness-index-2022-complete-report.pdf

Bade, G. (2023, May 25). Joe Biden wants a ‘new economic world order.’ It’s never looked more disordered. Politico. https://www.politico.com/news/2023/05/25/joe-bidens-economy-trade-china-00096781

Buch, C., Goldberg, L. and Imbierowicz, B. (2023, May 8). Trade fragmentation matters for bank credit supply: New evidence from the International Banking Research Network. VoxEu. https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/trade-fragmentation-mattersbank-credit-supply-new-evidence-international-banking

Cerdeiro, D. A., Mano, R., Eugster, J., Muir, D. V., Peiris, S. J (2021, March 12). Sizing up the effects of technological decoupling. International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2021/03/12/Sizing-Up-the-Effects-ofTechnological-Decoupling-50125

Federico, S., Hassan, F., and Rappoport, V. (2020, April). Trade shocks and credit reallocation. National Bureau of Economic Research. https://www.nber.org/papers/w31111

ICC (2023, April). ICC 2023 Trade report: A fragmenting world. ICC. https://iccwbo.org/news-publications/policies-reports/icc-2023-trade-report-a-fragmenting-world/.

IMF (2023, April 11). World Economic Outlook: A rocky recovery; Chapter 4, Geoeconomic Fragmentation and Foreign Direct Investment. IMF. https://www.elibrary.imf.org/display/book/9798400224119/CH004.xml

Kristalina, G. (2023, January 16). Confronting Fragmentation Where It Matters Most: Trade, Debt, and Climate Action. IMF. https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2023/01/16/Confrontingfragmentation-where-it-matters-most-trade-debt-and-climate-action

Lee, T. and Smith, T. (2023, January 11). Section 301 China Tariffs by End Use. American Action Forum. https://www.americanactionforum.org/research/section-301-china-tariffs-byend-use

Manak, I., Cabanas, G. and Feinberg, N. (2023, April 18). The Cost of Trump’s Trade War with China Is Still Adding Up. Council on Foreign Relations – CFR. https://www.cfr.org/blog/cost-trumpstrade-war-china-still-adding

Medeiros, E. (2023, May 26). The US must grasp the opportunity to stabilise relations with China. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/d8d1dfd7-eb8d-4ccf-a6d2-4ee6766d5f65

Pei, M. (2023, May 24). China Can’t Afford Xi’s Quest for Security. Bloomberg. www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-05-24/china-can-t-afford-to-prioritize-security-over-the-economy#xj4y7vzkg

Pesek, W. (2023, May 25). US-China trade war as mutually assured destruction. Asia Times. https://asiatimes.com/2023/05/uschina-trade-war-as-mutually-assured-destruction/

Rachman, G. (2023, May 29). De-risking trade with China is a risky business. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/1caf3dd9-1097-4de2-9b57-80b70e465154

Setser, B. (2022, April 26). China trade in manufactures as share of China’s GDP. Twitter. https://twitter.com/Brad_Setser/status/1651258097908719620

Shearing, N. (2023, April 24). The key to navigating a fragmented world is understanding the forces driving it. Capital Economics. https://www.capitaleconomics.com/blog/key-navigatingfragmented-world-understanding-forces-driving-it

Sisci, F. (2023, May 25). Competitive peace or Kissingerian war?. Settimana News. http://www.settimananews.it/informazioneinternazionale/competitive-peace-or-kissingerian-war/

Song, J. (2023, May 24). South Korea warns US could ‘overburden’ its chipmakers with China limits. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/5602cb1e-0dcd-4c7f-bed4-d6a9a5887d00

Spence, M. (2023, April 4). Destructive Decoupling. Council on Foreign Relations – CFR. https://www.cfr.org/article/destructive-decoupling

UNCTAD (2018, Jul 27). Trade in Services and Employment. UNCTAD. https://unctad.org/publication/trade-services-and-employment

UNCTAD (2022, September 29). Investment policy trends in climate change sectors, Investment Policy Monitor. UNCTAD. https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/publications/series/1/latestinvestment-policy-trends

Wolf, M. (2023, May 23). The G7 must accept that it cannot run the world. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/c8cf024d- 87b7-4e18-8fa2-1b8a3f3fbba1

World Bank (2023, February 23). Food Security Update. World Bank. https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/40ebbf38f5a6b68bfc11e5273e1405d4-0090012022/related/Food-Security-Update-LXXIXFebruary-23-2023.pdf

WTO (2023, April 5). Trade growth to slow to 1.7% in 2023 following 2.7% expansion in 2022. WTO. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news23_e/tfore_05apr23_e.htm

##submission.downloads##

Objavljeno

2023-11-08

##plugins.generic.badges.manager.settings.showBlockTitle##

Najčitanije od istog autora

1 2 > >>