VALUE NARRATIVE IN A MORAL JUSTIFICATION FOR INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION

Abstract

The paper discusses the foundations of the moral evaluation of international military interventions in the context of the narrative theory of identity. The narrative theory portrays the collective identities and value systems of both the intervenors and those againt whom the intervention is launched in terms of ‘narratives’ of ‘life stories’ of the communities. The author argues that the narrative theory provides the most useful tools to develop models of moral evaluation of particular interventions. He suggests that, unlike the deontological moral theories, which operate te terms such as ‘moral obligation’ or ‘duty’ to intervene, the narrative theory does no aspire to universality, but is capable of integrating empirical evaluations and comparisons, thus allowing the establishment of credibility or lack of credibility to intervene, superiority of the intervenors’ narrative, and a number of other factors. This allows the narrative theory to discriminate between particular interventions, without drawing generalized conclusions as to whether international interventions are morally justified or unjustified. The theory allows easy incorporation in the existing political institutions and practice, and promises to enhance the profile of moral evaluations within them. Finally, the theory allows for an empirically informed moral critique of military interventions based on the qualities of the value systems constitutive of the collective identities of the intervenors, as well as those which the intervenors attempt to address in the intervening theaters. In some cases, as the author shows, although the social and economic differences between the intervenors and the communities against which interventions are aimed are enormous, the qualities of the value systems in the sense of normative power, consistency and stability, suggest a superiority of the narratives of the recipients of intervention to those of the intervening states. However, the narrative theory makes the conclusions about moral evaluations of interventions dependent on the specific interpretation of the relevant facts and value-judgements made with regard to what features of the intervention, the intervenors, or the recipients of the intervention are deemed morally decisive.