DELEGATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: PRINCIPAL – AGENT APPROACH
Keywords:
delegation, authority, P-A, principal, agent, rational choice, international relations, international organiationsAbstract
The article deals with delegation of authority in international relations, through the application of P-A (Principal-Agent) approach, where states are single-unitary, multiple or collective principals and international bodies are agents. Author presents the answer of P-A approach to the question of why states delegate authorities to international bodies, what conditions have to be fulfilled for a successful delegation and how states control international bodies as their agents.
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