

The Culture of Polis

KULTURA

POLISA


Časopis za negovanje demokratske političke kulture
Journal for Nurturing Democratic Political Culture

Volume 19

Issue 3

2022

ISSN (Online) 2602-9466 ISSN (Printed) 1820-4589



Kultura - Polis, Novi Sad
Institut za evropske studije, Beograd

ISSN (Printed) 1820-4589

ISSN (Online) 2812-9466

UDC 316.334.56:008



KULTURA POLISA

Časopis za negovanje demokratske političke kulture

CULTURE OF POLIS

Journal for Nurturing Democratic Political Culture

Volume 19, Issue 3, August 2022

www.kpolisa.com

IMPRESSUM

Publishers

Executive Publisher

KULTURA – POLIS NOVI SAD [CULTURE OF POLIS], www.kpolisa.com

Novi Sad, Branimira Ćosića 2

Co-publisher

Institute of European Studies, www.ies.rs

Beograd, Trg Nikole Pašića 11

Editor-In-Chief

Željko BJELAJAC, *PhD, Full Professor*

University Business Academy in Novi Sad, Faculty of Law for Commerce and Judiciary

E-mail: editor@kpolisa.com

Deputy Editor-In-Chief

Darko M. MARKOVIĆ, *PhD, Associate Professor*

University Business Academy in Novi Sad, Faculty of Law for Commerce and Judiciary

Assistants Editor-In-Chief

Joko DRAGOJLOVIĆ, *PhD, Associate Professor*

University Business Academy in Novi Sad, Faculty of Law for Commerce and Judiciary

Aleksandar M. FILIPOVIĆ, *PhD, Assistant Professor*

*University Business Academy in Novi Sad, Faculty of Economics and Engineering
Management in Novi Sad*

Editorial Board

National members

Božidar BANOVIĆ, *Full Professor, University of Belgrade, Faculty of Security Studies*; Slaviša ORLOVIĆ, *Full Professor, University of Belgrade, Faculty of Political Science*; Dragan ĐUKANOVIĆ, *Full Professor, University of Belgrade, Faculty of Political Science*; Milan POČUČA, *Full Professor, University Business Academy, Faculty of Law for Commerce and Judiciary*; Aleksandar M. PETROVIĆ, *Full Professor, University of Priština, Faculty of Philosophy, Kosovska Mitrovica*; Vojkan ZORIĆ, *Full Professor, Megatrend University, Faculty of Civil Aviation*; Đorđe STOJANOVIĆ, *Research Associate, Institute for Political Studies, Belgrade*; Predrag TERZIĆ, *Research Associate, Institute for Political Studies, Belgrade*; Rajko PETROVIĆ, *Research Associate, Institute of European Studies, Belgrade*; Veljko TURANJANIN, *Associate Professor, University of Kragujevac, Faculty of Law*; Boriša LEČIĆ, *Assistant Professor, University Union Belgrade, Faculty of Law and Business Studies* Dr Lazar Vrkić in Novi Sad.

International members

Dejan MIHAILOVIĆ, *PhD, Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey (ITESM) Departamento de Relaciones Internacionales y Ciencia Política, Mexico*; Velibor SPALEVIĆ, *PhD, University of Montenegro, Biotechnical Faculty, Podgorica*; Pavel Evgenyevich BOYKO, *PhD, Kuban State University, Krasnodar, Russia*; Davor PAUKOVIĆ, *PhD, University of Dubrovnik, Department of Mass Communication, Croatia*; Daniela BLAŽEVSKA, *PhD, Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje, Justinianus Primus Faculty of Law, North Macedonia*; Tatjana TAPAVIČKI Duronjić, *PhD, University of Banja Luka, Faculty of Political Science, Bosnia and Herzegovina*.

Publishing Council

Živojin ĐURIĆ, *president, Institute for Political Studies, Belgrade*; Ljubiša DESPOTOVIĆ, *Institute for Political Studies, Belgrade*; Miša ĐURKOVIĆ, *Institute of European Studies, Belgrade*; Marijana CARIĆ, *University Business Academy in Novi Sad*; Vasilis PETSINIS, *PhD, Marie Curie Experienced Researcher at the Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies, University of Tartu, Estonia*; Wolfgang ROHRBACH, *PhD, St. Elizabeth University of Health and Social Sciences, Austria*; Paul MOJZES, *PhD, Professor Emeritus of Religious Studies at Rosemont College, USA*; Eugen STRĂUȚIU, *PhD, Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu, Department of International Relations, Political Science and Security Studies, Romania*; Jelisaveta TODOROVIĆ, *University of Niš, Faculty of Philosophy*; Zoran ARACKI, *University of Niš, Faculty of Philosophy*; Marija ĐORIĆ, *Institute for Political Studies, Belgrade*; Boro MERDOVIĆ, *Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia*; Željko NINČIĆ, *Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia*; Aleksandra ILIĆ, *University of Belgrade, Faculty of security studies, Belgrade*.

Language editor and proofreader for the Serbian language

Mara DESPOTOV, *University Business Academy in Novi Sad, Faculty of Law for Commerce and Judiciary in Novi Sad*

Translator, language editor, and proofreader for the English language

Jelena DUNĐERSKI, *University Business Academy in Novi Sad, Faculty of Law for Commerce and Judiciary in Novi Sad*

Print

Mala knjiga, Novi Sad

Circulation

200 copies

Kultura polisa (Culture of Polis) is a part of the international cross-referencing (CrossRef) system and is currently connecting with all relevant scientific databases.

CONTENTS

Articles

<i>Momčilo B. Bajac / Maja M. Vojinović</i> BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGIES AND MEDIA TRANSFORMATION	1–21
<i>Miša Djurković</i> BIOTECHNOLOGY, DIGITALIZATION, AND IMMIGRATION: NEW CHALLENGES FOR THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS	22–43
<i>Goran Nikolić / Jelena Zvezdanović Lobanova</i> STRENGTHENING THE GLOBAL IMPORTANCE OF CHINA'S ECONOMY IN THE POST-PANDEMIC PERIOD	44–75
<i>Veljko Djogatović</i> POSSIBILITIES FOR REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SAARC AND ASEAN	76–92
<i>Jovica Pavlović</i> EXAMINING NORMATIVE AND APPLICABLE ASPECTS OF THE PLEBISCITARY THEORY OF SECESSION	93–109
<i>Miloš Lončar</i> PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES OF ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE NOWADAYS	110–130
<i>Darko M. Marković / Ivana Spaić</i> MINIMUM AGE OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AS PART OF CRIMINAL POLICIES	131–155

<i>Tatjana D. Janovac / Saša R. Virijević Jovanović</i> THE EFFECTS OF CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN CULTURAL CLUSTER IN CRISIS SITUATIONS	156–175
--	---------

<i>Nina Mitić / Miodrag Brzaković</i> MODEL FOR EVALUATION OF BANKING SERVICES' QUALITY	176–202
---	---------

<i>Dušan Ilić</i> SERDARSHIPS AS PROTOREGIONS OF CENTRAL SERBIA	203–224
--	---------

Book Review

<i>Petar S. Ćurčić</i> VELJKO BLAGOJEVIĆ: MOĆ I SILA – SRBIJA I VOJNI FAKTOR U MEDJUNARODNOJ POLITICI [Review of the book <i>Power and Sila. Serbia and Military Factor in International Politics</i> , by Veljko Blagojević]	225–230
Authors Guidelines	231–242

Blockchain Technologies and Media Transformation

Momčilo B. Bajac and Maja M. Vojinović

University UNION Nikola Tesla in Belgrade

Faculty of management, Sremski Karlovci

Article Information*

Review Article • UDC: 004.7:070.1

Volume: 19 Issue: 3, pages: 1–21

Received: June 5, 2022 • Accepted: July 13, 2022

<https://doi.org/10.51738/Kpolisa2022.19.3r.1bv>

Author Note

Momčilo B. Bajac  <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2115-6373>

Maja M. Vojinović  <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7263-9549>

We have no known conflict of interest to disclose.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Momčilo

Bajac, Faculty of management in Sremski Karlovci, Njegoševa 1, 21205

Sremski Karlovci, Serbia. Email: momcilo.bajac@famns.edu.rs

* Cite (APA):

Bajac, M. B., & Vojinović, M. M. (2022). Blockchain Technologies and Media Transformation. *Kultura polisa*, 19(3), 1–21. <https://doi.org/10.51738/Kpolisa2022.19.3r.1bv>

Abstract

In this paper we start from the assumption that social dynamics and cultural-civilizational progress cannot be viewed separately from the social history of the media as complex technological-communication structures. In this paper we deal with the influence of new disruptive technologies DLT (Distributed Ledger Technologies) better known as blockchain technologies which, thanks to the latest technological solutions, have great potential for transforming the media and journalism as a profession, thus we have explained the technological concept on which they are based. We will discuss the concept of personalized blockchain journalism and propose a user economy model that guarantees the financial sustainability of the platform. Observing information as a user experience, we have discussed the possibility of adequate cognitive response of users in conditions of information saturation, and raised the issue of structuring information in designing a journalistic platform on the blockchain, as an ecosystem that will distance itself from existing polluted media space. Finally, we have proposed a topic for further reflection and scientific research, which is the latest technological transition based on quantum computing, artificial intelligence and the Metaverse, which will provide a completely new user experience in 3D virtual space, where user avatars will rely less and less on traditional media and journalism as we know it today.

Keywords: media, personalized journalism, blockchain, user experience, user economy

Blockchain Technologies and Media Transformation

The journalistic profession and the media have a significant role in filling the public space with information and facts on the basis of which citizens can achieve active social engagement in the search for truth in all spheres of public life.

Throughout journalism, the society monitors the state of its institutions and its future and reacts when necessary. Such journalism is essential for democracy, because a person cannot self-constitute his own meaning and purpose if he does not provide complete and accurate information about events beyond his scope. He must know what happened, how and under what circumstances. Work, health, future, life often depend on that knowledge. He has to work, to improve himself, to help others, to raise a family (Bjelajac & Filipović, 2018).

During the twentieth century, the mass media emerge and develop simultaneously with the emergence of modern political society, thus it comes to their merging, actually, the mass media become a function of political society. This symbiosis of the media and political society soon becomes a marriage of interest, which leads to pollution of the media space, blurring of the user experience and even open media violence. The role of the media and journalism has been completely perverted, and the factors of social integration and stabilization are becoming one of the most important factors of social disintegration and destabilization.

Journalism is becoming an easy weapon for the propaganda of powerful alienated interests that are gradually destroying social relations. Permanent pressure on the media, over time, demoralizes even the most moral owners and editors. The media is becoming depressed,

and depression is spreading like an epidemic horizontally, to all media in the community, and vertically, from the owner to the last media representative (Bjelajac & Filipović, 2018).

Nowadays, when trust in the media and the journalistic profession is at a historically lowest level, it is necessary to find new organizational forms, and channels of communication and redefine the role of the journalistic profession, so that journalism regains its basic function. The media should adhere to the basic principles of journalistic ethics, which concern objective, impartial and truthful reporting and provision of information, striving to promote positive values (Bjelajac & Merdović, 2018, pp. 298–299).

The Internet and WEB2.0 are directly responsible for the enormous concentration of power of platforms such as Facebook, Amazon, YouTube, Twitter and Google. These platforms have gained not only media, and economic, but also enormous political power by enabling a new era of surveillance capitalism and an “online world that is not subject to earthly laws” (Zubof, 2019). “Google as a pioneer, inventor of surveillance capitalism” (Zubof 2020) forces its users to trade their behavioural data for an information and connection service. These data are transformed by the method of machine learning or artificial intelligence into highly profitable algorithmic products that predict the behaviour of Google users. One part of these data represents the “behavioural surplus that becomes the basis of a completely new logic of accumulation” (Zubof, 2020), not only for commercial purposes, yet also as the main tool for social control. Surveillance capitalism has become the basic model of information capitalism online. With these technological changes on the Web2.0 platform, even journalism has failed to keep up. Journalism and journalists found themselves on the periphery of the information space on the Internet. “The reason why platform operators, not content creators, are able to earn more revenue is that they spent their time and effort building the space where people gather” (Kim, B. and Yongik, Y. 2018). In addition, journalism is threatened by the “responsibility for the space in which people

gather has been passed on to non-journalists who are platform operators" (Kim & Yongik, 2018).

Blockchain and Journalism

With the advent of interactive WEB2.0 and social networks, participatory or citizen journalism has been established as an "act of a citizen, or group of citizens, playing an active role in the process of collecting, reporting, analyzing, and disseminating news and information" (Teixeira et al., 2020) through social networks. Although their influence on the formation of public opinion has become very great, they face the problem of unfair monetization of the products of their work and censorship of content, especially in recent years during the US elections, the COVID-19 crisis and the war in Ukraine.

In order to successfully overcome the crisis in which journalism finds itself, internet journalism can use the opportunity to solve three acute problems with the help of new technologies: the problem of trust, the problem of monetization and the problem of ethical management of the publishing platform. One online journalistic project needs a platform and tools for publishing, a monetization system, i.e. a financial model of sustainability, and a management model which guarantees that the platform will function ethically and in accordance with journalistic standards. The platform can be set up as a decentralized dApps application on one of the existing blockchains, such as Ethereum, monetization is based on cryptocurrency or tokens, management is programmed by smart contracts, and content metadata is stored on the blockchain. Journalists who start in blockchain journalism are expected to take responsibility for the platform at the same time, i.e. to become its owners.

The Term of Blockchain

Blockchain as well as other Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLTs) are technologies enabling parties with no particular trust in each other to exchange any type of digital data on a peer-to-peer basis with fewer or no third parties or intermediaries. The Bitcoin blockchain released a person or entity

under the pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto into the hacker community in 2008, when he published a paper entitled Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System (Nakamoto, 2008). The blockchain is led through a distributed network of participants who follow the same rules defined by the algorithm to verify and add transactions to the blockchain. The most well-known consensus mechanism is the "Proof of Work", which relies on the processing power of computers. The whole process is called "mining", and miners are rewarded with cryptocurrency for the processing power involved when validating the transaction. The basic values on which this technology is based are security, decentralization, immutability, transparency, privacy, and openness.

Ethereum blockchain has completely revolutionized the concept of decentralization by extending the possibility of transactions to all types of value, not just monetary transactions. Ethereum is a general-purpose blockchain, which can have different types of decentralized applications running on it. Its contribution is reflected in the concept of smart contracts, WEB3.0 a new stage in the evolution of the Internet, and decentralized autonomous organizations (DAO). Smart contracts define rules like a regular contract, and automatically enforce them through a code.

They are self-executing, cannot be erased, and interactions with them are irreversible. "WEB 3.0 on the blockchain is distributed to a huge number of computers, and there are decentralized platforms free from all forms of pressure, censorship and surveillance" (Brekke, 2019). DAOs function through rules coded as computer programs, and smart contracts based on which actions are performed in favour of shareholders. DAO is a computer algorithm that applies token ownership rights, contractual obligations, and business logic rules. Token owners accumulate power and capital by founding organizations with their own money and thus gain real decision-making power. Through the Initial Coin Offer – ICO they gain complete financial independence from any central authority.

One calls this a property-user economy. Blockchain technology and the mechanism of smart contracts can solve problems related to the unauthorized use of intellectual property as well as other unfavourable relations in the value chain

of the media industry, which has always been to the detriment of authors as value creators. Blockchain can be permissionless, open to anyone who wants to access it, then permissioned with access only to authorized persons, and a hybrid that provides both, making it suitable for decentralized news platforms.

Model of Personalized Journalism in Decentralized Blockchain Ecosystem

We present a model of personalized journalism on a distributed network proposed by the authors Byeowool Kim and Yongik Yoon from the School of IT Engineering, Sookmyung Women's University in Seoul, 2018. This project was still under development at that time, especially in terms of user economy, i.e. the system of financial incentives necessary for the survival of the platform. As new funding models for the Ethereum blockchain have emerged in the meantime, we will propose a model that guarantees the economic viability of the platform.

Kim and Yongik were dealing with the issue of distributing and retaining data in journalism and proposing a new model of hybrid blockchain for journalism, in which the blockchain journalism platform became a distributed database of related articles. They proposed a new Proof of Sharing model with a list of pre-approved journalists who could only submit articles to the chain, a new set of self-regulating consensus rules governing the platform, and finally a personalized article selection mechanism for users – personalized journalism.

In the case when there were a small number of publishing houses on the journalistic market, they behaved monopolistically.

The press had authority over setting agendas, and readers had no choice but to receive the news that the press decided was important to them. At that time, the press called readers 'the masses' and treated them as one mass (Figure 1). A mass by definition is not able to choose the news according to personal wishes (Kim & Yongik, 2018).

When they took positions, it was very difficult for the competition to enter the market, so they could manipulate information as much as they

wanted and lead public opinion in the direction they wanted.

When the Internet came along, the situation changed dramatically (Figure 2). Internet platforms provided users with many more choices, and advertisers were given an additional opportunity to meet consumers, it turned out, in a much more efficient and cheaper way. The development of mobile devices has further expanded this space. People spent more and more time on new media and got used to receiving content on the Internet and mobile phones. "Subscription fees through traditional methods have dropped drastically. Besides, Internet media companies or individual content producers have entered the market, further competing for limited advertising expenditures" (Kim & Yongik, 2018). The struggle for one more click turned journalists to sensationalist news, "easier reading", and even fake and phishing news. As a result, public confidence in the press has declined. "Although it looked like an individual choice, article layouts and recommended algorithms were tightly locked to the secrecy of the platform operators. There was also a problem with privacy protection" (2018). Very soon Web platforms began to resemble traditional centralized monopolistic media, and even treated their users much worse than traditional media, which due to technical limitations did not have a personal relationship with users, as was the case with interactive Web environments.

A common problem in both cases is the power of centralized authorities to conduct editorial policy independently of user interests. Blockchain opens the possibility of a decentralized network, a new relationship between journalists and readers when readers and journalists can meet directly (Figure 3). As we mentioned before, a hybrid blockchain is more appropriate for blockchain journalism than public or private blockchain, because journalists and consumers who participate in the network have different roles. Journalists are professional authors of articles with permission to post such articles while users have the opportunity to read, validate and rank them. Traditional media have had the power to manipulate public opinion. Today's internet platforms place a large number of articles that are influenced and selected by platform operators burdened with censorship, commercial interests, collection of behavioral surplus, etc. Both have led to a drop of public confidence in the press. The common point of both problems is

that centralized government and “In distributed journalism, readers and journalists can meet directly” (Kim & Yongik, 2018). A hybrid, not a public or private blockchain, is suitable for the needs of journalism platforms, because there are heterogeneous participants in the chain. Journalists write articles, validate them and put them on the chain, because they have permission to do so, while users have access to the chain to read articles, rate, recommend and share them. In addition, readers have access to data for all generated articles and can receive news via automated referral algorithms.

“Proof of sharing is the process of getting certified by preapproved journalists to link to an existing article chain when an article is created” (Kim & Yongik, 2018). The number of journalists is not limited and they build their reputation by the quality of articles, evaluations and comments by other journalists and users.

“Journalist A creates a new article. The article goes through a redundant verification procedure for journalist B” (Figure 4). “This is the process of preventing similar articles from appearing many times. Journalist B checks whether the article is truly new” (Kim & Yongik, 2018). Duplicate verification consists of simple comparisons between new and existing articles on the chain. “This does not require any subjective judgment” nor too much engagement (2018). It is enough that one “randomly extracted journalist with an automatic duplicate check can sufficiently judge it” (2018). Then all the other journalists get confirmed articles to which they can leave short comments, which can be positive or negative, or not comment at all. “The more comments that are left in a limited amount of time, the more valuable the article is, and the more it is worth sharing. The time for commenting should be limited to ensure timeliness” (2018).

This process of consensus, Proof of Sharing, differs from mining activities, Proof of Work, and public blockchain, because journalism has different characteristics from the general process of the transaction on the blockchain, for example, money transactions. “An article includes a viewpoint of the reporter looking at the facts. Putting a reporter’s viewpoint in the article does not mean that the article is false, it just conveys one aspect of the fact” (Kim & Yongik, 2018). Therefore, Proof of Sharing is not censorship of the article but the process

of authenticity, whether it is worth sharing or not. As we can never recommend clear criteria for false news due to respect for freedom of expression, the validation of the article continues even after it is posted on the public blockchain, by users and journalists. If the news is found to be false, and this is repeated several times (which is defined by the consensus algorithm), the journalist is removed from the platform. This public part of the blockchain or agora is a public space for comment and argumentation of the participants and remains permanently written on the blockchain.

This setting on the blockchain opens the possibility to select the final set of articles individually, according to the digital identities of the network users. Personalization is done on the basis of the digital identities of consumers who can selectively display information about themselves (education, affinities, gender, age, etc.) when accessing the platform.

Personalized recommendation systems will run almost automatically, unlike platforms or media outlets that have authority over all the agenda settings. This is because the above process is completely independent of agenda settings. Given that a third party cannot control all journalists participating in a blockchain and cannot manipulate all individual agenda settings, it is virtually impossible to control the media and manipulate public opinion in personalized journalism (Kim & Yongik, 2018).

Platforms can be specialized in different spheres of life. From political, economic, cultural, artistic, sports, scientific, health and other topics, with the possibility of segmentation to completely specific interests. Personalized journalism delivers articles with value to share, minimizes the power held by both, traditional journalism and new platform operators and creates a public area, the Agora, where opinions of information users are collected. In this way, the critical public can follow the alienated power and contribute to the overall social development.

User Economy – Model of Journalism Economic Sustainability on Blockchain

Blockchain technologies are surprising, day by day, with their original and innovative solutions related to the models of economic sustainability of the platform. Firstly consider traditional ways, which are subscription and advertising revenue.

Subscription – there is currently very little chance that platform users will accept subscriptions as a way to access information as they are used to receiving it for free. However, they do not count the price they pay by providing their personal and behavioural data that centralized platforms like Facebook very skillfully monetize on the advertising market, and even for the needs of dubious government agencies. There is still a lack of awareness of online privacy's importance and the danger of losing it. However, a subscription can be counted on, partly, if the platform provides the user with significant information for which he is willing to pay. Yet, as the category of incentive is very important for blockchain, i.e. the possibility for the user to earn by using the platform instead of paying, some platforms such as LBRY Odyssey reward users for posting content, comments, sharing and other activities that contribute to the growth of platforms.

Advertising is a proven category on internet platforms because it is based on the misuse and trade of our behavioral data. However, personalized referral systems are very attractive to advertisers who want to increase the effectiveness of their advertising by targeting appropriate consumers who give them their approval in accordance with their digital identity, in order to meet some of their needs. In order to maintain the independence and loyalty of users, blockchain journalism platforms avoid funding from advertisers.

ICO (Initial Coin Offer) is the most attractive financing model that guarantees platform independence and loyalty to the principles of decentralization. Tokenization enables a user economy based on real incentives in the form of exchangeable cryptocurrencies that finally have their equivalent in FIAT currencies, i.e. they have real purchasing power.

NFT (Non Fungible Tokens) can be part of the user economy of the

journalistic platform in the exploitation of

author's photography, video, text, sound and other media content thus controlling and monetizing their use and protecting copyright, therefore digital footprint of author's work in the form of metadata located on the blockchain and smart contracts guarantee that their exploitation will be automatically charged to the author's crypto wallet (Ali & Sikha, 2021).

Finally, we can summarize the areas in which blockchain could improve the work of journalists:

- decentralized publishing platform, without central ownership and control;
- distributed publishing environment to combat censorship;
- financial independence thanks to the ICO (Initial Coin Offer);
- tools for controlling the origin and integrity of content;
- automated market for content and rights management;
- distributed publishing environment without the possibility of someone removing the content;
- widespread cryptocurrency with low or free transactions that facilitates the charge of very small amounts for the use of media products;
- cryptocurrency or token make it easier for media companies to encourage users to collaborate, create and share content.

One of the preconditions for the wider implementation of the blockchain and the economy of users based on micropayments in cryptocurrencies is the number of personal cryptowallets on the blockchain. There are 82.22 million of them so far (Statista, 2022), but this number is expected to grow rapidly with the growth of new decentralized applications and space on the Metaverse.

Information As a User Experience

The basic unit of communication in any media space is information. Conscious experience of information in the act of communication is called user experience. With each new "media sphere that is formed around the dominant medium" (Debre, 2000), the user experience increases and it leads

to a "recomposition of the senses" (Debre, 2000). Also, with an increased cognitive engagement, there is an improvement in a person's intellectual abilities and a deeper understanding of the reality around him. In the modern age, the journalistic profession has played a very important role in organizing information into a user experience, as a precondition for understanding the increasingly complex social reality. The proliferation of information that has come with the Internet and new communication technologies has led to an oversaturation of information and there is still no serious research on how this affects a person's cognitive architecture and ability to understand reality.

The Internet and the "hypersphere" (Debre, 2000) were created on the basis of the third, digital technological revolution. The basic unit that carries information is neither a word, nor a letter, a sound, a picture, but a digit, a binary code made up of one and zero. These binary codes that carry information can be combined indefinitely to create multimedia. The limiting linearity of media content is lost and replaced by layers. This has led to the production of information that not only reflects our reality, but regenerates it, thus increasing the user experience to unimaginable proportions. In the case of information overload, the human cognitive architecture is designed to limit the flow of information into "working memory" (Mayer, 2005). In conditions of increasing the amount of information per unit time, the logical reaction of the cognitive mechanism is to reduce the duration of information. This explains the fact that the generation growing up in the multimedia hypersphere chooses short and poor, and avoids long and complex information, loses the ability to concentrate and focus, the ability to better understand the environment in which lives. It is an excellent base for media manipulation and directing society in the interest of the global technocratic elite.

Topics for Further Research and Reflection

After all, there is a justified question, whether there is information limit and what happens if that limit is exceeded. From the technical point of view, there is no information limit, which is announced by the new generation

of computers, quantum computers. If the basic unit that transmits information in today's computers is a bit, in a quantum computer it is a qubit (quantum bit). The principle of operation of quantum computers is based on the quantum superposition of "basic states" of quantum subatomic particles. Unlike a classic bit that can only be in a state corresponding to 0 or 1 in an electrical circuit, a qubit can be in an infinite number of states at once. From the point of view of human cognitive architecture, there is information limit, and the question arises to what level the quantity of information can be increased at the expense of information content, i.e. simple sensory stimuli in relation to rational reaction to it, and to which moment that man completely loses a real relationship towards its external environment.

These are the challenges of the Metaverse, a virtual 3D space with the possibility of unlimited user experience. What kind of transformation the media and the journalistic profession must experience in order to be functional and play a positive role in this new media space in which, despite all the challenges, a person would remain aware of his external environment and build a rational critical attitude towards events in it? Journalists who become owners of the platform in the future must take into account the cognitive predispositions of users in the conditions of information overload. That is, how to organize information and user experience on the platform, how to motivate and with what incentives to address the audience. Personalized journalism with a well-designed user economy, incentives, consensus mechanism, respect for users and their preferences, could be a solution for the future of journalism. Journalists will have to find their small niche in the Metaverse and run their platform like any other private business. Blockchain technologies already offer great opportunities for the transformation of journalism in that direction.

The metaverse is an evolving concept, but is already finding practical applications on the existing WEB 3.0 network. It will be composed of a series of metaverses, virtual 3D spaces for different purposes and will be shaped as an alternative digital reality, a decentralized collective 3D virtual world in which users will be able to participate in various activities through their digital

avatars. Further development of Metaversum will require even greater user connectivity, improved human interfaces, complete decentralization, powerful Internet infrastructure, independent economy of creators, advanced user experiences with many new contents, which will radically redefine the very concept of media and information. The media industry will have to look for new ways to provide the audience with a direct user experience in the Metaverse, as it will rely less and less on traditional media.

Conclusion

In the ranking made in 2016, blockchain took fifth place in the list of five technologies with an exceptional impact on the further development of the world. After six years, we can state that blockchain has shaken the world. We cannot disagree with the statement of Voinea (2019) that the technical conditions for blockchain technology in journalism have already been created, which will further reflect on culture and society as a whole. Although there is a lot of untapped potential, there is currently no widely accepted blockchain application that would revolutionize journalism. Some existing projects in multiple areas "could distort journalism: monetization, distribution, user feedback, attribution, trust and data retention" (2019). As these platforms evolve, they will become ecosystems, much more than simple websites where people can gather, chat and share content. This social ecosystem, still in its infancy, is fully decentralized and with its user economy, has the potential to reinvent society shortly. The world of the future must be decentralized. Decentralization must stand before us as a lighthouse on the foggy and turbulent sea of the transition of the post-democratic world towards the distribution of power among a much larger number of social actors than has been the case so far. To have a better future, creative thinking about the present must not be burdened with prejudices, especially about new technology, because history has taught us that technological revolutions always precede any social changes (Bajac, 2019). Joseph Lubin, the co-founder of one of the largest DAO platforms, ConsenSys, brilliantly noted that if we want to build better economies and societies, we can't be content

to walk down the "street with posters on sticks" - instead of occupying Wall Street, it would be more useful to "invent our street" (Tappscot, 2016). There is great optimism in the Internet community regarding the possibility of new disruptive technologies to enable a fairer and more humane society, which is currently "sliding" towards an uncertain dystopia.

References


- Ammous, S. (2018). *Bitcoin standard*. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
- Ali, M., & Sikha B. (2021). Introduction to NFTs: The future of digital collectibles. *International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications*, 12(10), 50–53.
https://thesai.org/Downloads/Volume12No10/Paper_7Introduction_to_NFTs_The_Future_of_Digital_Collectibles.pdf
- Bajac, M. (2019). Kulturna prava, kulturna ekonomija i još po nešto [Cultural rights, cultural economy, and more]. *Kultura polisa*, 15(3), 29–41.
- Bjelajac, Ž., & Filipović, A. M. (2018). Uticaj masovnih medija na degradaciju savremenog društva [Influence of mass-media on degradation of contemporary society]. *Kultura polisa*, 15(4), 9–21.
- Bjelajac, Ž. & Merdović, B. (2018). Senzacionalizam u medijima kao uzrok destabilizacije politike suzbijanja kriminaliteta [Sensationalism in media as a cause of destabilization of criminal policy]. *Kultura polisa*, 15(35), 289–300.
- Brekke, J. K. (2019). Disassembling the trust machine, [Unpublished doctoral dissertation Thesis, Durham University, Geography Department].
http://distributingchains.info/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/DisassemblingTrustMachine_Brekke2019.pdf
- Debre, R. (2000). *Uvod u mediologiju* [Introduction to mediology]. Clio.
- Kim, B., & Yongik, Y. (2018). *Journalism model based on blockchain with sharing space*. Sookmyung Women's University in Seoul: School of IT Engineering.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329952663_Journalism_Model_Based_on_Blockchain_with_Sharing_Space/link/5c2578d2a6fdccfc706d10a3/download

- Mayer, E. R. (2005). *The Cambridge Handbook of multimedia learning*. Cambridge University Press.
- Nakamoto, S. (2008). Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system. *Bitcoin*. <https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf>
- Tapscott, D., & Tapscott, A. (2016). *Blockchain revolution*. Penguin Random House.
- Teixeira, L., Amorim, I., Silva, U.A., Lopes J.C., & Filipe, V. (2020). New approach to crowd journalism using a blockchain-based infrastructure. In P. D. Haghighi and I. Salvadori (Eds), *Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Advances in Mobile Computing & Multimedia* (pp. 170–178). Association for Computing Machinery New York.
- Voinea, V. D. (2019). Blockchain for journalism – potential use cases. *Social Sciences and Education Research Review*, 6(2), 244–257.
- Zubof, Š. (2020). *Doba nadzornog kapitalizma*[The age of surveillance capitalism]. Clio.

Appendix

Figure 1.


Centralized system with a monopolistic press



Note. Kim & Yongik, 2018, p. 6.

Figure 2.


Centralized system with highly competitive press and platform operator



Note. Kim & Yongik, 2018, p. 6.

Figure 3.


Distributed hybrid blockchain system for journalism platforms



Note. Kim & Yongik, 2018, p. 7.

Figure 4.

Proof of Sharing Process



Note. Kim & Yongik, 2018, p. 8.

Blokčejn tehnologije i transformacija medija

Momčilo B. Bajac i Maja M. Vojinović

Univerzitet UNION Nikola Tesla u Beogradu

Fakultet za menadžment, Sremski Karlovci

Sažetak

U ovom radu polazimo od pretpostavke da se društvena dinamika i kulturološko-civilizacijski progres ne mogu posmatrati odvojeno od društvene istorije medija kao kompleksnih tehnološko-komunikacijskih struktura. Bavimo se uticajem novih disruptivnih tehnologija DLT (Distributed Ledger Technologies) poznatijim kao blokčejn tehnologije koje zahvaljujući najnovijim tehnološkim rešenjima imaju veliki potencijal za transformaciju medija i novinarske profesije, pa smo zbog toga objasnili tehnološki koncept na kojem se one baziraju. Obrazlažemo koncept personalizovanog novinarstva na blokčejnu i predlažemo model ekonomije korisnika koji garantuje finansijsku održivost platforme. Posmatrajući informaciju kao korisničko iskustvo, razmatramo mogućnost adekvatnog kognitivnog odgovora korisnika u uslovima prezasićenosti informacijama, i iniciramo pitanje struktuiranja informacija u dizajniranju novinarske platforme na blokčejnu, kao ekosistema koji će se distancirati od postojećeg zagađenog medijskog prostora. Na kraju smo predložili temu za dalje promišljanje i naučno istraživanje, a to je najnovija tehnološka tranzicija zasnovana na kvantnom računarstvu, veštačkoj inteligenciji i Metaverzumu, koji će omogućiti potpuno novo korisničko iskustvo u 3D virtualnom prostoru, u kome će se avatari korisnika sve manje oslanjati na tradicionalne medije i novinarstvo kakve danas poznajemo.

Ključne reči: mediji, personalizovano novinarstvo, blokčejn, korisničko iskustvo, ekonomija korisnika

Biotechnology, Digitalization, and Immigration: New Challenges for the Theory and Practice of International Relations

Miša Djurković

Institute of European Studies, Belgrade

Article Information*

Review Article • UDC: 314.742:327

Volume: 19 Issue: 3, pages: 22–43

Received: July 8, 2022 • Accepted: August 4, 2022

<https://doi.org/10.51738/Kpolisa2022.19.3r.22mdj>

Author Note

Miša Djurković  <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4305-8184>

I have no known conflict of interest to disclose.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Miša Djurković,
Institute of European Studies, Trg Nikole Pašića 11, 11000 Belgrade, Serbia.

Email: mdjurkov@gmail.com

* Cite (APA):

Djurković, M. (2022). Biotechnology, Digitalization, and Immigration: New Challenges for the Theory and Practice of International Relations. *Kultura polisa*, 19(3), 22–43.

<https://doi.org/10.51738/Kpolisa2022.19.3r.22mdj>

Abstract

The author deals with the problems of re-examining the theoretical paradigms of international relations in the light of several current practical challenges. The text starts with the presentation of the European continent as a scene of continuous crisis, which means that from the perspective of the theory it must focus on those paradigms that have the best potential for classical crisis management. Then, the problems of biotechnology, digitalization and immigration are examined, which reaffirm the dominant importance of realism in an interesting way. The author illustrates with a series of examples how immigration can become a tool of mass engineering and mutual confrontation between states and other centres of power. Or how the digital sphere and the Internet can be used to undermine the security of states, and what states do to preserve sovereignty over cyberspace in their domain. Finally, what do biological warfare, nanotechnology and drones bring to the practice of international relations? However, it turns out that the theory of realism must also undergo adequate adaptation in order to understand and incorporate the needs of solving new current problems.

Keywords: international relations, theory, biotechnology, digitalization, immigration

Biotechnology, Digitalization, and Immigration: New Challenges for the Theory and Practice of International Relations

The whole cycle of crises that have shaken the European continent for a long period of time, requires a reconsideration of the paradigm of understanding the theory and practice of international relations. It is necessary to examine whether the classical paradigms of the theory of international relations help us to understand the transformation of the modern world. Therefore, we will examine three areas (digitalization, biotechnology, and immigration) that encourage reflection on the significance and evolution of the theory of international relations. The goal is to explore which paradigm helps us the most, as well as the extent to which it must adapt to new challenges.

The Continuous Crisis

The European area has become a space of permanent crises since 2005; in fact, we are already in the eighteenth year of a prolonged crisis situation. It all began with the failure of the draft European Constitution, in 2005, after the citizens of the Netherlands and France rejected the already adopted and signed document in referendums. At the same time, Angela Merkel, whose seventeen years of rule were marked by crisis management, became the head of the German government, and in fact of the entire European Union project, which provided Europe with a very high level of stability in these times of crisis.

The first significant project, pushed forward by Merkel, was the repackaging of the failed Constitution into a new document, the Lisbon Treaty, which amended the basic European treaty. One of the important innovations was the strengthening of the importance of national parliaments, which has become especially important for the political enlargement of the EU (Jančić, 2017, part I). As soon as that was over, a great financial crisis began, and then the economic crisis, which threatened to deeply endanger the very survival of the EU. The European Union has created a significant aid package, saving the systems of Greece, Italy, Ireland, Spain and Portugal, together with the

World Bank. The most significant challenge was the struggle for the survival of the Euro as a currency, which far exceeds only the economic level and is considered an important geopolitical symbol and the instrument of the EU. Despite terrible pressures and incentives from American financial experts and geoeconomic players such as Paul Krugman (Krugman, 2011) or George Soros, the Euro survived and, moreover, began to spread to some other countries in the meantime.

The next big crisis, which has culminated this year, is the Ukrainian Maidan and the opening of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia. After the change of the government in Kyiv, which one side calls a democratic revolution and the other a coup, Russia encouraged the annexation of the strategically important Crimean peninsula, as well as the armed uprising of the Russian population in eastern Ukraine, which led to the formation of two Donetsk and Luhansk republics. Since then they have functioned as separate parts, which are in a constant war of greater or lesser intensity with the Kyiv authorities.

Again, Merkel, along with French President Hollande, did a great job of pacifying this conflict by forming the so-called Minsk Process, which stopped the war and opened negotiations on a possible solution to the crisis. It should be reminded that the foreplay of this event was a failed attempt to bring Ukraine and Georgia into NATO in 2008, which was again stopped by Germany and France, acknowledging Russia's strong opposition. The year 2008 is also important because Priština, with the support of Western powers, and against the will of Serbia, declared its independence, which 5 countries of the European Union did not recognize. Putin then made the famous statement that someone drew a sword that has two ends, and for which it is not known on whose heads it may fall. That same year, Russia intervened, protecting the separatist areas located on the territory of Georgia, and waged a short-lived war with the Georgian army. Thus, the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia and the seizure of Kosovo in 1999 set a precedent for violations of international law on the territory of Europe, which Russia has been using since 2008 in the post-Soviet countries.

Only a year after the Ukraine war, the migrant crisis exploded (Đerić, 2016),

which we will deal with later in more detail. It arose as a result of the so-called Arab Spring, a chain of instability caused by the Americans, British and French as well as the Turks by inciting insurgency, and then by illegal military interventions in Libya, Syria and earlier Afghanistan and Iraq. This caused tectonic shifts of the population toward Turkey, Greece, Italy, Spain, France, and especially toward Germany and Sweden. European asylum and immigration policy has disintegrated, and the rise of the populist right has been fueled, even in the Western European countries.

The next big crisis came in 2016 when Britain decided to leave the Union. This painful process lasted for three years and finally ended in 2019 with the final withdrawal of the first great power from the EU. On the one hand, this brought relief because the British presence was often considered the biggest obstacle to further deepening and strengthening the Union. But on the other hand, it further undermined its credibility, reducing its military importance, GDP, territory and international position. The UK soon after entered into a new military alliance – AUCUS built on the foundations of the Commonwealth.

The UK's exit from the Union came at a time when the first signs of a future pandemic had begun in China. Over the next two years, the EU was dramatically affected by the economic consequences of the health crisis, but at the same time it underwent a huge transformation due to the introduction of new technologies, monitoring, increasing the importance of social networks, the emergence of things like the Cancel Culture etc. Again, the Schengen system of freedom of movement has been seriously called into question, but new things have emerged, such as the geopolitics of vaccination (Raucent, 2021).

Two years later, at the beginning of this spring, the war in Ukraine escalated, which has led to serious frontal battles, sieges of different cities, massive suffering of people and the destruction of buildings and cities. All of this meant that European people are getting used to living in a permanent state of emergency, in which emergency measures, laws, economic solutions

and even the suspension of basic constitutional and international rights are slowly being accepted as necessary. In this article, I will focus on the three aspects highlighted above to show how the theory and practice have had to adapt to new challenges. Constructivist theory of international relations and the theory of liberal institutionalism have recently gone through difficult times and offensive realism seems to offer the most as a paradigm of understanding contemporary world.

German economist Max Otte has been talking about the new Cold War since 2019 – the year that he published a voluminous book *The Breakdown of the World System* (Otte, 2019). Two years earlier, Harvard professor Graham Allison had opened a major controversy with his book *Destined for War: Can China and the United States Avoid Thucydides' Trap?* (Allison, 2017). The current year has brought just that, to the extent that a number of theorists talk about the war in Ukraine as the first proxy war between the United States and China through countries that are on the line of the new Iron Curtain.

In such a situation, global institutions are slowly becoming paralyzed, and everything depends on the direct confrontation and negotiations of the great powers. An interesting example of institutional paralysis is the behaviour of the World Health Organization during the pandemic. Contrary to their recommendations, in fact, each state individually, completely sovereignly adopted measures, and implemented its own regime and policy of lockdown, virus control and vaccination. Moreover, when at one point the Trump administration suspended funding for the WHO, it was taken over by private corporations such as Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, for example, so more than half of the funding of the nominally major international health institution came from private corporations, mostly producers of vaccines and similar pharmacological substances.

Wendt's article (Wendt, 2003) on the inevitability of the creation of a world state clearly indicates the actual irrelevance of constructivism. It seems that in these times we have never been further from that. Brutal realism

based on the long-suppressed terms of war, power, sovereignty, balance of power, geopolitics, struggle for raw materials, etc., emerged as the most relevant framework for understanding international relations, and even European studies at the moment. However, which is also my basic thesis, it must also undergo a serious transformation due to the growing influence of big tech companies, whose products are being transformed from the position of public space into the instruments of political struggle, then the increased influence of biotechnology, including biological weapons, but also the demands of transhumanism and finally issues of uneven fertile development of humanity, which by the force of logic must lead to population overflow and mass immigration.

Digitalization

Let's start with the current war in Ukraine. The decision of Facebook and Meta Corporation to remove from its digital space all posts, attitudes, memes and symbols that are considered pro-Russian or pro-Russian propaganda, and to tolerate the most radical pro-Ukrainian symbols and posts (including controversial symbols of the Azov Battalion which openly uses the swastika symbol), shows the direct alignment of this company on one side of the conflict and the rejection of any community standards other than those that follow the logic of Carl Schmidt, friend-foe. The power of social networks and digital companies like Twitter was felt two years ago by the president of the most powerful country in the world, the United States, Donald Trump, whose Twitter accounts have been suspended.

Digitalization has brought fears of changes in domestic politics, but also in international relations. A few years ago, in the obvious preparations for what is happening in 2022, Russia started experimenting with the so-called closed or unplugged Internet. It is about the possibility that the internal internet traffic becomes completely based on domestic servers and, if necessary, isolated from external communication. Given that a diversion within a country's cyber and digital system can do enormous damage today, each country is taking serious steps toward counterintelligence protection of its own digital, Internet, and cyber systems and space. Hence, other countries are following the Russian example.

Sometime around 2010, the United States formed the Cyber Command as the fourth type of warfare (Savin, 2014, 101). It is assumed that this system has already played a major role in the implementation of the actions of the Arab Spring in the years that followed, operating through Facebook and other social networks. Therefore, non-Western powers began treating Google, Facebook and Twitter as the instruments of American (NATO) intelligence and military action, so they acted accordingly by building protective systems against this type of undermining, which leads to so-called color revolutions and often civil wars. Recent book of Zuboff clearly displayed obvious links of Google and CIA which even had joint ventures (Zuboff, 2022, 130, 132). During my stay in Iran in 2020, I had the opportunity to see photos of cyber warfare centers located in Albania, where hundreds of bots, financed by the USA and France, are waging internet wars on Iranian social networks, leaving comments, etc.

For ten years, therefore, there has been a practice for certain countries that are in conflict with the American administration to temporarily or permanently suspend the work of certain social networks and companies, mostly of American origin, on their territory. China and Turkey are the best-known examples of this practice. But due to the technological progress of China and other countries, the opposite practice was introduced: the ban on TikTok and other Chinese applications in the United States. Amazingly, Americans began to use the discourse that others had been previously using against their companies, especially after Snowden's publications and the Arab Spring. That discourse is based on the claims that the citizens' and consumers' data are also being used for espionage, not only for the needs of business companies, but also for the needs of political and security services.

The most famous recent example is the decision of the Indian authorities to ban dozens of Chinese applications from operating on their territory precisely on the charge of collecting data on their citizens. This year a list expanded, so now it includes 224 apps.

This also raises the question of the relationship between the corporate system, intelligence systems and political and military institutions in the world of cognitive capitalism, about which Shoshana Zuboff recently published a great book.

As it is known, Google, today the most powerful corporation in the world, survived the great dot com crisis in 2000 by starting to sell customer data to large companies (instead of its services to citizens), which then use them to form and adapt their products and their advertising strategy. This opened a new process in which we became goods, while freely leaving information about ourselves, our desires, needs, habits, on social networks and other parts of the Internet, which is all related to the market needs of corporations to adapt the goods to those same users.

Here is just the definition of supervisory capitalism that Zuboff gives at the beginning of her book: „1. A new economic order that claims human experience as free raw material for hidden commercial practices of extraction, prediction, and sales; 2. A parasitic economic logic in which production of goods and services is subordinated to a new global architecture of behavioral modification; 3. A rogue mutation of capitalism marked by concentration of wealth, knowledge and power unprecedented in human history; 4. The foundational framework of a surveillance economy; 5. As significant a threat to human nature in the 21st century as much as industrial capitalism was to the natural world in the 19th and 20th; 6. The origin of a new instrumental power that asserts dominance over society and presents startling challenges to market democracy; 7. A movement that aims to impose a new collective order based on total certainty; 8. An expropriation of critical human rights that is best understood as a coup from above: an overthrow of the people's sovereignty.” (Zuboff, 2022)

The affair with Cambridge Analytica and Facebook have showed that big companies collect everything about us without our knowledge, violating privacy as much as possible, and then sell those reports to the corporations, but also to political entities and intelligence systems that have additional tools and instruments for collecting and processing such data. All this, of course, happens without the knowledge or consent of people who are treated as a commodity and subject to various types of market manipulation. That is why states and courts additionally began to deal with the issue of protecting the privacy of their citizens from this type of predatory and dangerous behavior by external entities, regardless of which sphere or country they come from.

In several recent works, I have thematized these types of social change, starting with the great British TV series *Black Mirror* (Đurković 2020, Đurković 2021). For example, one of the basic problems that has opened up today is the fight for the right to forget and to delete data about us or those that concern us. There are already generations of children whose every moment of life is immortalized on Facebook or some other social network, and all that is often preserved on some eternal clouds without our intention or knowledge. There are countless ways that even the things we post by ourselves can be used against us later on. Many people today are already losing their jobs or are unable to get them because of some photo or post on social media, many are being blackmailed or extorted money, data, services, and the best evidence of this is the fact that according to official textbooks 95% of espionage (including industrial espionage) is performed through publicly available sources.

Let's just mention the fact that the screens of all the devices we use, as well as the cameras with face recognition technology, can be used as tools for spying, surveillance, control, blackmail, etc. What to say about artificial intelligence technologies such as the Alexa device, which will soon be a standard part of the equipment of apartments and houses...

The good old state, if set on the right foundations, remains the best mechanism for the protection of individuals from such attacks, both from the country itself and from outside spheres. The question is how long it will have enough power or mechanisms – and even technological possibilities to deal with the powerful corporations and other external agents.

Biotechnology

Another interesting phenomenon related to the Ukrainian war is the accusation of the Russians, supported by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a claim that 26 military laboratories have been operating in Ukraine since 2014, experimenting with plague, anthrax and SARS viruses for US companies and the military sector. The Chinese claimed that the Americans allegedly have over 300 such laboratories around the world, and that the

US president's son Hunter Biden is connected with these in Ukraine. Russia mentioned that the Germans were also involved in the whole affair. Allegedly, these laboratories also experimented with so-called ethnic weapons, which is something we saw in the last James Bond movie, *No time to die*. Allegedly, genetic material was taken from Ukrainian citizens from the east, which are of the same genotype as in Russia, and based on that, viruses were made that could spread through drones and cause serious diseases and even deaths in entire groups of citizens in Russia.

So far we have not seen physical evidence of these allegations and therefore all this should be taken with a grain of salt. There are claims by American entities that there were some laboratories there, but they refute claims that experiments with such illicit agents have been performed. But in technical terms such things are absolutely possible. Biological weapons are extremely cheap and dangerous, and therefore much greater interest in them can be expected in the future. If it turns out that some country is really doing it near the border of another country, it could really be a *casus belli* from the standpoint of international law, much stronger than the US accusations of producing weapons of mass destruction in Iraq or other cases of preventive war known from recent history.

When we talk about the impact of modern technologies on the change in the paradigm of international relations, we cannot avoid the issue of drones and robots that are being introduced into the war system (Korać, 2019). The last example of the changed nature of the war was in 2021 in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. It is a disputed part of Azerbaijan, inhabited by Armenians, which separated from this state during the collapse of the USSR and has been functioning as a separate entity ever since. In earlier attempts to regain control of the area by military force, Azerbaijani leaders have failed because of an inaccessible terrain where the regular army could not have succeeded. This time, however, Baku's military strategists based their entire strategy on new generation military drones, primarily Turkish Bayraktars and Israeli suicide drones. They managed to bypass and

deceive the outdated anti-aircraft weapons of the Armenians, and thus neutralize the manpower, so after that the Azerbaijani troops advanced without any resistance. Thanks to new technology, the war was resolved in less than two months.

This case was closely followed by everyone in the region, and since then, mass purchases of the latest generation of military drones have started in Europe and especially in that region, as well as a serious update of anti-aircraft systems so that they can spot and neutralize drones.

As is well known, Americans have been using this type of war in the Middle East for more than two decades. Drones that sow death in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, are controlled from command rooms in Washington, Langley and other American cities. Interestingly, they are not run by the Pentagon but by the CIA and private outsourced security corporations. This turns war into video games, and raises a number of ethical and even security issues. Namely, if a drone that e.g. in Afghanistan attacks some military positions is controlled by a man located in an office in some American city, doesn't that make it somewhat legitimate to carry out a terrorist attack on the headquarters where that man is located, because the neutralization of the drone itself is not the same as the elimination of the man who controls it?

This is already introducing a new series of issues of military ethics and the very philosophy of human survival, because it is well known that very soon semi-autonomous or completely autonomous robots such as the army of Star Wars clones will be introduced into military operations. Artificial intelligence in itself opens up horrendous problems, and with its use in the military sphere, the question arises as to whether we are really coming to the brink of survival as a species.

The issue of enhancement or improvement of healthy people as the basis of modern transhumanism is mostly related to military needs and thinking. There are two directions of development in this field. One refers to the physical improvement of physical performance, such as the installation of infrared lenses for soldiers to better see at night and at a longer distance, or enhancement

of their strength and endurance in various ways. The second level of intervention is the design of chemical and similar substances that enable soldiers to function for longer time without sleep, for example, or the suppression of their fear, panic and other forms of natural reactions that often lead to premature reactions and even war crimes. The famous London School of Economics has a special Ideas program for a few years now, which is focused on international relations, and part of the research are issues of biotechnological control of soldiers' behavior in a war environment.

All of this takes on an additional dimension when placed in the context of international relations. States and cultures that refuse to pursue such controversial policies and mechanisms will do worse than those that engage in them. Hence, there will be security pressure for everyone to submit to efficiency orders. Therefore, the Technology Development Division of the Defense Intelligence Agency asked the National Research Council to conduct a special study on the technologies that are being developed and that could potentially endanger the security of the United States. It was published in the publication *Avoiding Surprise in the Era of Global Technology Advances*, issued back in 2005. The focus is on nanotechnologies, brain technologies, techniques that improve the way of communication and the dangers of biological warfare.

The Chinese National Strategy for Military-Civil Fusion from 2019 (Kania, Laskai, 2021) puts the emphasis on biology: they talk about biomaterials, biological weapons, brain-controlling weapons, ethnic-based genetic attacks, and so on. It is indisputable, therefore, that biotechnology is given great importance in military issues today, which changes the focus of technological research and the organization of military forces, and especially national defense.

Finally, it should be reminded that with all the advances in technology in the world, we still do not know whether the Covid 19 virus, which took at least two years of our life, is of natural or artificial origin.

Immigrations

The third important issue that has been re-examining the theory and practice of international relations over the last ten years is the problem of mass immigration. There have been talks before about the problems of biopolitics as challenges for political theory and the theory of international relations. But after the Arab Spring, a huge number of people set out for Europe and Turkey. With a series of wars, almost fifteen million people left their homes. Turkey alone has accepted millions of people on its territory. But the movement of these people across several migrant routes during 2015 caused great political, social, and ideological upheavals. That year, more than a million people entered Germany alone, of which over 90% were young men between the ages of 16 and 30. Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Italy, Spain have also become the ultimate destinations for many of these people.

The appearance of mass immigration at the gates of Europe caused the disintegration of the complete system of Dublin agreements and agreements on asylum and reception of immigrants. Suddenly, there were too many of them, so the European Commission adopted quotas in an attempt to distribute the burden of immigration and asylum seekers. Countries from Eastern Europe, primarily Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, have refused to apply this system, and we have seen a number of states (Bulgaria, Hungary, Croatia) build real barbed wire walls to protect their borders from large numbers of illegal immigrants trying to enter without documents, avoiding procedures and official border crossings. Many blamed Angela Merkel for the crisis, since she was the one to declare an open door policy for immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees, prompted by the demands of the German Chamber of Commerce to accept about 800,000 people a year due to low fertility. But on the other hand, it was discovered that almost all the Twitter accounts that relentlessly called and enticed the immigrants to go to Europe were located in the United States.

Large public debates have opened between those who believe that European nations still have all the rights, including legal ones, to control who

enters the country, how and under what conditions, and those who believe that states are obliged to accept anyone who comes from endangered war affected areas. Hungarian Prime Minister Orban and Polish leaders led the defense of the sovereign law of states, but an anti-immigrant wave rose within Western Europe as well which was called the new radical right or populists. They were part of the government in Finland, Denmark, Bulgaria, Austria and Italy, so there was a lot of talk about the wave of the new populist right (Bakić, 2019).

Namely, the resistance of Europeans was noticed, in which the traditional resistance of the working class against the reduction of wages played an important role, but the dimension of the resistance of Europeans towards the new corporate totalitarianism of nomadization was also significant. In Europe, there is a struggle for everything that draws on the roots of man for home, family, village, cooperative, parish, country, nation and state. Namely, while in the USA the whole system is built on the idea that children at the age of 18 leave home to study, work or start their own families, in Europe people are still much more attached to their environment, family and specific community. The arguments of this broad movement claim that the basis of any totalitarianism, as Franz Neumann (Neumann, 1974, p. 208) said, is the destruction of the community and the individualization of a man who, when left alone, becomes less brave, less secure and less motivated to fight for his rights and the rights of his children, family and community.

Within these debates, the hypothesis that immigration movements can be used as a mass weapon was opened. A frequent argument was that even the Arab Spring was initiated precisely with the aim to move the population and bring new inhabitants to aging Europe, inhabitants who will be able to work tomorrow, to give birth, but also to change the composition of the European space. On December 17, 2008, French President Sarkozy said: „What is our goal? The goal is to mix races. Mixing races from different nations is a major challenge for the 21st century. It is not a choice, but an obligation... We will all change at the same time – economic leaders, governments, political parties, we will all be committed to that goal. If people do not agree to this

voluntarily, then governments will have to impose this change by force" (Gottfried, 2021, p. 150). In 2008, two years before the Arab Spring, Kelly McGreenhill of Harvard University published an article entitled „Strategically Engineered Migration as a Weapon of War" (McGreenhill, 2008).

Let us also show a recent concrete example of the use of migrants as weapons in the fight between the two countries. After the attempt of the so-called colored revolution in Belarus failed last year, after the presidential elections, when the opposition, with the help of Western structures and great assistance from Poland, tried to protest and forcibly overthrow Lukashenko, he took revenge by organizing massive coming of migrants to the Polish border and encouraged them in November to attack and illegally invade the territory of that country. They were mostly Kurds who came from Egypt by direct airline to Minsk: their voyage was organized by a travel agency that promised to bring them directly to the EU border, thus making it much easier for them to reach Germany as their main destination. These people were brought to the Polish border in an organized manner, spent their nights outdoors in the cold and fought with Polish border forces and even the army in an effort to enter the country by force.

A few years ago, there was a similar case with Egypt and Israel, when the Palestinians dug tunnels in an organized manner and moved between Egypt and the Gaza Strip. The most interesting was the position of Turkish President Erdogan, who on several occasions threatened Europe by stating that he would unlock his doors, that is, encourage people from the camps to move towards Europe and flood it. It was a kind of blackmail that enabled him to get significant funds from the EU on a couple of occasions, as well as other benefits for his country. One of his most famous statements is the one when he told his citizens: "Go to Europe, have children and it will be yours" (Goldman, 2017).

But the very nature of different fertility rates and the average age of the population call for a mass influx of people from one part of the world to another. The fertility rate in Italy is 1.1, and the average age of the population

is 44 years. Apart from Europe, the situation is similar in the Far East. In Japan, the median age is 48, and among women it is 50. South Korea has a population of about 50 million people with the fertility rate that is currently around 0.7 and decreasing, which means that children are almost never born. Eastern Europe is emptying, and most Muslim countries have entered a process of demographic transition too. Iran dropped to 1.7, which is slightly higher than the European average.

On the other hand, the median age in Africa and some Asian countries where children are still being born in big numbers is astonishingly low: Angola 16, Afghanistan 19, Cameroon 18, Congo 16, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal all under 20, etc. Economic crises, war conflicts and natural disasters are the traditional triggers that make large masses of this young population move to richer and less populated parts of the world. As we have seen, some subjects have reasons to encourage and direct these processes.

Conclusion

These few examples have shown how even the classical paradigms of the theory of international relations are forced to adapt to new phenomena that threaten to change the essence of the human being. All this is happening within the framework of the transformation of the world into a multipolar one, so the paradigms of Cold War thinking based on the balance of fear are also returning (the new anti-Chinese alliance AUCUS). Many interpret the current war between Russia and Ukraine as the first proxy war between two future blocs, the Chinese and the American.

However, the fact that the greatest representative of the theory of offensive realism, Chicago professor John Mearsheimer, whose approach we use here as the most reliable model of the realistic theory of international relations (Mearsheimer, 2001) experienced terrible attacks from the so-called Cancel Culture because of his clear, logic-based views on the causes of war in Ukraine is really indicative for the state of science and free speech nowadays. This went so far that the students of the University of Chicago

where he teaches organized petitions to deny him the right to public speech and lectures and to expel him from the university. A similar thing happened during the Covid19 pandemic to the famous Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben, who rebelled against the idea of forced vaccination and turning the world into the dystopia he has been writing about for the past few decades. The label of anti-vaxer, conspiracy theorist, etc. was instantly attached to him. The situation is not much better in Russia and Ukraine due to the war. China, which is at the forefront of technological uses of surveillance systems, non-cash payments, and very controversial ideas such as social credit, also does not provide a model of academic and public free society.

So the most frightening thing is that we are once again forced to defend, above all, the basic freedom to be able to talk about problems, and to investigate, without being threatened with punishment, cancellations or even imprisonment. In Swedish schools, for example, it is no longer allowed to teach children the difference between truth and false, beautiful and ugly, etc., so you must not use objective categories. So what's the point of science if one is not allowed to talk about the search for truth or wisdom?

References

- Allison, G. (2017). *Destined for war: Can China and the United States avoid thucydides' Trap?*. Mariner Books.
- National Research Council. (2005). *Avoiding surprise in the era of global technology advances*. The National Academies Press.
<https://doi.org/10.17226/11286>
- Bakić, J. (2019). *Evropska krajnja desnica*. [European radical right]. Clio.
- Despotović, Lj. (2016). *Geopolitički i demografski aspekti aktuelne migrantske krize* [Geopolitical and Demographic Aspects of the Current Migrant Crisis]. *Kultura polisa*, 13(31), 11–28.
- Djerić, G. (Ed.). (2016). *Spatial demarcation: Between the politics of fear and effect on a purse*. Institute of European Studies, Belgrade.
- Djurković, M. (2020). 'Black mirror' and Covid 19: Biotechnological challenges for intercultural thinking. *Filosofskii polilog*, 1(7), 39–54.
- Djurković, M. (2021). Black mirror, enhancement and the impossibility of forgetting. *Disputatio Philosophica*, 23(1), 23–41.
- Goldman, R. (2017, March 18). 'You are the future of EU,' Erdogan tells Turks. *The New York Times*.
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/17/world/europe/erdogan-turkey-future-of-europe.html>
- Gottfried, P. (2021). *Antifascism – the course of a crusade*. Northern Illinois University Press.
- Greenhill, K. M. (2008). Strategic engineered migration as a weapon of war. *Civil Wars*, 10(1), 6–21.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13698240701835425>
- Jančić, D. (Ed.). (2017). *National parliaments after the Lisbon treaty and*

the Euro crisis. Oxford University Press

- Kania, E., & Laskai, L. (2021). *Myths and realities of China's military –civil fusion strategy*. Center for a New American Security.
<https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/myths-and-realities-of-chinas-military-civil-fusion-strategy>
- Korać, S. (2019). *Disciplinsko ratovanje u doba dronova i robota* [Disciplinary warfare in the age of drones and robots]. Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade.
- Krugman, P. (2011, January 12). Can Europe be saved? *The New York Times Magazine*.
<https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/magazine/16Europe-t.html>
- Mearsheimer, J. (2001). *The tragedy of great power politics*. W. W. Norton & Company
- Neumann, F. (1974). *Demokratska i autoritarna država* [Democratic and authoritarian state]. Naprijed.
- Raucent, E. (2021, August 6). La géopolitique des vaccins, attention chasse gardée! [Vaccine geopolitics, beware!]. Centre Permanent pour la Citoyenneté la Participation (CPCP).
<http://www.cpcp.be/publications/geopolitique-vaccins>
- Rustamzade, A., & Valiyev, A. (2021). Drones and special forces. *Baku dialogue*, 5(2), 90–109.
- Otte, M. (2019). *Der Weltsystemcrash, Krisen, Unruhen und die Geburt einer neuen Weltordnung*[Crash of the world system, crises, unrest and a New world order birth]. Finanzbuch.
- Savin, L. V. (2014). *Od šerifa do teroriste* [From sheriff to terrorist], MIR Publishing.
- Wendt, A. (2003). Why a world state is inevitable?. *European Journal of*

International Relations, 9(4), 491–542.

<https://doi.org/10.1177/135406610394001>

Zubof, Š. (2021). *Doba nadzornog kapitalizma* [The age of surveillance capitalism], Clio.

Biotehnologija, digitalizacija i imigracija: novi izazovi za teoriju i praksu međunarodnih odnosa

Miša Đurković

Institut za evropske studije, Beograd

Sažetak

Autor se bavi problemima preispitavanja teorijskih paradigmi međunarodnih odnosa u svetlu nekoliko aktuelnih praktičnih izazova. Počinje se od prikaza evropskog kontinenta kao poprišta kontinuirane krize, što znači da se i iz perspektive teorije mora usmeriti na one paradigme koje imaju najbolji potencijal za klasični krizni menadžment. Zatim se istražuju problemi biotehnologije, digitalizacije i imigracije koji na zanimljiv način reafirmišu dominantni značaj realizma. Autor nizom primera ilustruje kako imigracije mogu postati oruđe masovnog inženjeringa i međusobnih obračuna država kao i drugih centara moći. Ili kako se digitalna sfera i internet mogu koristiti za podrivnje bezbednosti država, te šta države rade da bi sačuvale suverenitet nad sajber prostorom u svom domenu. Konačno, šta praksi međunarodnih odnosa donose biološki ratovi, nanotehnologije i dronovi. Pokazuje se međutim da i teorija realizma mora da doživi adekvatnu adaptaciju da bi razumela i inkorporirala potrebe rešavanja novih aktuelnih problema.

Ključne reči: međunarodni odnosi, teorija, biotehnologija, digitalizacija, imigracija

Strengthening the Global Importance of China's Economy in the Post-Pandemic Period

Goran Nikolić¹ and Jelena Zvezdanović Lobanova²

¹Institute of European Studies, Belgrade

² Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade

Article Information*

Review Article • UDC: 338.1:616.98(510)

Volume: 19 Issue: 3, pages: 44–75

Received: June 28, 2022 • Revised: July 16 2022 • Accepted: July 20 2022.

<https://doi.org/10.51738/Kpolisa2022.19.3r.44nzi>

The article was written within the Research Program of the Institute for European Studies and the Institute of Social Sciences for 2022 supported by the (Serbian) Ministry of Education, Science, and Technological Development. Nikolić (IES) is engaged in the project Serbia in the processes of European integration: global context, institutions, and identity (no. 179014). Zvezdanović Lobanova (IDN) is engaged in project no. 47010 Social Transformations in the Process of European Integration – A Multidisciplinary Approach. Both projects are financed by the (Serbian) Ministry of Education, Science, and Technological Development.

Author Note

Goran Nikolić  <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9312-2194>

Jelena Zvezdanović Lobanova  <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3159-3331>

We have no known conflict of interest to disclose.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Goran Nikolić, Institute of European Studies, Trg Nikole Pašića 11, 11000 Belgrade, Serbia. Email: goranvnikolic@gmail.com

* Cite (APA):

Nikolić, G., & Zvezdanović Lobanova, J. (2022). Strengthening the Global Importance of China's Economy in the Post-Pandemic Period. *Kultura polisa*, 19(3), 44–75.

<https://doi.org/10.51738/Kpolisa2022.19.3r.44nzi>

Abstract

Despite a pandemic that has brought most of the global economy to its knees, Chinese economic growth continued in 2020 and strongly accelerated in 2021. An almost certain scenario in which China is becoming the leading world economy already brings strong geopolitical implications, primarily in the form of shaking the existing world order, which is practically managed by Washington. The key reason for the strong growth of China's economy is the high share of both savings and investments in GDP (over two-fifths each) in a very long period, together with its impressive technological progress. In this regard, the direct reason for the current tension between the two countries is China's economic transformation towards the upper end of global industrial value chains. Attempts to end China's economic expansion through forced technological unbundling, US trade sanctions, or forced changes in global supply chains, seem doomed to failure given its vast internal market and conquest of entire product ranges or supply chains. America will continue with its efforts to maintain primacy over China in the basic technologies of the future, from artificial intelligence to quantum computing, with the help of huge investments in science. Although the US and China are not necessarily on the path of confrontation, this certainly cannot be ruled out. The aim of this paper is to project the future of the American and Chinese economies' dynamics of GDPs. The applied methodology is based on a linear projection of the GDP growth of both countries in the period after 2026.

Keywords: pandemic, economic growth, GDP, China, USA, competition

Strengthening the Global Importance of China's Economy in the Post-Pandemic Period

The challenges faced by the world in the conditions of the COVID-19 pandemic have produced different reactions from countries, which, in addition to direct positive effects, also led to the exposure of the shortcomings of global and national societies (Bjelajac & Filipović, 2020, p. 9; Filipović & Bjelajac, 2020, p. 147). Almost no one during the fierce trade war imposed by the US expected Chinese merchandise exports to break the record in 2020, and intensively to grow in 2021 also. However, China's economic recovery from the coronavirus pandemic has been blunted by a global shortage of shipping containers that have raised transportation costs and slowed manufacturers in fulfilling fast-moving goods orders around the world. Due to the Chinese container trade balance (export of three containers for each imported) and delays in containers returning to China due to the pandemic, a large shortage makes exports difficult (Reuters, 2020). Closely related to the export trend is the economic growth, which cumulatively increased by 10.4% in 2020–2021 (IMF, 2022). Wilhelm & Au (2020) point out that the pandemic has shown how strong China's supply chains are, and they expect the three areas to boost China's economic development (learning from Huawei's R&D investment, developing agencies modelled on Germany's Fraunhofer Institutes, and further opening capital markets). Kang and Chen (2020) state that the pandemic encourages the acceleration of trends that existed before, and that, in addition to pandemic control and the return of society to normal, innovation and digitalization enabled the resumption of strong economic growth in China. According to the McKinsey and Company Report (2020, 5–7), the sense of confidence sparked by achieved results in pandemic control has encouraged Chinese retailers to return to the growth path, which showed the potential of Chinese consumers to lead not only domestic economic recovery but also global.

China has finally managed to connect more economically with its regional neighbours. At the ASEAN summit in November 2020, an agreement was

established: the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which brings together 15 Asia-Pacific countries covering almost a third of the world's population and global GDP (making it the world's largest trading bloc). This, among other things, means that the countries of East and Southeast Asia no longer have to look for primarily Western trade partners. Although China is by far the largest economy within the RCEP, it would be wrong to see that agreement as a Chinese endeavour, because the real driving force of the negotiations (started in 2011) was ASEAN. It is indicative that China, Japan, and South Korea joined forces in a trade agreement for the first time. The RCEP is impressive primarily because of its scale, while in essence, it is less comprehensive than similar trade agreements, perhaps because of the extreme heterogeneity of the participating countries (from rich Australia, through developing economies like Thailand, to poor states like Laos and Myanmar). The RCEP is a de facto framework for the trade aspects of their relations and it foresees, among other things, moderate and relatively slow reductions in tariffs, bureaucracy reduction, a simpler framework for intellectual property and investment rights (harmonization of standards and guidelines on origin rules are agreed, as well). The production in the region is likely to be strengthened, to the regional companies' benefit. The RCEP is also important because for most countries in the region it is important to maintain a balance between China and the US in their foreign, trade, and security policies (Günther, 2020).

Fischer (2020) sees 2020 as an extremely successful year for China, in the context of a wider 20th-century global transition dominated by the United States in the 21st century when he expects Chinese dominance (although things did not look like that at first, with an epidemic grew into a pandemic in early 2020, with the continuation of the trade war with the US, and the "violent" suppression of protests in Hong Kong). He sees the RCEP as a "geopolitical coup" that, according to the author, will put China at the centre of the world's largest free trade area, linking China's vast market to that of the ASEAN, including important US allies such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand (India could join later), with the only important regional player left out – the US. According to him, a

new geopolitical reality will come with the new free trade zone; a network of dependencies will form around China, strengthening its position in the region of Indo-Pacific. As China emerges stronger from this year's crisis, America is weaker with far-reaching geopolitical consequences, and without the eventual renewal of US global leadership under Biden, China will be well on its way to becoming the world's dominant power. What Chinese hegemony might look like, this author tries to present through a diplomatic precedent at the end of 2020, when Beijing dictated 14 points to Australia, demanding that it "correct the mistakes" it made in bilateral relations.

So, China seems to be acting confidently, with an economy recovering, modernizing its military, accelerating technological development, and expanding diplomatic influence around the world. However, Blumenthal (2020) sees China as both an assertive and an ambitious force, but also one with fundamental weaknesses that could slow its rise. He sees a number of economic, social, and political challenges facing Beijing, including the growing demographic crisis, slowing GDP growth due to the re-strengthening of the state's influence over the economy, capital flight (with rich Chinese going abroad with hundreds of billions of dollars), environmental degradation, and the possibility for the country of falling into the "middle-income trap". On the other hand, this author perceives the ambitions of that country as global, and by no means regional. China wants to lead a new world order based on its own power and governed by Beijing. The Communist Party of China (CPC) considers the Sino-centric international order essential (China's self-perception as the natural centre of the world has always served as an important source of domestic legitimacy).

The issue arises whether the most populous country in the third decade of this century will continue its dramatic rise, threatening the existing American-led order and whether the Covid-19 pandemic will eventually accelerate that process. In an attempt to answer this question, we will first analyze the most important economic indicator of the size of an economy: Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

The key research question we are trying to answer here is whether China will continue its dramatic rise in the 2020s, threatening the existing US-centric

global order and whether the Covid-19 pandemic will further accelerate that process. More precisely, the key hypothesis we are trying to prove is that the size of the Chinese economy measured by GDP (at market rates) will become larger than that of the US in 2028.

The applied methodology is based on a linear projection of GDP growth of the two countries in the period after 2026, or in the period starting from 2022 to 2028. The first projection implies identical nominal growth in each year during the period 2026-2029 (which follows a far more complex estimate made by the IMF by 2026) is of course a simplification of a far more complex reality. However, given that is a short period of time, the possibility of error is reduced to probably no more than one percentage point. The second projection is based on the assumed repetition (starting in 2022) of cumulative nominal GDP growth in 2015–2021 in both countries, which is a method with a slightly higher possibility of error.

The aim of this paper is to project the future dynamics of the GDP of the two leading world economies. Namely, based on data on GDP trends of the US and China economies taken from the IMF (with IMF projections until 2026), with additional calculations by the authors, we calculated the size of GDP and GDP PPP for the two economies, and we expressed the same data as the share of Chinese GDP in the US's GDP. The mentioned methodology is based on reference data (IMF 2022, IMF 2021, IMF 2020) referring to the size of the GDP of China and the US, as well as their projections until 2026. The authors assume that nominal GDP growth achieved in 2026 will be maintained over the next three years, or that nominal GDP growth in 2015–2021 will be repeated in the period 2022–2028 (for both economies). Given that nominal GDP growth incorporates addition to real GDP growth, the GDP deflator, and possible exchange rate changes, this approach is methodologically acceptable.

The purpose of this paper is to bring it closer to the scientific public perhaps the key economic dynamics that are already shaping and will shape the global (economic) order – the strong rise of one non-Western country with all the implications for smaller economies like Serbia. The potential scientific contribution of the paper is the author's attempt to analyze a topic that is of great importance not only

for the world economy but also for the position of our country in the very near future. In addition to the mentioned scientific contribution, the work can be interesting and useful to the wider professional and academic population as well, especially having in mind that the topic we are dealing with is widely present in journalism and public discourse in general.

The contribution of this paper is the analysis of a topic that in our academic public, in spite of the numerous implications for Serbia, does not have enough attention. Namely, since the change in the global economic constellation implies changed geo-economic dynamics, this text could optimistically help other scientists, especially Serbian ones, to further research the same topic. The limitation of the research is the focus on only one, i.e. two indicators, which, despite being the most important indicators of the size of the economy, are not enough to see the overall economic and geopolitical status of the two main world actors. In addition, the projection of GDP trends, especially the part done by the authors of this text, carries a risk in terms of accuracy.

In addition to the introductory part and the conclusion, the paper contains the following chapters: Literature review; Accelerating of the "catching-up" process; The effects of the expected slowdown in global trade to China; The position of the new American administration towards China. At the very end, the sources used are listed.

Review of Literature

China's economic rise has led many authors around the world to analyze how long the expansion could last and whether the country's economy could become a global leader.

The projection of HSBC Holdings Plc (Kennedy, 2018) indicates that this will happen in 2030. The authors of the scientific analysis for the PwC (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2019, pp. 19-20) believe that China's economy will be larger than the American one before 2030 while regarding GDP PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) China is already since 2014 the largest economy in the world (followed by the US, EU27, India). The CEBR study (2019, p. 75)

indicates that China could become the world's largest economy somewhat later, 2033: the projection is based on relatively moderate growth rates of 5.4% 2019–24, 5.2% 2024–29, and 4.3% 2029–34). The OECD study (2018, p. 8), which is less optimistic for China, estimates that China's share of world GDP will peak in the 2030s at about 27% of world GDP – well above the US share. Huang (2020) is also cautious about Beijing's capacity, believing that the perception that Beijing is on its way to becoming the world's No. 1 is based on problematic assumptions – that rapid GDP growth will continue, and that the size of GDP can be equated with the strength of the country. The author points out that China's GDP growth has been slowing continuously since 2007, but there are doubts about how the Chinese official statistics calculate the data. In addition, he states that the increase in GDP is closely related to the "bubbles" in the real estate market, speculation and publicly invested capital investments, all of which lead to excessive capacities and a high volume of non-performing loans. Huang (2020) emphasizes that even if China's GDP exceeds that of the US, it does not mean that this country will be as strong and rich as the US, because GDP alone cannot necessarily indicate an improvement in individual well-being (and even then GDP per capita would be over four times lower than in the US, due to the difference in population between the two countries).

The British Center for Economic and Business Research (CEBR) indicates that China will overtake the US as the world's largest economy in 2028 due to the pandemic (BBC, 2020; CEBR, 2020). According to CEBR, Beijing has gained an advantage due to the early control of COVID-19, as well as due to planned policies regarding technologically advanced industries. When it comes to the year of the famous "catching up", the assessment of Homi Kharas, an associate of the Brookings Institution (Bloomberg, 2021), is identical.

Accelerating of “Catching-Up” Process

The question is: whether the world's most populous country will continue its dramatic rise in the third decade of this century, threatening the existing order

led by the US and whether the Covid-19 pandemic will possibly accelerate that process? In an attempt to answer this issue, we will first analyze the most important economic indicator of the size of an economy: Gross Domestic Product – GDP.

If we look at the official IMF projections (IMF, 2020) (Table 1) and assume that the US and China will maintain nominal GDP growth from 2025 for the next three that is five years, respectively, which is a realistic assumption (although it is possible that both countries have a slight slowdown in growth), as early as 2028 China's GDP will surpass that of the US (by almost 1%). This implies that even in the event of somewhat slower growth of the Chinese economy, it would still become larger that same year than the American one (Figure 1).

When it comes to GDP by Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), it will be 54.4% higher than the American one in the same year (catching up, according to this indicator, had already happened during the second decade of the 21st century). In 2028, China's GDP per capita will be at 37.1% of the US's (and two-fifths of the US's two years later), while GDP per capita will be almost a quarter of the US's (exactly 24.2%), with a tendency for further constant growth. In any case, what is becoming increasingly certain is not whether the Chinese economy will become the world's largest by the most important economic measure of the size of the economy, but only when that will happen. Exceptions are possible, but it is not realistic for them to be higher than a few percentage points except in the case of very sudden extraordinary circumstances.

Recent IMF data (IMF, 2022; IMF, 2021) practically confirm these conclusions, together with the upward correction of China's GDP to 18 000 bn. \$ for 2021 (Tang & Wang, 2022). Taking into account projections of GDP growth of China and the US until 2026 (given in the IMF's October report 2021) we are coming to the conclusion that in 2026 China will lag only 8.3% behind the US in terms of GDP. Consequently, the growth of the nominal GDP of both countries achieved in 2026, which would be repeated in the next three years, would lead to China's GDP becoming 1.6% higher than that of the US. In the alternative projection we have done, the nominal growth rates of China and the US achieved in the six years to 2021 would be

repeated in the next six years. According to that scenario, already in 2028, China is a leading world economy.

What is interesting is that the first such calculations of one of the authors of this article from 2010 indicated the end of the 2020s as a period of famous catching up, which is practically indistinguishable from the projections in this article written more than a decade later (Nikolić, 2010, 86–98), while the more recent prediction was almost the same (Nikolić and Malović, 2020, 474). Tables 1 and 2 show, in addition to GDP, other major economic indicators of both countries, while Graph 1 shows the expected trajectory of GDP movements of China and the US from 2020 to 2030. What needs special attention when looking at these tables is the very high level of investment and savings in Chinese GDP (twice as high as in the US), which actually almost completely explains its high growth rates (Tables 1 & 2).

In this regard, the so-called "circular growth" strategy, an attempt to shift the economy more to domestic demand, is a consequence of a long-term threat to China's investment and export-led growth model. Although the sustainability of the model has been questioned over the last two decades, the country's development strategy has remained virtually the same. Despite the fact that Beijing periodically tried to make the economy more dependent on domestic demand, that effort always ended with more investment, primarily in infrastructure (resulting in a capacity expansion that made China even more export-dependent). Namely, the investments are not final demand; when the government initiates investments by mobilizing resources, it leads to less income for households and consequently less consumption. After each investment boom, the government must promote exports to absorb excess capacity. Investments in new technologies mean higher productivity and that explains China's competitiveness, which decreases with each additional injection of capital. This is the main reason why China has slowed down under the same growth model. Related to this, an additional problem is the trade war with the US, which could redirect exports elsewhere, which will require its price competitiveness, hindering the development of the local middle class. Namely,

the disposable income (of both the average Chinese and as a share of GDP) in 2019 was 43%. It is clear that at such a low relative level of income, consumption hinders economic growth, which makes exports more important. As the pandemic brought down domestic consumption, the Chinese economy has become even more dependent on exports, and Beijing's concerns are understandable. With Covid-19's vaccine, global production will normalize and China will face more competition, while reduced monetary and fiscal stimulus in rich countries will reduce their import demand, which could cause a decline in Chinese exports. In response, it appears that Beijing will again seek new ways to subsidize exports, which in turn will lead to a reduction in disposable income (Xie, 2020).

What will certainly alleviate the problems facing Beijing is the strong growth of the digital economy, which began well before the pandemic (already in 2018 accounting for 34.8% of GDP, with 191 million jobs – representing a quarter of total employment). The digital economy is caused by years of growth that have outpaced GDP growth, even though it is only close to one-third the size of the US digital economy. The pandemic-induced crisis will strengthen the growth trend of the digital economy, as the pandemic has damaged many businesses and industries, while greatly accelerating the application of digital technologies. Households have adopted applications that have enabled them to purchase food online, schools and universities have reoriented to online lectures, and companies are increasingly using digital tools to operate their business. A similar digital transformation affects, in addition to health, the Chinese financial industry (for example, Chinese mobile banking applications have 562 million users). Among the main beneficiaries of these new jobs are young, educated Chinese, and this is probably the reason why urban unemployment has not increased significantly in recent years. The process of digital transformation will accelerate in the coming years, also due to the government's planned investments in new infrastructure, including 5G networks and data centres, which will reduce China's lag (behind the West) in some key technologies (June, 2020a).

Digitization will also affect the improvement of the global status of

the Chinese currency. Namely, although the Yuan is not yet open for trading and does not pose an immediate threat to the dominance of the dollar, China's approval of some kind of payment in the national crypto-currency will pose a direct challenge to the US. The size of China's domestic market, together with the widespread use of mobile payments and their importance in global trade could trigger the widespread adoption of the "crypto Yuan". Although so far much attention in the technological war between Beijing and Washington has been focused on Huawei, control over the world's financial structure will be of greater importance – and China's efforts in crypto-currencies have given it a great advantage in this area (Arduino, 2020).

Connected with currency, the liberalization of the financial system, and the timely response to Covid-19, have boosted confidence in the yuan and increased demand from global investors looking to diversify dollar portfolios. Additionally, the global pandemic has finally revived Chinese capital markets, with an inflow of as much as \$150 billion in 2020. The benchmark stock index (CSI 300) rose 27% during the year, outperforming the S&P 500 by 13 percentage points. Chinese 10-year government bonds yield over 3%, three times more than US ones (Lockett and Hale, 2020).

The effects of the expected slowdown in global trade on China

Related to China's positioning in the post-pandemic period, this time in a negative context, global trade is very likely to slow down in the post-pandemic world, which could be a serious problem for the world's leading exporter (China). While much of the economic activity (health, housing, and utilities) is not traded internationally, what is widely traded such as cars, electronics, and tourism services will continue to decline sharply. Industry 4.0 (growing automation and data exchange in manufacturing technologies, including cyber-physical systems, internet of things, cloud computing, and smart factories) already had a negative impact on world trade before the pandemic (trade in services grew faster, probably reflecting the emergence of Industry 4.0 as well as the US-China trade war). The question is what is the possible evolution

of supply chains and international trade in the medium and long term after the pandemic i.e. will there be lasting changes in international trade after the recovery of the global economy? Possible long-term effects on trade could be changes in the structure of demand; the acceleration of Industry 4.0; and protectionism clothed in matters of national security. Life will almost certainly return to the new normal, with some permanent changes in the structure of demand. People in rich countries can work more from home, reducing the demand for cars and gasoline, office, and retail space. This will put pressure on raw materials, which will positively affect China as its leading importer. The three industries with wide value chains especially important for developing countries are cars, electronics, and clothing. Higher demand for electronics is expected, and lower for cars and clothing in the post-pandemic world. Demand for health and care for the elderly is likely to increase. These are immigrant-dependent industries, especially in advanced economies, but also in China regionally, which is a problem that Beijing will easily overcome, given that China's rural population still numbers about 400 million people (which is well above the standards for the country of this income level). Yet, probably the biggest risk to trade for developing countries, especially China, is growing protectionism in advanced economies, especially the US. Before the pandemic-induced recession, the US charged customs duties of about 25% on about half of imports from China, so that a certain amount of final operations in electronics, clothing, and footwear had already been redirected to countries such as Vietnam, Indonesia, and Mexico. As a result, China's exports to the US fell, but China's exports to other developing countries rose (ASEAN became China's first trading partner, with the US falling to 3rd place, with the EU in 2nd place). China has already moved to the middle of many value chains, producing machines and components of medium technology, which are then exported to countries that perform the final assembly. The risk for China is that Washington's new administration will find a way to make protectionism more effective because tariffs directed at China have not fulfilled the planned goals (the US trade deficit continues

to grow, which is expected, because it is affected by the difference between savings and investments). Also, so far there has been no return of production to the US, and China's share in world exports continues to grow. A recent survey of American companies in China showed that almost no one is thinking about returning home, while about one-seventh is thinking about redirecting some products to lower-paid countries. Additionally, there is a risk of an increase in protectionism in China, as the "double circulation" policy may suggest (Dollar, 2020).

Jun (2020b) highlights that concerns about the dependence of global production on China have prompted calls to expel that country from global supply chains. But, contrary to popular belief, the country's continuous economic growth is not so much dependent on maintaining a global free trade system and access to Western technology. Instead, the real drivers of China's economy over the last decade have been rapid growth in purchasing power and investment – including in the country's technology sector. Politicians in the West still think that the most effective way to combat China is by targeting its position in global supply chains. However, the already serious impact of the global financial crisis in 2008 forced China to accelerate its "change of focus" by developing a more integrated huge domestic market and promoting growth driven by "(internal) dual circulation". Such efforts have gained new momentum in recent years as a result of escalating trade frictions with the US and the recognition that China's continued economic expansion requires overcoming structural imbalances. The government has not only liberalized imports but has also begun to allow foreign penetration of financial markets and other non-tradable sectors while facilitating cross-border capital flows. The construction of large networks of information and communication infrastructure is subsidized and private companies are encouraged to innovate in the most modern sectors such as mobile payments, e-commerce, the internet of things, smart manufacturing. All this indicates that it is a naive belief that forced technological decoupling, trade sanctions or forced changes in global supply chains will end the future economic expansion of the most populous country.

Dollar (2020) believes that the worst-case scenario would be the division of the world into the American and Chinese spheres, with developing countries being forced to choose. The best hope for resolving all these risks is new trade agreements that would reflect an open trading system. It is desirable to amend the provisions of the World Trade Organization (WTO) regarding cross-border data flows, services, protection of intellectual property rights, and subsidies to state-owned enterprises.

The position of the new American administration toward China

Although it is more multilateral in nature than Trump, Biden is under pressure to be harsh on China, especially when it comes to technology (Zhou, 2020). Pei (Pei, 2020) believes that the development of an effective strategy for cooperation, competition, but also coexistence with China is one of the most difficult foreign policy challenges for the new American president. Biden is unlikely to change the basic tenets of Trump's Chinese policy. Namely, China will remain the most important American geopolitical opponent, and maintaining its rise will be the main principle of US foreign policy for the foreseeable future. However, Biden's policy toward China is significantly different from Trump's. His strategic calculation is that the Sino-American conflict will be a decades-long marathon, the outcome of which will primarily depend on whether the US can maintain and strengthen its competitive advantages: economic dynamics, technological innovations and ideological attractiveness. In addition to bringing together traditional U.S. allies, the U.S. president should therefore focus on strengthening America by repairing its dilapidated infrastructure, advancing an inadequate human capital base, and promoting R&D investment. Mutually beneficial cooperation on climate change, pandemics and non-proliferation is desirable. Therefore, Biden's focus on creating a more nuanced and sustainable long-term Chinese strategy could lead to a welcome break in the Sino-US Cold War. As the U.S. economy needs all the help it can get to recover from a pandemic crash, Biden should even reduce the scale or even end the trade war. Chinese leaders are certainly aware that an open

conflict with the US is not good for them, because Beijing obviously believes that time is on its side since the Chinese economy will continue to grow faster than the American one in the coming decades, gradually shifting the overall balance of power in its favour. While the short-term interests of Biden and Xi could be reconciled, achieving a comprehensive reduction in US-Chinese tensions will not be easy. But, the biggest obstacle to more stable relations remains the trade war. Biden and Xi should start talks immediately to prevent a looming catastrophe – namely, China's inability to meet the Trump administration's request to buy an additional \$ 200 billion in US goods and services during 2020-2021. However, all these expected positive changes will probably not change the trajectory of the Sino-American confrontation characteristic of the great powers.

Rennie (2020, 97-99) believes that Biden's team will want competition with China to become more orderly, less openly ideological, but also more challenging for Beijing, which will try to ease tensions, but has no illusions about a complete reset of relations (i.e. return to 2016 and earlier). The new president will not rush to abolish the tariffs that Trump imposed on two-thirds of imports from China, nor will Biden immediately relax all export controls and restrictions on investments by Chinese high-tech companies. America will certainly try to contain China, making the continuation of the fierce competition between the two great powers inevitable. Although the Democratic Party is more sceptical than ever about globalization, Biden's team will include economists who believe that tariffs are mostly harmful to the US and who see serious risks in using the dollar-dominated global financial system as a tool to keep China. Silicon Valley technology chiefs, who will be more present in the administration, will address the government to be much more selective in determining which high-tech products and supply chains are a threat to national security. However, the president will call on America to maintain its primacy over China in the basic technologies of the future, from artificial intelligence (AI) to quantum computing, with the help of large investments in science. Biden will keep the decades-old balance in which

America uses its armed forces to deter China from attempting to invade Taiwan while assuring Chinese leaders that the US will not encourage a formal declaration of independence. Washington will seek China's help in problems such as climate change or the development of treatment against Covid-19. China may be asked to join the US in reviving the nuclear pact that Obama signed with Iran. Finally, America will return to the business of forming coalitions, or at least fight less with its allies, as Biden wants friends in his backyard as he positions himself against China (97-99).

Dou (2020) emphasizes that Biden's selection of seasonal professional diplomats for foreign affairs and defence positions signals a return to the traditional liberal diplomatic philosophy of the US. During the election campaign, Biden already stressed the need to strengthen ties between the US and its allies, and he will probably try to multilaterally oppose Beijing in the South China Sea. This would make any type of conflict more complicated given the range of parties involved and their interests. We can expect more diplomatic and military interactions between the US and the Philippines, which will probably get a Washington-friendly leadership in the 2022 presidential election. So, the return of the Biden administration to the so-called multilateralism "and towards a" rules-based order "will not deny continuous, intensified military competition between the two countries. Biden can take steps to improve communication between the two sides so that the misunderstanding does not become a catalyst for military escalation, but the US is likely to continue shipping ships, strengthening military coordination with Southeast Asian countries. This means that the Sino-American will become worse than before Trump's arrival in the White House, and the distribution of defence and diplomatic resources will remain focused on the Asia-Pacific region as well.

Kroenig and Cimmino (2020) believe, albeit without offering empirical evidence, that China's autocratic system of governance is a major handicap in rivalry with the US because such systems stifle economic growth and innovation by limiting free enterprise. They believe China is affected by the economic slowdown; few true friends abroad; and domestic insecurity. The US National

Security Strategy for 2017 correctly diagnosed the problem of competition with China but did not articulate the desired end state of this rivalry. The US should strive for the revitalization, adjustment, and defence of the "international system based on rules" led by America, and in the long run, they would like China to be a member of that system. But that will not be possible soon, maybe not as long as the existing party is in power in Beijing. Therefore, in the short term, the United States and its allies must defend that system from the economic and military threats that China poses and impose serious costs on it when it violates international standards. This strategy will be successful when it convinces Chinese leaders that challenging the US-led system is too difficult and expensive.

Relations between Washington and Beijing are also affected by the deterioration of diplomatic ties between Australia and China, which deteriorated sharply during 2020, among other things, because Australia has not adequately balanced relations with Beijing for several years. Australia's huge economic dependence on China – a market for more than one-third of its exports gives that country no choice but to have good relations with its regional neighbour. It is almost impossible to find alternative markets on that scale in the near future, or ever. Evans (2020) considers that discriminatory and protectionist trade and industrial policies, periodic cyber attacks and attempts to exert undue influence on the Australian government institutions are unacceptable to Canberra, but that Australia has not only joined but also led international efforts to punish Huawei and has introduced strict restrictions on foreign investment and laws against foreign influence. He believes Australian leaders should stop irritating Beijing, and that Australia should recognize the legitimacy and inevitability of some of China's international aspirations.

Discussion: Can the deterioration of China-US relations be avoided?

In the context of China's post-pandemic global positioning, perhaps a key issue is its ability to avoid or mitigate deteriorating relations with its main economic,

strategic, and geopolitical rival. It is important to note here that, unlike the Cold War, the new geopolitical structure is not marked by a binary division with clearly defined camps, as friends and enemies often cross traditional boundaries for short-term economic interest or political gain. Additionally, regional powers pursue their goals, often against the interests of the world's leading two players. It seems that the American bilateral party consensus against China will survive the change of the presidential administration, while the existing pandemic puts the EU in front of the biggest existential crisis since its emergence. Russia will continue to follow its independent global agenda, despite often siding with China (Vicenzino, 2020).

Beijing has to move wisely through a paradigm shift in US-China bilateral relations and live with the "new norm" of pervasive power competition, from trade and technology to the financial sector and humanitarian efforts, and proactively strengthen its capacity for high-tech self-innovation. In this regard, although the immediate cause of the current tension between the US and China is the growing strategic difference between the two countries in positioning their bilateral relationship, it only reflects a deeper root cause – China's economic transformation towards the upper end of global industrial value chains (e.g. in the production of automobiles and mobile phones). Although competition in military power and GDP size is still relevant, building complete industrial value chains (which are basically based on long-term improved industrial policies) has largely gained much more importance in the game of power competition. The most important aspect of the ongoing strategic competition between the US and China is that it is a race between Washington trying to regain the dominance of the entire industrial value chain and Beijing witnessing a proactive improvement in that domain. Current US industrial policies aim to achieve direct, vertical control of entire global industrial value chains, including rebuilding labour-intensive industries, maintaining capital-intensive ones, and keeping absolute dominance in state-of-the-art technologies (AI, Quantum Information Science, 5 G). In some of these state-of-the-art industries, China is accumulating a certain advantage, which has already caused the inevitable and growing pressure on Washington.

China has shown resilience and is managing to resist for now, which will be even more important in the post-Covid 19 periods when American pressure is expected to intensify. Namely, the US must decide whether to view China's rise as an existential threat and try to stop it with all available means, or to accept it as an equal partner. Ideally, this competition should take place within the agreed multilateral framework of rules and norms that govern the UN and the WTO. If the US decides to try to stop the rise of China, it will risk provoking a reaction that could lead the two countries on the path of decades of conflict, without excluding its military aspect. The US and China are not necessarily on the path to full confrontation, but that cannot be ruled out. The path to creating a new order is certainly not easy, because powerful domestic pressures encourage and limit the foreign policy directions and choices of both countries. It is not certain that the two countries will manage their bilateral relations on the basis of rational calculations of their national interests. Any confrontation between these two great powers will hardly end as it did in the Cold War, with the peaceful collapse of one country, according to Hsien-Loong (2020). Blumenthal (2020), already cited, highlights the outline of the plan for the victory of the US: "This will mean convincing China that such a (global) competition is too costly and could come at the expense of Beijing's crucial goal of regime survival."

Cooley and Nexon (2020) believe that the rise of great powers, such as China and Russia, has led to autocratic and illiberal projects competing with the liberal international system led by the US. Many developing countries can now seek alternative patrons, instead of remaining dependent on Western support. Both new regional organizations and illiberal transnational networks are challenging American influence. These two authors see the long-term tendencies of the global economy, especially the rise of China (which has expanded access to global resources and markets, among other things through the Belt and Road Initiative, and the deployment of staff in global institutions such as the UN, Interpol, World Health Organization), as events that transform the geopolitical landscape. The transnational civil society

networks that practically created the liberal international order no longer enjoy the power and influence they once had, as illiberal competitors now challenge them in many areas, among which are some from western countries. For example, the lobby group The National Rifle Association of America worked transnationally to successfully win the proposed referendum "against weapons" in Brazil in 2005, which is certainly partly responsible for Bolsonaro's coming to power in 2018. These developments reflect the ways in which the "counter" movements "order" helped to accelerate the decline of hegemonic powers in the past. Namely, transnational networks played a crucial role in maintaining and challenging previous international orders (e.g. Protestant networks helped erode Spanish power in early modern Europe, especially by supporting the Dutch revolt of the 16th century; liberal and republican movements, especially in the context of revolutions across Europe 1848, played a role in undermining the Concert of Europe, which sought to govern the international order in the first half of the 19th century; the rise of fascist and communist transnational networks helped create global powers that would later enter World War II). Covid 19 further accelerates the erosion of the US hegemony as China increases its influence in the WHO and other global institutions. Even if the core of the American hegemonic system remains solid, Washington will have to get used to the increasingly complex international order. American policymakers should already conceptualize the world after global hegemony. If they succeed in preserving the core of the American system, Washington could continue to lead the strongest military and economic coalition but in a world of multiple centres of power.

The Covid 19 pandemic seems to have provided the anti-Chinese "hawks" in the Trump administration with the perfect opportunity to resolutely redirect US Chinese policy in line with its own long-term goal of decoupling the two economies. However, it will be impossible to completely separate the American and Chinese economies, and any offensive American action toward China will produce a Chinese counter-reaction. For example, the benefits of blocking Huawei's approach to American technology are already clearly

inseparable from the risks, as China may retaliate and will certainly redouble its efforts to develop its own sophisticated semiconductors (Schell, 2020). As the US-China rivalry heats up, it will need to be managed with expertise, risk management, and careful efforts to achieve mutual understanding (Farrell & Newman, 2020). In this regard, Beijing, faced with growing external threats, has also made risky moves due to the West's anti-Chinese campaign, being additionally motivated to pursue policies such as the Hong Kong national security law, and the escalation of political and military pressure on Taiwan. These steps, in turn, strengthened the perception among officials in the US, the EU, Australia, and elsewhere that China is becoming what the European Commission in 2019 called "systemic rival" to the West. By placing competition over human rights, democracy, and the rule of law at the centre of US-Chinese strategic competition, the U.S. administration has practically declared a new Cold War (Nathan, 2020). So, at the beginning of 2020, the American policy of revolutionary revision of the existing rules and norms had already been shaped, influencing the intensification of the frontal collision of the US with China in almost all spheres, except the war. This conflict is objectively caused by the impossibility of simultaneously achieving the goals of the two superpowers. China itself has been trying for a long time to turn the conflict with the United States into a kind of "phone war" because the Chinese calculate that time works for them. However, the US is trying to turn the conflict into an "open form" in a revolutionary way, which gives Washington a better chance of winning. Thus, the change in the balance of power is manifested both through an increase in Chinese capabilities and through an increase in the US determination to maintain a dominant position (Vicenzino, 2020).

However, trying to emulate the Cold War by pulling the Iron curtain around the world would alienate potential allies and harm the American economy. Le Miere (2020) believes that it is better to maintain prudent engagement, "deter" as necessary and build American-led international institutions and alliances to maintain the existing order.

Solana and Fernández (2020) consider economic separation to be wrong

because never before have two global superpowers been so interdependent and so at the risk of harming themselves by trying to hurt each other. Things can spiral out of control if political leaders and influential commentators begin to unnecessarily adopt conflict rhetoric. Cold War analogies can become a self-fulfilling prophecy and push the world into disaster. De-escalation is undoubtedly in the long-term interest of every country, not just the US and China, according to the two authors, who emphasize that there is nothing predetermined in the evolution of great power relations: although the US-China rivalry is there to stay, it does not prevent exploration of ways of cooperation. Solana and Fernández (2020) conclude with the thesis that the Sino-US Cold War would be a war of choice, not a necessity.

Conclusion

The basic research hypothesis of this paper has been confirmed. Namely, the answer to the key research question (whether China will continue its dramatic rise in the 2020s to become the world's largest economy, and whether the Covid-19 pandemic will further accelerate that process), is positive – the Chinese economy, measured by GDP at market rates, will become larger than the American one in 2028. The methodology used is based on a linear projection of GDP growth for China and the US in the period after 2026, or in the period from 2022 to 2028. Given that it is almost certain that the economy will dominate future geopolitical positioning, an important moment will happen at the end of 2020, when the Chinese economy, according to our calculations, will become the largest in the world.

References

- Arduino, A. (2020, September 7). Cryptocurrency: the next battleground in the US–China rivalry. *South China Morning Post*.
<https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/3100330/cryptocurrency-next-battleground-us-china-rivalry>
- BBC. (2020, December 26). Chinese economy to overtake US 'by 2028' due to Covid. *BBC News*.
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55454146>
- Bjelajac, Ž., & Filipović, A. (2020). COVID-19 pandemic – Security challenges, risks and threats. *Kultura polisa*, 17(2), 9–23.
<https://kpolisa.com/index.php/kp/article/view/262>
- Hancock, T., & Curran, E. (2021, January 14). China Set to Topple U.S. as Biggest Economy Sooner After Virus. *Bloomberg*.
<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-14/a-year-after-covid-began-china-s-economy-is-beating-the-world>
- Centre for Economics and Business Research [CEBR]. (2021). *World Economic League Table 2021* (12th ed.).
<https://cebr.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/WELT-2021-final-15.01.pdf>
- Centre for Economics and Business Research Ltd. (CEBR). (2020). *World Economic League Table 2020* (11th ed.).
<https://cebr.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/WELT-2021-final-23.12.pdf>
- Consumer News and Business Channel (CNBC). (2021, January 7). *Yuan may appreciate 4-5% against the U.S. dollar in 2021: Analyst* [Video]. CNBC.
<https://www.cnbc.com/video/2021/01/07/yuan-may-appreciate-4-5percent-against-the-us-dollar-in-2021-analyst.html>
- Blumenthal, D. (2020). *The China Nightmare: The Grand Ambitions of a Decaying State*. American Enterprise Institute.
- Cooley, A., & Nexon, D. H. (2020, July/August). How Hegemony Ends. The Unraveling of American Power. *Foreign Affairs*.

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-06-09/how-hegemony-ends>

- Dollar, D. (2020). *The future of global supply chains: What are the implications for international trade? Reimagining the global economy: Building back better in a post-COVID-19 world*. Brookings Institution.
- Duo, D. (2020, December 8). *On South China Sea, expect more of the same from US President Joe Biden*. South China Morning Post.
<https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/3112866/south-china-sea-expect-more-same-us-president-joe-biden>
- Elhedery G. (2022, 14 February). *As cryptocurrency risks spread, central bank digital currencies are set for their moment in the sun*. South China Morning Post.
<https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3166750/cryptocurrency-risks-spread-central-bank-digital-currencies-are-set>
- Evans, G. (2020, December 14). *Australia's China Problem*. Project Syndicate.
<https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-china-strategy-australia-needs-by-gareth-evans-2020-12>
- Farrell, H. & Newman, A. (2020, June 3). *The Folly of Decoupling From China*. *Foreign Affairs*.
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-06-03/foolly-decoupling-china>
- Filipović, A., & Bjelajac, Ž. (2020). The role of mass media in disaffirmation of security culture during the Covid-19 pandemic. *Kultura polisa*, 17(2), 137–150. <https://kpolisa.com/index.php/kp/article/view/271>
- Hsien-Loong, L. (2020, July/August 2020). *The Endangered Asian Century (America, China, and the Perils of Confrontation)*. *Foreign Affairs*.
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2020-06-04/lee-hsien-loong-endangered-asian-century>
- Huang, C. (2019, April 21). *If China thinks it's overtaking the US any time soon, here's a wake-up call*. South China Morning Post.
<https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/3006892/if-china-thinks-its-overtaking-us-any-time-soon-heres-wake-call>

- Global Times staff reporters (2022, February 28). *Shares of cross-border payment system, digital currency rise in A-share trade*. Global Times. <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202202/1253494.shtml>
- Günther, M. (2020). *A deal for the Asian century*. International Politics and Society.
- Iggo C. (2021, June 30). *Where bitcoin fails, central bank digital currencies will succeed*. South China Morning Post. <https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3139165/where-bitcoin-fails-central-bank-digital-currencies-will-succeed>
- International Monetary Fund (2019). *World Economic Outlook Database – October 2019*. <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2019/October>
- International Monetary Fund (2020). *World Economic Outlook Database – October 2020*. <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2020/October>
- International Monetary Fund (2021). *World Economic Outlook Database – October 2021*. <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2021/October>
- International Monetary Fund (2022). *World Economic Outlook UpDate, January 2022. Rising Caseloads, A Disrupted Recovery, and Higher Inflation*. <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2022/01/25/world-economic-outlook-update-january-2022>
- Jun, Z (2020, September 7). *China's Rapid Shift to a Digital Economy*. Project Syndicate. <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-digital-economy-transformation-pandemic-by-zhang-jun-2020>
- Jun, Z. (2020, Jun 24). *Explaining China's Economic Resilience*. Project Syndicate. <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-unstoppable-economy-domestic-investment-consumption-by-zhang-jun-2020-06>
- Kang, X. & Chen, D. (2020, November 10). *Why China's Economy Keeps Booming Even After COVID-19*. The Diplomat. <https://thediplomat.com/2020/11/why-chinas-economy-keeps->

[booming-even-after-covid-19/](#)

- Kroenig, M. & Jeffrey Cimmino, J. (2020, December 7). *China Is Both Weak and Dangerous*. Foreign Policy.
<https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/12/07/china-weak-dangerous-china-nightmare-dan-blumenthal-review/>
- Le Miere, C. (2020, June 3). *China's relations with the US are at their lowest for 30 years, but don't call it a new cold war*. South China Morning Post.
<https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3087015/chinas-relations-us-are-their-lowest-30-years-dont-call-it-new-cold>
- Lockett, H. & Hale, T. (2020, December 14). *Global investors place Rmb1tn bet on China breakthrough*. Financial Times.
<https://www.ft.com/content/d9ac222d-90d8-4570-b89e-a99f1bd4829b>
- McKinsey & Company (2020). *China consumer report 2021 (Special edition) - Understanding Chinese Consumers: Growth Engine of the World*.
<https://www.mckinsey.com/~media/mckinsey/featured%20insights/china/china%20still%20the%20worlds%20growth%20engine%20after%20covid%2019/mckinsey%20china%20consumer%20report%202021.pdf>
- Nathan, A. J. (2020, September 25). *The Heart of the New Cold War*. Project Syndicate.
<https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/human-rights-at-the-center-us-china-cold-war-by-andrew-j-nathan-2020>
- Nikolić, G. (2020). Rastuća globalna uloga G20 i BRIK i njihov trgovinski značaj za Srbiju. *Tržište, novac, kapital*, 43(2), 86–98.
- Nikolić, G., & Malović M. (2020). Mogući strateški odgovori zapada na uspon Kine ako se njen snažan ekonomski rast nastavi. *Kultura polisa*, 41(1), 471–491.
- Guillemette, Y. & Turner D. (2018). The Long View: Scenarios for the World Economy to 2060. *OECD Economic Policy Papers* 22.
<https://doi.org/10.1787/b4f4e03e-en>.
- Pei, M. (2020, November 20). *A Roadmap for Stabilizing Sino-American Relations*. Project Syndicate.
<https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/biden-xi-roadmap->

[for-stabilizing-america-china-relations-by-minxin-pei-2020-11](#)

PriceWaterhouse Coopers - PwC (2017). *The World in 2050: The Long View, How will the global economic order change by 2050?*

<https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/world-2050/assets/pwc-world-in-2050-summary-report-feb-2017.pdf>

Qiu, S., Singh, S. & Khasawneh, R. (2020, December 10). *Boxed out: China's exports pinched by global run on shipping containers*. Reuters.

<https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-global-shipping-container/boxed-out-chinas-exports-pinched-by-global-run-on-shipping-containers-idUSKBN28K0UA>

Xie, A. (2020, September 11). *The real economic reforms China needs to become less dependent on exports*. South China Morning Post.

<https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3100870/real-economic-reforms-china-needs-become-less-dependent-exports>

Rennie, D. (2020, December). China: Still a contender (The World in 2021). *The Economist*. <https://www.economist.com/the-world-in-2021>

Rowley, A. (2022, February 28). *Bit by bit, central bank digital currencies like China's will eat into US dollar hegemony*. South China Morning Post.

<https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3168576/bit-bit-central-bank-digital-currencies-chinas-will-eat-us-dollar?module=opinion&pgtype=homepage>

Schell, O. (2020, April 3). *The Ugly End of Chimerica*. Foreign Policy.

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/03/chimerica-ugly-end-coronavirus-china-us-trade-relations/>

Solana, J. & Fernandez, O. (2020, June 18). *Averting a Cold War of Choice*. Project Syndicate.

<https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/america-china-averting-cold-war-of-choice-by-javier-solana-and-oscar-fernandez-2020-06>

Tang, F. & Wang O. (2022, January 18). *China GDP growth beats expectations, narrows gap with US, but population crisis, Covid-19 cloud outlook*. South China Morning Post.

<https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3163720/china-gdp-growth-2021-beats-expectations->

[narrowing-gap-us](#)

Vicenzino, M. (2020, June 13). *US China rivalry will shape post coronavirus world order while India and the EU struggle to keep pace*. South China Morning Post.

<https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3088626/us-china-rivalry-will-shape-post-coronavirus-world-order-while>

Wilhelm, B. & Lavender, A. (2020, October 21). *Having Contained COVID-19, China Sees Economic Growth – and Opportunity*. The World Politics Review.

<https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/29154/for-china-pandemic-containment-leads-to-economic-growth-and-opportunity>

Yongding, Y. (2020, December 3). *China Can Spend More to Grow More*. Project Syndicate.

<https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-2020-growth-recovery-fiscal-expansion-by-yu-yongding-2020-12>


Zhou, C. (2020, November 27). *Donald Trump's mooted China sanctions to throw spanner in the works of C919 passenger jet plans, sources say*. South China Morning Post.

<https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3111666/donald-trumps-mooted-china-sanctions-throw-spanner-works-c919>

Appendix

Figure 1

Share of China's GDP in US GDP 2020–2030



Note. Author's calculations based on IMF data, 2020.

Table 1

Main economic indicators of China 2020–2025

China	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Real GDP growth (in %)	1.9	8.2	5.8	5.7	5.6	5.5
GDP in current dollars, billions \$	15222	16835	18241	19746	21369	23089
GDP PPP in current dollars, billions \$	24162	26731	28784	30985	33361	35882
Share in world GDP PPP	18.6	19.1	19.4	19.8	20.2	20.6
GDP per capita, current dollars	10839	11956	12924	13964	15089	16284
GDP PPP per capita, in international \$	17206	18983	20395	21912	23556	25307
Total investments, as % of GDP	43.9	42.5	41.6	40.7	39.8	39.0
Gross national saving as % of GDP	45.2	43.2	42.2	41.3	40.4	39.5
Growth of the volume of exports of goods and services	0.0	7.8	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.9
Balance of payments' current transactions, as % of GDP	1.3	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5

Note. The IMF's database, October 2020.

Table 2

Main economic indicators of the USA 2020–2025

USA	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Real GDP growth (in %)	-4.3	3.1	2.9	2.3	1.9	1.8
GDP in current dollars, billions \$	20807	21922	22968	23913	24834	25783
GDP PPP in current dollars, billions \$	20807	21922	22968	23913	24834	25783
Share in world GDP PPP	16.0	15.7	15.5	15.3	15.0	14.8
GDP per capita, current dollars	63051	66144	69004	71538	73974	76475
GDP PPP per capita, in international \$	63051	66144	69004	71538	73974	76475
Total investments, as % of GDP	20.3	20.6	20.9	21.1	21.2	21.3
Gross national saving as % of GDP	17.7	17.8	18.2	18.4	18.6	18.7
Growth of the volume of exports of goods and services	-12.6	7.2	4.6	4.0	3.0	2.4
Balance of payments' current transactions, as % of GDP	-2.1	-2.1	-2.1	-2.1	-2.0	-2.0

Note. The IMF's database, October 2020

Jačanje globalnog značaja kineske ekonomije u post-pandemijskom periodu

Goran Nikolić¹ i Jelena Zvezdanović Lobanova²

¹Institut za evropske studije, Beograd

²Institut društvenih nauka, Beograd

Sažetak

Uprkos pandemiji koja je bacila na kolena veći deo globalne ekonomije, rast kineske privrede se nastavio u 2020. i snažno ubrzao u 2021. Skoro izvestan scenario u kome Kina prestiže SAD kao najveću svetsku ekonomiju u ovoj deceniji već donosi snažne geopolitičke implikacije. Ključni razlog snažnog rasta kineske privrede je visok udeo štednje i investicije u BDP (po preko dve petine) u veoma dugom periodu, zajedno sa impresivnim tehnološkim progresom koji ja ta zemlja napravila. S tim u vezi, direktan razlog trenutne napetosti između dve države je kineska ekonomska transformaciju ka gornjem kraju globalnih industrijskih lanaca vrednosti. Pokušaji da se forsiranim tehnološkim razdvajanjem, američkim trgovinskim sankcijama ili forsiranim promenama globalnih lanaca snabdevanja okonča ekonomska ekspanzija Kine, imajući u vidu njeno ogromno unutrašnje tržište i osvajanje celih paleta proizvoda, odnosno lanaca snabdevanja, deluju osuđene na neuspeh. Iako SAD i Kina nisu nužno na putu konfrontacije, to se svakako ne može isključiti. Cilj ovog rada je projekcija buduće dinamike BDP-ova dve vodeće svetske ekonomije; američke i kineske. Primenjena metodologija se bazira na linearnoj projekciji rasta BDP-a obe države u periodu nakon 2026. (koji se nastavlja na oficijelne procene MMF-a zaključno sa 2026).

Ključne reči: pandemija, ekonomski rast, BDP, Kina, SAD, konkurencija

Possibilities for Regional Integration in South and Southeast Asia: A Comparative Analysis of SAARC and ASEAN

Veljko Djogatović

Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute, Belgrade

Article Information*

Review Article • UDC: 327.39(5-12+5-13)

Volume: 19 Issue: 3, pages: 76–92

Received: April 27, 2022 • Revised: June 27, 2022 • Accepted: June 29, 2022.

<https://doi.org/10.51738/Kpolisa2022.19.3r.76dj>

Author Note

Veljko Djogatović  <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5068-6045>

I have no known conflict of interest to disclose.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Veljko Djogatović, Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute, Bulevar Mihajla Pupina 115, 11060 Belgrade, Serbia. Email: veljko.djogatovic23@yahoo.com

* Cite (APA):

Djogatović, V. (2022). Possibilities for Regional Integration in South and Southeast Asia: A Comparative Analysis of SAARC and ASEAN. *Kultura polisa*, 19(3), 76–92.

<https://doi.org/10.51738/Kpolisa2022.19.3r.76dj>

Abstract

During the second half of the twentieth century, an accelerated wave of economic and political integration at the regional level hit all corners of the world. Regions of South and Southeast Asia did not fall far behind in this regard. This paper aims to examine the scope of regional political integration in these two regions of Asia, then identify the main (non)institutional barriers that prevent emerging supranational bodies from reaching out to their full potential and analyse the results in the field of regional political associating achieved so far. Using the content analysis of the relevant literature as a primary scientific method showed some important results: (a) it is pointed out that a higher degree of integration has been achieved between the member states of the ASEAN compared to the SAARC, (b) basic historical (colonization period, type of political culture, structure of the political system) and contemporary (political violence, secessionism, ethnoreligious disputes) threats to a deeper integration have been pointed out and (c) great potential of these regions for deeper integration in the field of politics, but also the economy, culture, etc., is clearly emphasized. In conclusion, it could be argued that the Southeast Asian region, through its arguably most important supranational entity – the ASEAN organization – has achieved an extremely high degree of regional integration compared to its neighbouring counterpart – SAARC and that the latter organization has a long way to go in approaching good practices and results achieved by ASEAN within the field of regional political integration.

Keywords: comparative politics; political integration; regionalism; integrative potential; SAARC; ASEAN

Possibilities for Regional Integration in South and Southeast Asia: A Comparative Analysis of SAARC and ASEAN

The scope of this paper is to deal with the idea of regional integration in South and Southeast Asia. First, the focus of the paper will be directed towards the political dimension of regional integration, visibly permeated, and intertwined by its socio-demographic, cultural and economic dimensions. The author will try to give an answer to several important questions: (1) whether and to what extent political integration is possible in South and Southeast Asia, (2) what are the main (non)institutional barriers standing in front of the most important supranational political institutions developed in these regions, and (3) which region has proved more successful in terms of the results achieved within the field of regional political integration – (a) South Asia, with its most important representative in the form of SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) or (b) Southeast Asia, with its most important representative in the form of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). The argumentation of this paper goes in the direction of pointing out the fact that these regions not only possess regional integrative potential but that that potential is at an enviable level. What distinguishes them is the domestic and current situation regarding regional political integration. While on the one hand, countries in the region of Southeast Asia decided to put their weapons aside and unite politically and economically in the organization of states (ASEAN) more than half a century ago, countries from South Asia, a group of SAARC member states, even in addition to the existence of supranational political associations, failed to solve the recurrent problems and disputes of the past – colonial heritage, mutual intolerance, ethno-religious violence and other social disasters. This manuscript will highlight some of the most important (non)institutional barriers that prevent both regions from fully exploiting their integrative potential, given their past, current situation, and future plans. Structurally, the paper is divided into four parts – the first one will serve to present introductory remarks and ideas closely related to

the issue of regional integration in South and Southeast Asia. Then, the focus of the paper will be shifted towards (non)institutional obstacles that stand in the way between the current situation and reaching the maximum integrative potential in these regions. The third chapter will be devoted to confronting the two most important supranational associations of this type in South and Southeast Asia – SAARC and ASEAN. Finally, the last chapter will present several tentative conclusions reached by this study and will present some suggestions referred to policymakers working in these organizations, as a contribution to exploiting their full integrative potential.

The Idea of Regional Integration in South and Southeast Asia

Until the 1990s, Southeast Asia was known and recognizable in the world for its militaristic regimes, frequent coups, and authoritarian dictatorships (Krstić, 2007, p. 5). According to this criterion, the region of South Asia does not fall far behind. However, what separates these two regions in terms of the structure of political regimes and the frequency and influence of political violence within them, is the absence of its overflowing into the sphere of international politics. While the most important supranational institution of political organization in Southeast Asia – ASEAN – was founded back in 1967, despite numerous, to put it mildly, disagreements among the future member states of this organization – the process of deeper connection and unification of South Asian countries was about to be reached almost two decades later. Although both Gandhi and Nehru expressed sincere sympathy for the ideas of political unification of the region (understood broader than what it is today), conflicts on the periphery of the central state of this region in every sense – India – prevailed. Given that mutual trust and reconciliation are the two most important promoters of successful regional integration, South Asia failed to meet these criteria both in the period when the most important integration of some other regions took place (e.g., Europe in the form of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) or Southeast Asia in the form of the ASEAN), and even today to a significant extent (Brennan &

Murray, 2015, p. 58). However, the positions of the representatives of seven countries in this region (the eighth member of this organization is Afghanistan, which joined in 2007) converged in Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh, 14 years after its declaration of independence. The idea of economic integration overcame the idea of political integration, bearing in mind the more than obvious economic backwardness of this region compared to neighbouring regions. Guided by the logic that countries that share common economic partners and are member states of the same supranational economic-political body, seven founding states of SAARC have made significant efforts to bring progress and cooperation to the South Asian region. The results of these efforts will be discussed in more detail in the next two chapters.

On the other hand, ASEAN, the most influential regional organization in Southeast Asia, was created during the war in which three of its current members participated – Vietnam (at that time officially divided into North and South), Laos and Cambodia. Today, ASEAN consisted of all countries geographically located in the region of Southeast Asia (with the exception of Timor-Leste), i.e., Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Brunei. The common historical heritage, model and logic of colonial rule, political culture, religious and ethnic diversity, and general economic backwardness compared to the rest of the developed world were sufficient catalysts for the birth of the idea of integration of Southeast Asian countries. The favourable political climate and the absence of a regional hegemon in any way contributed to the formation of (probably) the most successful regional community in the world after the European Union. Although these countries still abound in intra-state or inter-state conflicts (e.g., the conflict between the pro-Buddhist government and Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar, the conflict between Thailand and Malaysia in the southern provinces of Thailand or the general dispute over the holders of sovereignty over Spratly islands in the South China Sea involving as many as four Southeast Asian countries – Brunei, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia), the formation of an entirely new way of conducting regional

policy – often called “the ASEAN way” – and its successful implementation and constant improvement, concluded with the idea of prosperity of the entire region taking precedence (see Cockerham, 2010, pp. 165–185). Having in mind the necessity and urgent need for a regional organization within both regions, two regional intergovernmental organizations were born – SAARC and ASEAN. However, given that there were and are many (non)institutional advantages, obstacles, perspectives and range of reach, these two organizations are currently at vastly different stages of development. In the next chapter, the author will point out some of the most important obstacles that stand in the way of successful political integration in the two observed regions.

Obstacles to Successful Political Integration in South and Southeast Asia

Although countries in these two regions are sharing experiences of the colonial past, economic and political problems and disagreements, historical ethnoreligious heritage and linguistic diversity, significant differences in the scope of regional political integration still exist, which greatly contributed to their two most important representatives (ASEAN and SAARC), from their inception to the third decade of the XXI century, grow into two completely different entities. In this chapter, the most important obstacles that have contributed to forming the above-mentioned distance between essentially similar organizations will be pointed out. Given the quite different starting points for developing the idea of regional integration in these two organizations, the problems and obstacles faced by ASEAN and its member states can be divided into four groups:

(1) the ethnic-national-religious structure of a society – the broad religious picture of Southeast Asia ranges from Catholicism (Philippines), Buddhism (Myanmar, Thailand), and Confucianism (Singapore) to Islam (Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei) (Krstić, 2007, p. 5). A substantial number of researchers and theorists of contemporary political relations have noticed how much effort is needed to keep members of several different religious and ethnic communities in the same political community. The abovementioned

clashes within the borders of Myanmar or Thailand are a clear indicator of this problem, and this was no exception during the period of establishment and development of ASEAN. The orientation of a group of people toward the idea of a “motherland” or existing “holy place(s)” (e.g., Muslims towards Mecca and Medina or Roman Catholics towards the Vatican/Rome) further reduces the chance of reaching a general common interest as the most important feature needed during the organization-forming period.

(2) the role of the (nation-)state – given the historically significant role of the (nation-)state in Southeast Asia, it is clear that this level of government could only act as an obstacle to the successful implementation of the ideas of the founders of ASEAN and the formation of representative bodies and policies of the organization itself. In countries of Southeast Asia, the state was an important and key factor in socio-political, economic, and cultural development, as it was the only arena of confrontation of different political currents and the only legitimate prey that politicians, kings, religious leaders, or any other “winners” could win (2007, p. 74). Whatever the type of government in question was, the determination of the political course of the entire nation was in the hands of several representatives of the political (or some other, e.g., religious) elite. With the idea of creating a supranational political organization came a clash of legitimacy and legality, which posed a great challenge for the, in the majority of cases, young states of Southeast Asia, only recently freed from colonial rule.

(3) the quality of democracy – following up on the previous problem, naturally, the question of the quality and degree of democracy in Southeast Asian societies was a major challenge faced by the young political elite, primarily ASEAN ideological fathers, during the 1960s. An overview of the state of these societies provides the best insight into how far they were from the ideals of democracy – a wide range of political systems ranging from absolute monarchy (Brunei) to militaristic dictatorship (Myanmar), one-party communist state (Vietnam, Laos) and neo-communist authoritarian regime (Cambodia) to strong and energetic but often problematic democracies (Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines) and well-established “illiberal democracies”

(Malaysia, Singapore) (2007, p. 5). Although political association is feasible even in the absence of democracy within the societies of (potential) member states, its existence significantly facilitates the understanding and harmonization of basic principles and goals of the future community.

(4) political conflicts, disputes, and separatist aspirations – although no significant number of interstate conflicts/wars have been reported in the region, twentieth-century political history has been riddled with conflicts and political violence at the domestic level. Virtually no state can boast of the fact that it is currently not in the middle of any territorial dispute with any other state in the region. On the other hand, the number of current ethnic and religious conflicts is not negligible, especially in the territory of Myanmar, Thailand, and the Philippines. The dispute over territorial integrity and sovereignty over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea has been the subject of many international debates and trials (see Kilibarda, 2010, p. 155). These are all major challenges when the goal is to integrate ten states into one supranational political community.

Besides these four fields, which cover the largest number of obstacles to successful regional political integration in Southeast Asia, some other, thematically narrower but also significant challenges should be mentioned: (a) lack of democratic political culture, (b) role of Asian values, (c) demographic dominance of Indonesia, (d) different levels of economic development, etc. Given the scope of this study, more will be said only about the results and achievements of ASEAN in the field of the four aforementioned criteria, meaning the four basic groups of (non)institutional barriers.

The South Asian region, on the other hand, suffers from a smaller number of equally serious political diseases:

(1) the ethnic-national-religious structure of society – the fact that India alone is home to hundreds of different nations and religious groups and that several hundred different languages are spoken throughout its territory, further complicates the process of uniting these differences into one functional member state of a supranational political organization. Religious

clashes, wars and persecutions are commonplace in a number of countries in the region (Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan in particular). In addition, one could talk about the importance of the caste system for hundreds of millions of Hindus, then the conflict between monotheistic and polytheistic /atheistic religions, religious-national conflicts in Sri Lanka and Nepal, as well as religiously motivated terrorism encouraged by Al Qaeda in the Indian subcontinent (AQIS) in almost all countries of the region. Therefore, it is clear what challenge the founders of SAARC faced in the 1980s.

(2) political and economic imbalances – what makes the crucial difference to the Southeast Asian region is the existence of dominant power in the South Asian region. Although India has not positioned itself as a hegemon since the inception of SAARC, it is clear that its economic, demographic, and political dominance leaves a major impact on the way this organization functions. Given its size, India has an indirect power to rule the entire region and beyond. However, given the fact that there are two countries in the region with which India used to be in a political union (Bangladesh and Pakistan) and with which it does not have the best political relations at the moment, this represents a huge challenge and obstacle to South Asia's sustainable political integration. Opposite the “Indo-centric pole”, which is consisted of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan, are four additionally economically-underdeveloped countries – the Maldives, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, and Nepal. The level of economic development within these eight countries varies significantly and as such represents a major challenge for the formulation of future economic and political public policies of the SAARC organization.

(3) political conflicts, disputes, and separatist aspirations – South Asia can boast a slightly smaller number of lower-intensity conflicts than Southeast Asia. Regional police and guerrillas working for India and its defence ministry across the bordering areas, the conflict between Bangladesh and Myanmar, the recently ended civil war in Nepal, the region's deepest wound – Jammu and Kashmir question – and other security threats, make an insurmountable problem shared by all of the eight member states. Given the centrifugal forces

of separatist aspirations, as opposed to the centripetal forces of regional political integration, it is crystal clear how important the factor of political violence is for the idea of uniting South Asia into a supranational community with a set of common goals.

In addition to the aforementioned factors, it is important to stress out, as in the case of Southeast Asia, some other important obstacles: (a) lack of democratic political culture, (b) current undemocratic political regimes, (c) varying degrees of economic development, (d) colonial heritage, etc. The next chapter will provide a more detailed insight into the degree of success that the two mentioned organizations have managed to achieve in terms of integrating member states into one team.

Prosperous vs. Failed Student: the Story of ASEAN and SAARC

Social conditions in which ASEAN originated and resides differ significantly from those in the South Asian region – societies are extremely heterogeneous, democracies are surrounded by authoritarian and communist states, there is no common economic ideology, and levels of development and living standards vary widely (Brennan & Murray, 2015, p. 59) while achieving good results is further hampered by China's activities as an (outside-)regional hegemon, countries that find it difficult to come to terms with the idea and concept of shared sovereignty and lack of effective leadership at the regional level (p. 131). However, the findings of numerous studies have unequivocally pointed out that regional integration has had a significant impact on economic development, which is one of the basic goals of regional organizations (Bong & Premaratne, 2018, p. 10). Another insight given to us by studies on the development and impact of ASEAN on the region of Southeast Asia is the way in which these countries have managed to break out on the path of prosperity. The so-called "ASEAN way", i.e., decision-making by consensus, non-interference in the internal affairs of member states and paying attention to their specific needs, found an effective middle ground between bureaucratization and too demanding and excessive liberalization in supranational decision-

making (United Nations Development Programme, 2006, p. 9). Some authors, however, point to the negative aspects of the “ASEAN way”, among which are criticisms closely related to its low level of transparency and excessive level of delegation (Cockerham, 2010, p. 165). Given the successful resolution of a number of conflicts in the region with the active participation of ASEAN (e.g., the Moro uprising in the Philippines which ended in 2019, the war between Cambodia and Vietnam which ended in 1989, uprising in Aceh in Indonesia which ended in 2005, etc.) the region should face decades of prosperity and further strengthening of mutual relations. In that direction, on 31st December 2015, the establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) was announced, a logical continuation of the development of mutual relations between the then seventh largest economy in the world and the third in Asia (Dosch, 2017, p. 25). The ultimate goal of the AEC is to create and strengthen three pillars of integration: (1) security communities, (2) economic communities, and (3) socio-cultural communities (see Kilibarda, 2010, p. 161). Other authors, such as Dedeić (2015), pointed out that the ASEAN single market still does not exist while progress in building the second pillar is clearly visible through tax policy harmonization, adoption of more infrastructure master plans, protection of competition, consumers and intellectual property so it can be concluded that ASEAN remains an informal group, a less ambitious project than the EU, without a large number of regional economic integration institutions (279). But the results achieved by ASEAN in terms of successful regional integration have contributed to an increasing number of descriptions of this organization by the term “miracle” (see Mahbubani & Sng, 2017). The aforementioned insights clearly and unequivocally point to the importance of results achieved by ASEAN as the most important supranational/regional organization in Southeast Asia.

On the other hand, the success of the SAARC organization is questionable, to say the least. Constant conflicts between Pakistan and India, Indian domination of the region, civil wars in Nepal and Sri Lanka, the problem of mass poisoning by polluted drinking water in Bangladesh, and Afghanistan's

orientation towards Western Asia and the Middle East cumulatively put SAARC in an unenviable position. Having in mind all the obstacles listed in the previous chapter, the situation gets even more complicated. Authors of different backgrounds consider the impossibility and practical failure of forming a collective regional identity in the South Asian societies as the greatest failure of SAARC. Chakma (2018) points out that even the term “South Asia” does not originate from this area but was formed by researchers from the USA and was first used as part of the name of an official organization – SAARC (p. 3). The success of this organization in many areas of regional integration has remained questionable to say the least. The asymmetry of the nature of the regional system (India's dominance in terms of size, economic strength, natural resources, and military power is so great that it surpasses all other countries in the region combined) has led to increasing demands from other countries (except the Maldives and Afghanistan) to participate in other regional organizations (BBIN, BIMSTEC, SASEC and BCIM, for example), which clearly indicates the absence of collectivist/regional consciousness in this area (2018, pp. 5–8). Although this regional bloc is guided by the basic principles of equality of sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, non-interference in the internal affairs of other members and mutual benefits, the results are insignificant – South Asia remains the least integrated region in the world (Chaturvedi et al., 2017, p. 79). In fact, many authors agree that SAARC has not only failed to bring the countries of the region closer but has further distanced them one from another. Four reasons and indicators stand out in particular: (1) treating borders as purely intra-state issues, (2) too strong a link between national sovereignty and natural resources, (3) wrong instruments for promoting regionalism, and (4) enormous differences between normative and real, or the purpose of the organization and its performance (Lama, 2018, p. 100). Finally, SAARC became hostage to Indo-Pakistani rivalry, mutual mistrust, and a lack of necessary political will among the leaders of all eight member states (Jain, 2005, p. 72).

Conclusion

Having in mind the projected goals of this paper, I have tried to answer the questions: (1) whether and to what extent political integration is possible in South and Southeast Asia; (2) what are the main obstacles that the most important supranational political institutions developed in these regions are facing and (3) which region has proven to be more successful in terms of political regional integration. Clearly presented arguments and empirical insights point to the high degree of regional political integration achieved in the region of Southeast Asia through ASEAN as a promoter of integrative tendencies. On the other hand, numerous economic, political, historical, and other factors lead to the conclusion that, at this very moment, SAARC has no real chance of approaching the level of development and importance of ASEAN in the field of regional integration. Although both regions have recorded stable economic growth over the past two decades, in Southeast Asia alone it is the result of predominantly good regional integration. On the other hand, not a small number of SAARC members no longer hide that they have higher hopes for other regional organizations rather than SAARC itself. Such moves by member states call into question both what has been achieved through integration and what could be achieved in the future. Although it is clear that ASEAN is not a perfect organization without any problems in its functioning, it is quite obvious that ASEAN has a much better chance of survival and further deepening of relations than SAARC. Benefits from the active participation of strong leaders during its inception days (Suharto, Lee Kuan Yew, Mahathir Mohamad and Siddhi Savetsila) are significant, but benefits that ASEAN made from approaching the victorious side in the Cold War, and from some other regional events (e.g., Sino-Soviet division and political events in China) are clearly expressed through a heightened sense of unity within the region, a high degree of trust and self-confidence, accompanied by the absence of inter-state wars (Mahbubani & Sng, 2017, pp. 71–78, & 185–186). On the other hand, the distance that many countries feel towards India, the bureaucratization of the organization and its constant questionable future given the decades-long conflict between

Pakistan and India, completely undermine the ideals of unity, progress, and solidarity (see Karim, 2019, p. 60). What SAARC lacks are more frequent gatherings of member states and their representatives, given that there is no good integration without frequent and (in)formal dialogue and discussion (2019, p. 69). Given the significantly more favourable current situation in the region of Southeast Asia and, consequently, ASEAN itself, it can be concluded that there is indeed greater potential for further progress of this organization, however, the future will show the capacity and scope of SAARC – whether it can join the “race” as a significant regional actor.

References

- Bong, A. & Premaratne, G. (2018). Regional integration and economic growth in Southeast Asia. *Global Business Review*, 19(6), 1–13.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0972150918794568>
- Brennan, L. & Murray, P. (2015). *Drivers of integration and regionalism in Europe and Asia: Comparative perspectives*. Routledge.
- Chakma, B. (2018). SAARC and region-building: Is South Asia a region? *Journal of the Indian Ocean Region*, 14, 1–17.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/19480881.2018.1478272>
- Chaturvedi, P., Zaki, H. & Biswajit, N. (2017). SAARC Geopolitics and trade: missing intra-regional connectivity a hindrance to further economic integration. *South Asian Survey*, 22(1), 78–106.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0971523117708963>
- Cockerham, G.B. (2010). Regional integration in ASEAN: Institutional design and the ASEAN way. *East Asia*, 27, 165–185.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140-009-9092-1>
- Dedeić, D. (2015). Preobražaj udruženja zemalja jugoistočne Azije u ekonomsku zajednicu po ugledu na iskustvo Evropske unije [Transformation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations into an economic community based on the experience of the European Union]. *Poslovna ekonomija*, 9(2), 259–282.
<https://doi.org/10.5937/PosEko1502259D>
- Dosch, J. (2017). The ASEAN economic community: Deep integration or just political window dressing? *TRaNS: Trans-Regional and National Studies of Southeast Asia*, 5(1), 25–47. <https://doi.org/10.1017/trn.2016.28>
- Jain, R. (2005). India and SAARC: An analysis. *Indian Journal of Asian Affairs*, 18(2), 55–74.
- Karim, M.R. (2019). Same principles but different outcomes of SAARC and ASEAN: Searching gap. *Journal of Public Administration and Governance*, 9(1), 60–72.
- Kilibarda, Z. (2010). Integrativni procesi u regionu jugoistočne Azije [Integrative processes in the region of Southeast Asia]. *Vojno delo*, 62(3), 147–165.

- Krstić, Z. (2007). *Savremeni politički sistemi zemalja jugoistočne Azije* [Modern political systems of Southeast Asian countries]. Službeni glasnik.
- Lama, M. (2018). Renegotiating alternative integration model in the SAARC. *International Studies*, 54(1–4), 82–105.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0020881718790685>
- Mahbubani, K. & Sng, J. (2017). *The ASEAN miracle: A catalyst for peace*. Ridge Books.
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (2006). *South-East Asia regional economic integration and cooperation: Deepening and broadening the benefits for human development*. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

Mogućnosti za regionalne integracije u južnoj i jugoistočnoj Aziji: uporedna analiza organizacija SAARC i ASEAN

Veljko Đogatović

Multidisciplinarni institut za digitalno izdavaštvo, Beograd

Sažetak

U drugoj polovini dvadesetog veka, talas ubrzanog ekonomskog i političkog udruživanja na regionalnom nivou zapljusnuo je sve krajeve planete. Regioni južne i jugoistočne Azije nisu zaostali u ovom pogledu. Rad ima za cilj da ispita koji su dometi regionalnih političkih integracija u pomenuta dva regiona Azije, zatim da utvrdi koje su to glavne (van)institucionalne prepreke koje novonastala naddržavna tela sprečavaju da ispune sav svoj potencijal kao i da analizira koji su rezultati u polju regionalnog političkog udruživanja do sada postignuti. Analizom relevantne literature, kako stručne tako i novinarsko-obaveštajne, došlo se do značajnih rezultata: (a) ukazano je na postignut veći stepen integracije između država-članica jugoistočnoazijske organizacije ASEAN u poređenju sa južnoazijskim SAARC, (b) identifikovane su osnovne istorijske (period kolonizacije, tip političke kulture, ustrojstvo političkog sistema) i savremene (političko nasilje, secesionizam, etno-religijski sporovi) pretnje dubljoj integraciji i (c) jasno je istaknut veliki potencijal ovih regiona za dublja integrisanja u polju politike ali i ekonomije, kulture i dr. Zaključno, moglo bi se tvrditi da je region jugoistočne Azije, putem svog verovatno najvažnijeg naddržavnog entiteta – zajednice ASEAN – dostigao izuzetno visok stepen regionalne integracije u poređenju sa komšijskim pandanom – organizacijom SAARC – te da pred drugopomenutom organizacijom predstoji dugačak put približavanja dobrim praksama i postignutim rezultatima ASEAN-a unutar polja regionalne političke integracije.

Ključne reči: regionalna integracija; južna Azija; jugoistočna Azija; SAARC; ASEAN

Examining Normative and Applicable Aspects of the Plebiscitary Theory of Secession

Jovica Pavlović

Institute of European Studies, Belgrade

Article Information*

Review Article • UDC: 321.218.4:321.013

Volume: 19 Issue: 3, pages: 93–109

Received: July 5, 2022 • Accepted: July 27, 2022

<https://doi.org/10.51738/Kpolisa2022.19.3r.93p>

Author Note

Jovica Pavlović  <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1477-7665>

I have no known conflict of interest to disclose.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Jovica Pavlović,
Institute of European Studies, Trg Nikole Pašića 11, 11000 Belgrade, Serbia.

Email: jovica.pavlovic@ies.rs

* Cite (APA):

Pavlović, J. (2022). Examining Normative and Applicable Aspects of the Plebiscitary Theory of Secession. *Kultura polisa*, 19(3), 93–109. <https://doi.org/10.51738/Kpolisa2022.19.3r.93p>

Abstract

In this article, I rely on the reflective equilibrium methodology in providing a critical overview of the strongest and weakest arguments through which prominent proponents of plebiscitary secession theories defend the right to (unilateral) secession from internationally recognised states; a right that should – in their opinion – be achieved via referendums. By doing so, I demonstrate that the said right – although conceivable in the realm of normative theory – is rarely applicable in practice in a meaningful/justified manner. Instead, more often than not, it is prone to being (mis)used as an excuse for validating interest driven and unethical political conduct, either by separatist/irredentist nationalists or by regional/global powers that support such secessionist causes (as a part of their own geopolitical strategies). In fulfilling the main aim, I therefore argue that plebiscitary theories of secession do not provide answers to questions concerning the likelihood of just implementation of the said right in real-world cases, while their theoretical arguments come across as incomplete when dealing with the relationship between individual and collective rights, but also with issues concerning the nature and motives of contemporary secession movements.

Keywords: secession, ethics, plebiscitary theory, territory

Examining Normative and Applicable Aspects of the Plebiscitary Theory of Secession

Contemporary political philosophers have developed three theories concerning the right to (unilateral) secession from internationally recognised states. Remedial theories argue that the right to secession does not override the political obligation towards a just state, except in exceptional cases (Buchanan, 1991. pp. 152–157). Ascriptive theories claim that only peoples (as pre-political communities) have the right to reclaim political authority and territorial sovereignty that they delegated to the state (Miller, pp. 81–90). Supporters of plebiscitary (or plenary/associative/choice) theories argue that any group of individuals has the right to reclaim complete political jurisdiction over the area that they reside in and the land that they own (Beran, 1984, pp. 23–25). This position – which corresponds to the contractualist view that the state of nature ended with the signing of the social contract – is justified through following arguments.

The last group of the aforementioned theorists refer to the freedom of association, thus opposing the assumption that the obligation towards modern states is more important than this freedom. They do this in two ways, both of which can be described as radically democratic. Plebiscitary theorists who rely on contractualist arguments believe that there is no sufficiently valid reason to remain in a political community just because your ancestors decided to be a part of it. The existing state (which – among other things – encompasses the current constitution and the international borders within which this constitution is implemented) can be viewed as legitimate only if the current generation consents to reside in it, while consent can be active or passive in nature. Therefore, the state can be understood as being legitimate if no citizen calls its constituent components into question (Beran, 1984, p. 25).

However, if individual citizens express dissatisfaction with the current political system, they (like their ancestors, the founding fathers of the existing country) have the right to change that system, and a referendum on secession

is one of many justified instruments for implementing such a decision. Such a position is consistent with the liberal-democratic claim that freedom is one of the most important values, that freely associated individuals are the source of state sovereignty and that political decisions should be made on the basis of a majority vote. In other words, just as the citizens of all democratic countries have the opportunity to replace the old government and elect a new one, a group of freely associated individuals – claim the proponents of plebiscitary theories – also has the right to democratically choose to form a new state on the territory of an existing one, if they believe that secession will allow them to create a political community that better suits their interests. Beran (1984, p. 23), for example, believes that sincere democrats do not have a strong enough reason not to view the possibility of forming a new state as just another issue that should be resolved by voting.

Although most representatives of associative theory develop their normative claims by referring to the right of associated individuals to decide on how they want to organise their own political communities, some authors argue for the right to secession by challenging the legitimacy of existing countries, claiming that they essentially lack political (democratic) legitimacy, but also that they cannot justify the reach of their own sovereign power, that is, the position of international borders within which they operate. Unlike their colleagues who rely on the social contract theory, they argue that modern states and their borders are the product of historical circumstances, such as wars and conquests, which consequently makes them unjust. Their citizens must therefore have the right to form new countries, those which would be legitimate from the moment of their creation.

However, no proponent of the plebiscitary school of thought argues for unconditional secession, because it is clear that the right to secede must be limited if undesired consequences are to be avoided. Some of the basic conditions in this regard refer to the fact that the seceding community must be numerous and territorially concentrated. Although advocates of associative theory have yet to devote more attention to precisely defining the conditions

that make secession a just act, it is clear that they argue that newly created states must be functional and fair democracies, while their creation must not endanger the political or economic stability of the countries from which they are breaking away (Wellman, 2005, p. ii). They also believe that the emerging state must guarantee the right to secession to all groups that want to leave it, because the initial act of territorial separation cannot otherwise be morally just (Beran, 1984, p. 30).

Furthermore, since a certain number of individuals will always remain within the state that they do not wish to reside in (be it the newly seceded state or the old one), philosophers who defend plebiscitary theory – such as Daniel Philpott (1995, p. 356) – argue that seceding states must guarantee rights identical to those that their citizens possessed within the previous political system, but also additional rights (where such rights are necessary). Most of them also argue that seceding groups must not begin the process of territorial separation before it becomes evident that the old state will be able/willing to provide its citizens with a level of rights equal to the one they currently enjoy. Daryl Glaser (2003, p. 372) represents an exception in this regard, as he argues that secession is justified if there is an overall net increase in the level of democracy in both the old and the new state. Nevertheless, despite some disagreements on certain issues, all proponents of plebiscitary theories agree that the will to secede is best expressed through referendums, as indicated by the name of theories that they advocate. The text that follows relies on the reflective equilibrium methodology in fulfilling the main aim; that is, in providing a critical overview of the strongest and weakest arguments through which prominent proponents of plebiscitary secession theories defend the argument that (unilateral) secession from internationally recognised states should be achieved through referendums.

Advantages of Plebiscitary Theory of Secession

The presented arguments, through which representatives of plenary theories favour individual freedom over political obligation towards the state

– that is, arguments through which they derive the right of secession from – point to several advantages that the plebiscitary approach achieves when compared to the opposing normative theories of secession. First of all, by relying on the claim that only individuals are capable of making independent decisions, proponents of plebiscitary theories avoid some of the theoretical and epistemological difficulties encountered by ascriptivists (but also many remedialists) when presenting their own arguments. For example, they – unlike ascriptivists – do not have to demonstrate that groups also possess (collective) rights, just like individuals. All they must do is take the simple position that secession represents an individual right, the application of which is initiated by individuals through political association, and not a collective right that is possessed by the community that those individuals belong to. Even those advocates of plebiscitary theories who believe that secession must be understood as a collective right (because of its evident communitarian characteristics), do not think that renouncing the individualistic logical apparatus is necessary in this respect. On the contrary, they are of the opinion that political rights of individuals are projected onto communities (if individuals are unable to consume them alone), but not owned by those communities (Wellman, 2005, pp. 41–42).

Proponents of plebiscitary theories thus argue that the opposing theories of secession unjustifiably limit the right to external territorial self-determination of some individuals, either by supporting the most prominent ascriptive criterion (according to which only politically formed nations have the right to independence) or by supporting the basic remedial ultimatum (according to which only communities that have suffered injustice have the right to separate from the existing state). They argue that plebiscitary theories fare better in comparison to the two other normative approaches, because – for example – the latter school of thought unjustifiably favours certain individuals over others, by ignoring the fact that not all people belong to nations, at least not in the full/classical sense. While plenary theories abide by the principle of equality (by taking the position that every person

has the freedom of association with the aim to secede), ascriptive theories seem to disqualify cosmopolitans, because of their distinctly supranational and non-territorial identity.

On the other hand, in the eyes of their advocates, advantages of plebiscitary theories – when compared to the remedial approach – are multiple. First, advocates of plebiscitary theories claim that remedialists place groups that were not discriminated against in an unequal position, by granting the right to secession only to those communities that suffered injustices. By doing so, remedial theories seem to motivate peaceful groups to commit strategic violence with the aim of provoking retaliation from central authorities of their states (in order to fulfil the condition of 'injustice suffered'), therefore establishing 'group suffering' as political currency that can be useful and profitable in practice, thus calling into question the validity of their normative and ethical assumptions and conclusions.

Secondly, since citizens of modern democracies are free and capable of choosing persons whom they want to marry, whom they want to form a business with or establish any other union (and leave it when they wish to do so), supporters of plebiscitary theories claim that there is no reason for the state to be an exception in this regard. In comparing the right of secession to the right of divorce, they conclude that forcing individuals to remain in any country against their will is as immoral as obliging a married person to remain married despite his or her intention to file for divorce. It follows that one of the main advantages of choice theories lies in the fact that they base their argumentation on the justified assumption that adult relationships must be based on mutual and voluntary consent; an assumption that leads to the conclusion that secession is a right that autonomous individuals possess by their very nature.

While comparing plebiscitary theory with other secession theories is important in terms of outlining its strengths, it is important to consider some of its advantages that are more general in their nature. For example, Wellman (2005, p. 2) believes that the most significant advantage of the named

ethical standpoint lies in the fact that it strives to enable the largest possible number of people to choose the country that they want to live in. Although an international order that would guarantee an independent country to every group desiring complete political independence is unthinkable, there is no reason not to strive for the establishment of a world order that would support peaceful secession in cases where independence is practically achievable. As the aforementioned author points out, allowing for a plebiscitary right to secession would not motivate groups to start seceding from countries that they belong to for no reason. Rational individuals are aware of the fact that establishing a new state is a difficult task and will not choose to endanger the existing political and economic order without a valid reason. It follows that secession, as a right that citizens invoke only when there is a strong need for its application, should not be limited by requirements other than the minimal requirements put forth by plebiscitary theories (i.e., territorial concentration of seceding groups).

Accepting the minimally conditioned right to secession would also solve the 'tyranny of the majority' problem, because a territorially concentrated minority – whose interests are not taken into account, that is, which is constantly outvoted and left out of the decision-making process – could form its own country. Consequently, states would have a greater responsibility and motivation to be just and tolerant, as well as to strengthen their democratic capacities (especially in the domain of minority rights), in order to avoid separatism (Glaser, 2003, p. 376). Improvement of democracy could be expected even in cases in which minority communities decide to secede after all, because creating a smaller state would reduce the gap between elected officials and citizens. It follows that the right to secession guarantees (at least in theory) that all political systems within which it is accepted will be further democratised, regardless of whether the said right is implemented or not.

Shortcomings of Plebiscitary Theory of Secession

Of course, things are somewhat different in practice, because the

phenomenon of secession is more often associated with violent conflicts than with justified methods of creating new states or democratizing existing ones (Stančević, 2015, p. 62). Therefore, the main weakness of the plebiscitary argument is reflected in its cognitive distancing from the real processes that cause and shape secessionist endeavours. Although collective rights can be based on individual freedoms (especially if we accept the standard starting points of liberal philosophy), basing the specific right of secession on the presumptions of liberal individualism inevitably produces an abstract theory that ignores key motives of real-world secession movements.

Namely, independence is – in practice – almost never declared by groups of freely associated individuals, but rather by nations. The primary cause of secession in most cases is not the aspiration to establish a better democratic government within the new socio-political system. It is difficult to imagine that the citizens of stable democracies (such as the citizens of the United Kingdom or Spain) would be ready to engage in the not-so-easy process of forming a new state just for the sake of establishing a somewhat more efficient political system, especially not if we perceive them as rational and primarily interest-driven individuals, as proponents of plebiscitary theory and individualistic liberal philosophy do. The desire to secede should, therefore, be sought elsewhere, and the discourse of separatist campaigns best demonstrates that it often rests in the (sometimes politically and economically irrational) desire for national self-determination and/or unification. Thus, it can be concluded that plebiscitary theories unjustifiably equate the struggle for national self-determination with the struggle for greater political freedoms of individual citizens.

Further shortcomings of plebiscitary theories can be divided into three groups. The first set of shortcomings is theoretical in nature, as it questions whether collective rights – such as the right to secede – can be derived from the freedom of association, being that it is primarily an individual freedom. The second criticism of plebiscitary theories is related to their rather unconventional understanding of the state. Finally, the third group

of shortcomings is reflected in certain procedures proposed by proponents of plebiscitary theories when discussing potential institutional mechanisms through which the right to secede should be implemented.

When it comes to the theoretical shortcomings of the plebiscitary ethics of secession, the unsustainability of the arguments through which proponents of the given normative approach try to establish the collective right to territorial separation must be emphasised. In their attempt to avoid recognising communities and groups as moral agents (by establishing individuals as the only holders of the right to secession), proponents of plebiscitary theories falsely equate participation in the democratic process (i.e., such as voting) with the act of sovereign decision-making. Consequently, they come to the unfounded conclusion that citizens can be (that is, that they actually are) perfectly autonomous political actors; a conclusion from which they infer that individual freedom of association is not limited in any way, not even by the need preserve the territorial integrity of existing states.

However, it can easily be proven that the democratic principle of "majority rule" actually excludes the possibility of complete political self-determination of the individual, which makes any attempt of deriving the right to secession from individual freedom of association unfounded (Buchanan, 1998, p. 17). In other words, the argument is that citizens of contemporary democratic states simply cannot be viewed as sovereign political decision makers. On the contrary, they symbolically delegate their political power to others (by voting), as they choose the candidates that they wish to see elected, with the outcome of the election depending on the sum of all votes. It thus follows that it is the entire political community – and not each individual who resides within it – that is truly autonomous in making political decisions. And since the right to secession is territorial in its nature – meaning that it can, consequently, only be exercised by autonomous actors capable of achieving territorial sovereignty (actors such as nations) – the said right must be understood as a collective right, and not as an individual right.

Therefore, the right to secede from the state does not reside in the

individual, not only because the individual is not capable of applying it without joining a group (which is a fact recognised by some members of the plebiscitary school of thought), but also since the individual does not possess neither political nor territorial sovereignty; two essential components of autonomous decision-making from which the right to secede and the capability of drawing new international borders can be derived. Citizens, therefore, can only become independent as members of a group that chooses to leave the existing state, but they cannot be the bearers of the right to secession (as individuals), nor can the justification of the said right arise from their freedom of association. It must not be forgotten that the freedom of socio-political association of individuals (which they certainly possess) is not synonymous to the freedom of disintegrating existing institutions, nor to the freedom of territorial separation from existing states.

The analogy between secession and divorce, on which advocates of the plebiscitary approach often rely, is also questionable. While divorce is carried out according to predetermined laws that are interpreted by authorised courts, the act of secession takes place – at least from the moment in which separatists impose it as a matter of international importance – in a specific type of legal vacuum within which the principle of national self-determination and the principle of territorial integrity are constantly competing for primacy. This is why the outcome of any secession attempt mainly depends on objective power and interests of key international actors. It follows that the right to secession – unlike the right to divorce – is not reciprocal, because the parties concerned (unlike to two people in a marriage) do not enjoy it equally (Aronovitch, 2000, p. 30).

In addition to the already mentioned weaknesses of plebiscitary theories, it is also important to comment on the oversights that some plebiscitary theory proponents make when claiming that secession is justified because states are not the product of voluntary consent, but of historical circumstances. In order to refute this overly permissive attitude towards the act of redrawing borders, two counterclaims can be put forth. First, the fact that modern states

were not formed through explicit consent of (all of) their citizens – and the fact that most of existing countries were indeed created through war and conquest – does not exclude the possibility of their rehabilitation. This argument is especially valid in cases where injustices were committed in the distant past, having little or no direct impact on the current socio-political situation. Building a just and democratic political system requires a painstaking multi-generational effort that cannot simply be nullified by the fact that modern states are unable to justify the source and the scope of their own territorial sovereignty through contractualist rhetoric.

Second, if we assume that existing international borders are unjust, we indirectly call into question the morality of borders as such. The very act of drawing a demarcation line demands – by definition – that ‘the other’ be excluded, which implies that such an act (if viewed strictly from the position of plebiscitary theories, which argue for the necessity of voluntary consent) cannot be moral, due to its exclusive nature, except in cases where the desire for demarcation is mutual, and the geographical position of the international border is agreed upon. And since it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which every international border is accepted by citizens who live on both sides of the demarcation line, it is clear that even the best-conceived redistribution of the territory must ignore the will of some individuals. In order to confront this problem, plebiscitary theorists argue that it is necessary to take the will of the majority into account, which means that borders should be established in line with the aspirations of the largest number of people. However, this conclusion inevitably leads supporters of the plebiscitary normative approach (primarily those who believe that the act of redrawing of international borders is permissible due to the lack of original/democratic legitimacy of existing states) to a whole series of problems, such as – for example – the problem of favouring individuals that belong to large (and therefore more numerous) groups/nations.

Problems (albeit of a different nature) are also encountered by advocates of plenary theories who – when challenging the moral validity of contemporary

states – manage to resist the superficial appeal of majority decision making. Some of them fall into the well-known traps of philosophical anarchism, since – by denying the legitimacy of already established international borders – they inevitably call into question the justification of the state as an institution. On the other hand, others encounter difficulties similar to those faced by radical cosmopolitanism, since their rationale – which argues against demarcation, but not against the state – seems to establish a single global state as an option without an alternative. It therefore seems that plebiscitary normative ethics produce a multitude of issues, those far more problematic than the problems which they initially aim to solve; such as the problems which arise from remedial and ascriptivist theories of secession.

Other weaknesses of the plebiscitary normative approach are of a technical nature, as they are related to the way in which advocates of associative theories conceive the democratic procedure of leaving existing states. One of the most conspicuous failures in this regard is that plebiscitary theorists have not clarified whether the secessionist – who fail to realise their ambitions at the first referendum – have the right to strive for a second referendum on secession. Therefore, they also failed to consider the important question of how much time needs to pass between two referendums in order for the latter plebiscite to be justified.

Even those carefully considered plebiscitary theory proposals, such as those of Glaser or Beran, suffer from certain shortcomings. The first of the two mentioned authors (who claims that only those citizens who have resided on the seceding territory for a sufficient amount of time can participate in the secession plebiscite), does not take into account the interests of individuals who, although they do not live within the bounds of the given territory, own real estate and/or companies that operate within its borders. On the other hand, Beran's proposal – although it provides a useful framework for thinking about the procedure of secession – does not go into sufficient detail, as he fails to deliberate on specific mechanisms of achieving independence in a democratic and just manner. Consequently, it remains unclear whether it would be better

to only organise one classic plebiscite or a series of cascade referendums on secession. It is also not made clear whether it is better to stick to the simple majority principle or some other democratic principle (i.e., absolute majority principle).

Finally, the fact that philosophers and political scientists who advocate plebiscitary theories only consider peaceful scenarios of secession represents perhaps the biggest practical weakness of the plebiscitary approach to secession. By considering and developing only those institutional solutions that depend on the political will of the state to allow for a vote on the issue of secession to be held, all procedures that could be useful in resolving secessionist disputes in situations where the state does not accept the possibility of losing territory are overlooked.

Conclusion

Plebiscitary ethical theory consequently remains incomplete, as it does not develop arguments for practical cases of secession, in which the outbreak of violent conflicts is an objective possibility. Thus, following questions remain unanswered: Is the right to form a new state non-existent in situations where the outbreak of violence is a realistic threat? If so, doesn't such a conclusion establish the threat of force and provoking violence as a justified method through which existing states can deny the said right? Isn't such a conclusion directly opposed to other claims made by the proponents of the said school of thought? Consequently, how should the right to secession be implemented in practice in cases in which states oppose its implementation, if avoiding violence is the goal? Are negotiations between the two conflicting parties the best solution and in what format should they be conducted; with intermediaries (and which intermediaries) or without them? Is interventionism justified if negotiations of such kind fail and violence occurs? Also, if negotiations succeed, is international presence justified (with the goal of monitoring the implementation of the agreement achieved between secessionists and central authorities)? In other words, in what form and to what extent is international presence desirable?

As they do not offer answers to the aforementioned and related dilemmas, conclusions put forth by plebiscitary theorists seem rarely applicable in practice. Thus, the implementation of their moral arguments does not seem feasible in the context of contemporary international and interstate relations.

References

- Aronovitch, H. (2000). Why secession is unlike divorce. *Public Affairs Quarterly*, 14(1), 30–31.
- Beran, H. (1984). A liberal theory of secession. *Political Studies*, 32(1), 21–31.
- Buchanan, A. (1991). *Secession: The morality of political divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec*. Westview Press.
- Buchanan, A. (1998). Democracy and secession. In M. Moore (Ed.), *National self-determination and secession* (pp. 14–33). Oxford University Press.
- Glaser, D. (2003). The right to secession: An antisecessionist defense. *Political Studies*, 51(2), 369–386.
- Miller, D. (1995). *On nationality*. Oxford University Press.
- Philpott, D. (1995). In defense of self-determination. *Ethics*, 105(2), 352–385.
- Stančetić, V. (2015). Smisao secesije u doba globalizacije [The Point of secession in the era of globalisation]. *Kultura polisa*, 13(29), 59–74.
- Wellman, C. (2005). *A Theory of secession: The case for political self-determination*. Cambridge University Press.

Razmatranje normativnih i primenjivih aspekata plebiscitne teorije secesije

Jovica Pavlović

Institut za evropske studije, Beograd

Sažetak

U radu koji sledi, oslanjam se na metodu uspostavljanja refleksivne ravnoteže kako bih pružio kritičku evaluaciju najboljih i najslabijih argumenata putem kojih pobornici plebiscitne teorije secesije pravdaju pravo na (unilateralno) otcepljenje od međunarodno priznatih država putem referenduma. Na taj način ukazujem na činjenicu da se pomenuto pravo – iako je njegovo postojanje dokazivo u domenu normativne teorije – u praksi zapravo retko kada može primeniti na smislen i pravedan način. Naime, ono se često koristi/zloupotrebljava kao izgovor kojim se stremi pravdanju neetičkih i interesom vođenih političkih poduhvata, bilo onih koje preduzimaju separatisti/iredentisti ili regionalne/svetske sile koje secesionistima pružaju podršku (radi ostvarivanja sopstvenih geopolitičkih ciljeva). Stoga – u nameri da ostvarim primarni cilj rada – argumentujem da plebiscitna teorija secesije ne daje odgovore na mnoga pitanjima koja se tiču optimalnih načina primene pomenutog prava u praksi, pri čemu i teorijska argumentacija koju razvija ostaje nedorečena u pogledu definisanja odnosa između individualnih i kolektivnih prava, ali i u domenu sagledavanja prirode i motiva savremenih secesionističkih pokreta.

Ključne reči: secesija, individualna prava, kolektivna prava, teritorija

Problems and Perspectives of Economic Intelligence Nowadays

Miloš Lončar

Law Office Lončar, Novi Sad

Article Information*

Review Article • UDC: 330:327.84

Volume: 19 Issue: 3, pages: 110–130

Received: July, 2022 • Revised: August 17, 2022

Accepted: August 20, 2022

<https://doi.org/10.51738/Kpolisa2022.19.3r.110>

Author Note

Miloš Lončar  <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8724-2261>

I have no known conflict of interest to disclose.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Miloš Lončar,
Law Office Lončar, Železnička 4, 21000 Novi Sad, Serbia.

Email: office@lawofficeloncar.com

* Cite (APA):

Lončar, M. (2022). Problems and Perspectives of Economic Intelligence Nowadays. *Kultura polisa*, 19(3), 110–130. <https://doi.org/10.51738/Kpolisa2022.19.3r.110>

Abstract

Acquiring knowledge, that is, finding the necessary information, leads to knowledge about the subject of interest. This creates the capability of moving towards the set goal, in every area of work, action and activity, both of the individual and of the organization which one belongs to, of any level, structure and form of organization (nation, state/country and other forms of social organizations). The genesis of the concept of business intelligence indicates that it has its source in the total awareness/intelligence, and as the result, purpose and product of the intelligence activity. Such activity is also followed by the problems which arise from its implementation. In regards to this activity, which also includes espionage (illegal activity focused on secret information which is protected by somebody), business intelligence is legal and ethical activity, focused on the public, open and accessible information. As the other intelligence activities, business intelligence is also focused on the future, which also implies the possession of information about someone's intentions. The perspectives of economic intelligence are reflected in this. Therefore, as the subject of research, by applying the method of synthesis and description, as basic, and the method of abstraction, as auxiliary, the paper points out the problems and analyzes the perspectives of business intelligence in modern business and security circumstances, with the intention of achieving the goal of this paper, i.e. answer to the question: Is it possible to give an answer about the future intentions of the competition on the basis of the public information available to everyone, which mainly concerns the present?

Keywords: intelligence, espionage, economic espionage, information, competition, market

Problems and Perspectives of Economic Intelligence Nowadays

All societies in the world, regardless of the social organization, i.e. arrangement or the level of development of economic, political, cultural or other goods, are subject to a certain form of endangerment, which carries a greater or lesser degree of danger to their survival and development, i.e., their security. Because of this, a pessimistic view of the process of globalization and interdependence also arises, that such processes will not lead to international cooperation, but to competition. Globalization benefits the developed countries, and limits the perspective of less developed countries, leading to new inequalities and deepening of the gap between the rich and the poor.

One of the main reasons for underdeveloped countries to lag behind is the inability to adopt new technologies, which are the catalyst for world affairs. In this manner, technology solves some problems, but also creates new ones. In history, no generation has faced, as today's generation, such form of random violence, which was enabled and made available by modern weapon technology.

What kind of world order awaits us in the future? The very beginning of the 21st century already announced that there will be major changes in international relations: the return of Russia to the world stage, strong, first of all, the economic strengthening and influence of China on a global scale, the European Union facing significant identity problems, the financial and migration crisis, the evident decline of the influence of the United States of America and the strengthening of Islamic fundamentalism, which produces international terrorism on the widest scale. These processes encouraged theorists to deal with the emergence of the new organization of international politics. In this manner, some claim that new bipolarism is being born (Stepić, 2018, p.619), while the others are closer to the opinion that an era of multipolarity in international relations is emerging (Proroković, 2018, pp. 116–124).

Bipolar world no longer exists, but it will not be replaced by the

unipolar world empire either, which will alone control important trends in the development of human society. The world, from an economic point of view, is already multipolar, and as the information revolution advances and interdependence increases, and transnational actors on the international scene become more and more significant, there will be dispersion of power.

Today, in most developed countries, the economy is becoming dominant, to such an extent that it has become the basis of the power and influence of politics, and thus of the state/country.

In the conditions of globalism and global market competition/game, the economic development of one country is significantly conditioned by the business opportunities and economic circumstances of other countries. Finding out the acquired experience and knowledge of others, recognizing and perceiving business possibilities for one's own economy in such market, becomes crucial not only for the economic, but also for the overall development of one's own country. In such circumstances, economic intelligence is becoming the starting point, and thus the basic point of positioning of economic entities on the domestic and international market. Its importance has long been recognized in business practice around the world.

It is indisputable that by analyzing public and the information which is available to everyone and observing former and current processes and events, the answers can be given about the future moves of the competition. However, such answers, although they may individually have a significant degree of probability of realization, only they offer a representation of different scenarios. The practice shows that accurate information about the future intentions and business moves of competitors can only be obtained through the "human source", the so-called insiders, i.e. people within a competing company who have such information at their disposal or from the people who are in contact with them. It is this hard-to-find information that is often crucial. Due to this, an additional question is being asked; is this open, public and the information accessible to everyone? Surely, it is not. It is obvious that directing business intelligence to that spectrum of information implies entering the "gray zone".

Finding out the right and complete information in time results, in the end, in good positioning and business advantage on the market. With this intention, economic intelligence is approached, as the process of collecting business information and acquiring knowledge, which enables important business opportunities to be noticed before others notice them, with the aim to gain a business advantage over the competition. In regards to the collection of business information through the application of economic intelligence, it is also important to recognize the existence of economic espionage, as an activity in the "gray zone" with the same goal, and clearly demarcate them.

In contrast to the global and regional environment, which dedicate great attention and importance to economic intelligence, allocating significant material resources and training people for such activity, here we do not recognize the loss of important information as a problem, nor is it considered a major damage. "It is mistakenly believed that information has no material value, because it is not a tangible object or a material good" (Stajić, 2011, p. 241). Approaching this subject of research, the intention is to look at the problems which follow the practice of economic intelligence, but also the perspective of such intelligence activity in modern business operating conditions.

From the structural point of view, the subject of research is divided into two mutually interconnected units. In the first part, the problems which follow business intelligence as the activity are approached, which is being connected to the second part, in which the perspectives of this activity are analyzed, primarily at the company level, but also at higher levels of social and state organization.

From the methodological point of view, by approaching such subject of research, in the paper, several basic and auxiliary scientific methods were used, in the manner in which, as the basic scientific methods, the method of synthesis (the procedure of scientific research by linking, connecting and unifying) and the method of description (description in order to obtain precise information in order to fully define the observed phenomenon), and

the method of abstraction were used (highlighting the main thing in the subject of study and separating it from the unimportant) as an auxiliary scientific method, in order to show the importance of business intelligence, the problem that follows this activity, finding possible solutions, as well as showing the lack of perspective not only for business, but also for overall state development.

By spotting the exceptional importance that business information and timely and complete intelligence have for the economic/business life not only of one state, but also in wider, international business framework, in the following presentation, with the review of the available literature and in the scope/volume required for the creation of the expert paper, as the subject of more detailed consideration, the problems and perspectives of business intelligence are taken, in order to, within the scope of the concluding consideration, briefly refer to the spotted observations about the importance of the activity of business intelligence for modern business operations as the activity which is gaining more and more significance in the process of economic strengthening of our country.

Business Intelligence – Problems

Finding something out/learning and acquiring new knowledge is permanent feature of human and overall social development. As an activity, intelligence is an indispensable part and important element of state security and building the economic strenght of the country, and thus an important factor in the positioning of the country towards other countries and other international entities.

Today, the world's leading countries are waging economic wars for the sake of market and territorial positioning in comparison to all other economies, especially developing countries. The main goal of all participants in this process is the economic conquest of parts of the world market.

The continuity of striving for greater interstate influence also includes the intention of appropriating other people's technology as an "upgrade" and strengthening one's own economic and thus political power.

With that intention, knowledge is also obtained through aggressive approaches to universities. Recruiting university personnel has become common and continuous activity of intelligence services, both at the state and company level. Thus, this type of scientific staff becomes key resource in scientific and technological research and development.

As part of the business process, economic intelligence is the activity which companies plan, organize and implement in order to take or preserve their market position.

Business knowledge acquired in this manner, through the analyzes obtained from the collected data and information, there is also "the power of the state built, essentially, on knowledge and information technology, so, in the context of the new economy and the new world order, knowledge will become the primordial basis of economic power" (Petrović Piroćanac, 2005, p. 161).

The progenitor of the term economic intelligence, Dr. Stevan Dedijer, considered it crucial for economic development to connect the collected information and, on the basis of the knowledge thus acquired, to recognize the further development processes (Petrović Piroćanac, 2005, p. 173).

At the time of the "easier" access to information and numerous business data, by their processing and analysis, companies come to the opportunity to shape their business environment and "adjust" the business competition to act reactively or to remove from themselves the circumstances that should cause companies to react in such a way to actions of its competitors.

Contemporary business practice arguably shows that it is often very difficult to draw the line between legal business-intelligence activities and illegal business espionage. This leads to the problem – the question/issue of the code of ethics, as the professional manner of behavior, which should be applied during the realization of the business intelligence affairs. Different cultural features and positive/current legal regulations, in different countries, show that something that is considered unethical or illegal in one nation or country does not have the same meaning in other countries. Precisely

for the sake of clearer separation of legal business-intelligence activity from illegal business espionage, i.e. attempts to "unify" different national cultural features, as well as avoiding unacceptable acts during the professional performance of business activities in the field of business intelligence, the principles of realizing such activity at the international level are accepted.

The above stated leads to the next problem – the question; have all dilemmas been resolved by accepting the code of ethics or are there still "grey areas/zones"? "Grey zones" certainly exist, and it seems that they will also exist in the future, for the simple reason in which no code can include all future situations, as well as because in such, specific situations, individuals interpret the provisions of this code differently.

Business intelligence is also focused on the research of management personnel of competing companies. Such activity is quite understandable because the managers are subjects who make decisions. Collecting information about them enables us to perceive their psychological profiles, on the basis of which their future decisions are estimated. This implies collecting data about their personality. In this sense, the question of "entering" their privacy, as well as the question of secrecy and protection of their personal information, is justifiably raised.

A special dilemma before business intelligence is posed by the possibility that the company, by realization of the activities from the legal spectrum of this activity, accidentally or indirectly finds out about the business secrets of other business entities. In relation to this, the following question is asked; will such information be used in making one's own business decisions? In accordance with the ethical business code, it would be appropriate for the accidental learning/discovering of other people's business secrets to be the obligation of the new owner not to use them in order to preserve the business integrity of the competitors. Exceptions of acting in business practices show that such an approach is, however, far from the set rule.

An even greater controversy is created by the result of business intelligence. Namely, although this activity is directed to public, open and information

accessible to everyone, the following question comes up; are also the final products of intelligence activity/work like that? Final, business-intelligence analyses, which originated as the result of processing, interpretation and analytical shaping of public, open and the information accessible to everyone, in reality temporarily become secret and available only to business policy creators and decision makers. Their performance/output is visible to others only afterwards.

It is obvious that business intelligence in its comprehensiveness is undeniably useful and necessary for the application in the modern business conditions of the companies operation, but it is also labeled by the series of specificities, dilemmas and controversial issues to which there is no universal and uniquely acceptable answer. Gradual and further studying of the phenomenon of business intelligence and drawing conclusions by analyzing cases from practice will contribute to the creation of prerequisites for formulating complete (comprehensive) theory that can provide clearer answers to the series of dilemmas. The surest way to avoid and eliminate disputed situations is to act "in good faith", respecting national and international norms, professional legalities and the code of ethics.

Business Intelligence – Perspectives

As the intelligence activity which includes the process of legal collection of public and information available to everyone, by ethical means, their analysis, in order to obtain "useful product", i.e. knowledge based on which decision makers can make rational decisions about the further business development of the company, economic intelligence focuses attention on exploitation so-called open sources.

Almost 90% of the demanded information can be obtained from open sources, without the need to undertake illegal activity. "The largest amount of the demanded information is found "close at hand", and which the analyst is qualified, educated and persistent in his work" (Petrović Piroćanac, 2005, p. 11)

Due to the importance of business development, economic intelligence has a multidisciplinary approach in the analysis of collected data and information. To such an extent that neither the geopolitical and geoeconomic facts, nor the cultural or social environment of the area being processed are neglected.

Leading companies give decisive importance and influence to this kind of activity. With the sole aim to obtain the best possible quality information, and thus the decisions made also, in order to gain the advantage over other subjects. An important aspect of such activities is also the collection of information in order to answer business questions: what is happening in the business environment, what is the place and role that competitors have, why certain activities are happening, what can be expected as future business event, what needs to be done in relation to future business events and in what manner to undertake such business activities.

Although this activity, at the company level, is handled by specially specialized services, to them can also be assisted by the "state structure", when it is assessed that there is a national interest. Then the company's interests are equated with this interest, so cooperation with state intelligence structures can bring better market position of the company.

In this manner, the effectiveness of economic-intelligence work in modern business conditions is confirmed, both on the internal and the external plan.

By strengthening its own economy, the country achieves a better international position, and thus acquires a greater international image. Business intelligence as the activity also contributes to this.

The basic meaning of business intelligence refers to the legal collection of business information and data and their forwarding to users in the parent company or the state. In this sense, the motive by which a certain company is guided is to "find any information (because information is power) that will help the company achieve its goals" (Radović, 2008, p. 145). The goal may be to create a new product or imitate a product, develop new technology, increase market share or advantage, etc.

Places where information and data of interest for business-intelligence activities can be found are formal documents (plans, reports, specifications of products and work processes, technical documentation, etc.), sketches of plans and projects, unimportant pieces of paper (invoices, travel maps, napkins, etc.), internal correspondence (meeting minutes, decisions, resolutions, newsletters, etc.), state institutions (authorities for statistical, patent, business and other associations, archives), which collect various information and data from companies, public services (daily and weekly newspapers, magazines, internet), formal meetings (in companies), informal meetings (after working hours) (Radović, 2008, p. 146).

The biggest internal problem that companies have are their disloyal employees, especially those who work with confidential information or on confidential projects. It is very difficult to protect oneself from such employees. According to some studies, in over 70% of the cases, the employees were responsible for giving away confidential information (Golubović, 2020, p. 57).

How the collected information, from different sources or different information from the same source, will be systematized and, based on that, reported certain findings, which are the subject of further processing and analysis, and then handing them over, in the form of useful information, as the "finished product" of intelligence activity, to the parent campaign or the state, depends on the cautiousness, expertise and capability of experts for business-intelligence activity.

In addition to this, the human factor remains an unavoidable companion and point of support and success of business intelligence activity.

Economic intelligence is an instrument without which there is no modern business. As the "business radar", economic intelligence enables companies to conduct their business effectively, i.e. to remain competitive in the market. By managing business information and data, economic intelligence is the basis for the company's management in the process of making final business decisions, whose implementation leads to the achievement of set goals, i.e. the final realization of the company's previously defined business plan.

The question of security of collected business information and, based on it, acquired business knowledge, is no less important than the question of its disclosure, collection, processing and analysis. Therefore, economic counter-intelligence activity, as the defensive side of economic intelligence, aims to protect access and prevent the disclosure of business information, classified by the appropriate degree of confidentiality, to unauthorized persons, i.e. identifying potential threats and risks to the company's business security.

As the activity of periodic nature, economic intelligence includes several phases, which are carried out during the intelligence cycle (planning phase, management phase, collection phase, processing and analysis phase, final report preparation phase, distribution phase and usage phase) (Trivan, 2012, p. 116). Each of the mentioned phases requires careful planning and systematic realization.

Finally, the knowledge thus produced is distributed to the end user, which represents the final stage of intelligence activity. Due to the willingness and readiness of the user to believe or not in the presented document, it represents a very delicate task (Bonifacio, 2019, p. 12).

During the research, considering the presence of this activity at the world level and in the economic systems of the developed countries, the important characteristics of modern business intelligence were observed/spotted:

1. Business intelligence is the starting point and the follower of the economic development of every country that has strategically decided to strengthen its economy and international position.

2. Carriers of business intelligence are business entities, which, with a strategic approach on the domestic and foreign market, position themselves as the indispensable creators of business operations.

3. Within the scope of business entities, business intelligence is organizationally structured as an independent service, which cooperates with all internal and external elements and factors of importance for business operation.

4. Business intelligence in the non-state sector represents an integral part of the entire intelligence activity at the state level, whose mutual connection and cooperation represent the foundation of the economic development of the state and its good positioning towards others, by strengthening the political and military power of the state.

5. Human capital is the unavoidable factor for the success of business intelligence.

6. Business intelligence is legal and continuous activity of collecting, processing, analyzing and producing useful information and data, in the unlimited space and areas of own interest and action.

7. Modern state is the guarantor of the development of the culture of intelligence, in which the awareness of the importance of knowledge and cognition is woven into the system of basic values of the modern social community.

8. Business intelligence is recognized and acknowledged intelligence activity, elevated to the rank of scientific discipline at the world's leading university centers, in which it is methodologically studied, improved and confirmed by the results obtained in practice.

In the light of the above stated characteristics, business intelligence can be viewed in a broader and narrower sense. Viewed in a broader sense, business intelligence represents the subject's competence to timely identify early signals of economic possibilities or threats to the market position or prevent the loss of information and data labeled as secret.

In the narrower sense, business intelligence could be defined as methodologically regulated, permitted by law, ethical and coordinated activity of the intelligence services of the state and non-state sectors, undertaken for research from open sources, collection, processing, analysis, production, transmission, presentation, use and protection of useful business information and data, required for making business decisions to develop and protect the market position of the business entity.

In this manner, we are getting close to two world schools of thought

about business intelligence and its importance for the success of one country. The bearers of these opinions are Konosuke Matsushita, Japanese business magnate, on the one hand, and Stevan Dedijer, a Swedish professor of Serbian origin, on the other hand. Despite the presence of several national views on this matter, Japanese and Swedish understanding of business intelligence are particularly useful examples for emulation, development and positioning of the Serbian state among contemporary cultures of business intelligence.

There are great possibilities/opportunities for the application of business intelligence in Serbia, especially with the realization of specific social circumstances also, such as: determined commitment to the development of the market economy, gauged/weighted influence of state authorities on the economy, prudent/careful openness towards foreign investments and effective control of the participation of foreign companies on the domestic market, improving the efficiency and responsibility of all segments of the legal system and legal regulation of sanctioning unethical forms of behavior of function holders at all levels of state and business organization, support for the development of business ethics and business culture, comprehensive use and protection of communication and improvement of electronic business transactions.

Although the outflow of important knowledge, information and data in Serbia is not yet considered as great damage, with the presence of certain technological backlog, there is still very interesting information for business competition in the Serbian economy. Little or no attention is given to their protection, with the explanation that it is not about money, object or other material good. However, the information about people, knowledge and potentials are valuable (intangible) assets for anyone who knows how to use them and, based on them, create business opportunities for themselves. Such information is of inestimable significance for all serious companies. This is especially when they tend to attract the management staff of the target companies by work engagement, who also bring with them important information and data. By leaving such personnel to them easily, and forgetting to adequately protect themselves from such behavior of the competition, and failing to

take countermeasures, domestic business entities become doomed to business failure.

With the economic recovery, Serbia is becoming very interesting area for various business observations, so the intelligence activity on the economic plan has become intensive. It should be emphasized that foreign business intelligence activity is particularly present. One gets the impression that the foreigners know the opportunities/conditions and circumstances in Serbia better than domestic economic actors and that they have all the necessary information about domestic companies, on the basis of which they create their policy strategy of imposing requirements/conditions, therefore bringing their companies to a better starting position on the domestic market. Knowing the methodology of such activity remains unavailable, exclusively due to the lack of recognition of the significance of business intelligence as the basis for the development and protection of one's own economy and the building of the economic strength and political power of one's own state. And at the root of this intelligence is knowledge as the starting point of the development, strength and power.

In Serbia, members of the state structures of the security services deal primarily with economic intelligence affairs.

As these services are only occasionally introduced to business data and information as indirect products of their primary activity, experts who deal with economic-intelligence activities should be experts, with special and unique knowledge, ethically built and aware of the importance that initial information entails. As an activity that has its own rules, studying economic-intelligence activity, with its breadth of interest, can lay the theoretical foundations and principles of economic intelligence, applicable in practice. The knowledge/cognition gained about the past activities of individuals and companies of the world's leading economies supports such approach.

Conclusion

Historically observed, intelligence activity is encountered already at

the beginning of the development of human society. What's more, the entire development of humanity can be seen as the process conditioned by intelligence. Getting to know the environment, the manner of forming and building social relations, the action and influence of the environment on individuals and society as a whole, the creation and emergence of objects/subjects, recognition of the importance of cooperation, but also the protection of what has been acquired are, essentially, the result of what constitutes awareness/intelligence.

Therefore, the study of the position and operation of economic intelligence, its value determination for today's development of collectivity (society, state, supranational structures and other forms of social organization), but also of individuals, deserve special interest and research. With particular consideration of the possibility of improving the competitiveness of the economy, business stability and security of the Republic of Serbia.

Intelligence activity as an inevitable/unavoidable link in the business decision-making of the business entities appears as the key weapon in the realization of the business strategy within the completely legal framework. This type of activity can also be encountered and found in the economies of all economically developed countries of the world. Besides the state/government sector, conditioned by the competition and the need to survive on the market, business entities also form sectors that deal with intelligence activities.

As the activity that arose from the intelligence area, which is dominantly connected to the state, from the point of view of ethics, economic intelligence is ethical activity, because the professionalism of the experts who deal with it is indisputable today, although ethics has different meanings in different cultures. The professionalism of the approach to this activity also implies ethics, especially when collecting information and revealing information to competitors, in order to avoid identification with economic espionage.

Economic intelligence is public and legal activity, aimed at collecting information from the open, public and the information available to everyone, in contrast to economic espionage as an illegal and secret activity, which is undertaken in order to collect confidential information, classified with certain

degree of secrecy.

As business function with companies of the world's leading economies, economic intelligence confirms its importance by the fact that it is a market worth almost 100 billion US dollars, on which this activity is carried out in more than 95% of cases of obtaining business data and information.

Although its roots can be found in the early period of the development of human society, economic intelligence is, nevertheless, a phenomenon of the new age. In addition to the importance it has in the conditions of global market business operation and globalization relations, where geoeconomics takes precedence over geopolitics, the theoretical framework of economic intelligence is not fully determined. However, as business practice, it is applied daily on the markets of the leading economically developed countries of the world. As such, it is gradually turning into theory, which is systematically studied at the world's leading universities.

By observing the place, importance and role of economic intelligence in the Republic of Serbia, with the inclusion on the world market and connection with foreign business partners, economic intelligence is becoming important business-intelligence activity, although it is still looking for a place in business practice. The fact that domestic business entities recognize the importance of timely and complete business information for market positioning and further economic development certainly contributes to this. With such development of the business environment, in Serbia, also the experts who, primarily, professionally and ethically, deal with the affairs of collection, processing, analysis, reporting, distribution and use of business information and acquired business knowledge are becoming significant, in order to enable the management of companies, i.e. the decision makers of all form and level of organization, proper and comprehensive assessment of circumstances, possibilities and opportunities for purposeful decision-making and monitoring of the realization of the decisions made.

By applying in practice the already present and accepted rules of work and behavior, and especially by the primary use of data and information

from the so-called open (public, accessible to all) sources, and by skilful review and analysis of the collected material, the future moves of the competition on the market can be recognized. This also gives an affirmative answer to the question asked in the said scientific research paper.

Observing/spotting and showing the problems that appear through the practical application of business intelligence, but also recognizing its perspective within this research paper, nevertheless show that their additional analysis and argumentation go beyond the borders and character of this kind of paper. Broad area, such as business intelligence, deserves much more research and scientific work.

References

- Bonifacio, M. M. (2019). *Strateška inteligencija – razumeti svet špijunaže* [Strategic intelligence – understand the world of espionage]. Samizdat.
- Golubović, S. Z. (2020). *Savremena ekonomska diplomatija* [Contemporary economic diplomacy]. Partenon.
- Dedijer, S. (2011). *Autobiografija – špijun kojeg smo voljeli* [Autobiography – the spy we loved]. VBZ.
- Dedijer, S. (2003). Development & intelligence 2003–2053. *National Security and the Future*, 3(3–4).
<https://www.nsf-journal.hr/online-issues/intelligence-systems/id/1153>
- Dedijer, S. (1996). Development and management by intelligence: Japan. In B. Cronin (Ed.), *Information, development and social intelligence*. Taylor Graham.
- Dedijer, S. (1975, April 20). *Social Intelligence – a comparative social science approach to an emerging problem*. Dartmouth College (Commented in New York Times, 10 May 1975).
- Petrović Piroćanac, Z. (2005). *Ekonomska špijunaža: mali vodič kroz istoriju ekonomske obaveštajnosti, do Desete revolucije inteligencije u istoriji čovečanstva* [Economic espionage: a small guide through the history of economic intelligence, to the tenth intelligence revolution in the history of mankind]. Draslar partner.
- Proroković, D. (2018). *Era multipolarnosti* [The era of multipolarity]. Službeni glasnik.
- Radović, V. (2008). Ekonomska špijunaža – motivi i metode, [Economic Espionage – Motives and Methods]. Pregledni članci, Spoljnotrgovinski fakultet, Univerzitet Privredna akademija.
- Stajić, Lj. (2011). Zaštita od ugrožavanja nematerijalne imovine sa posebnim osvrtom na ulogu prava [Protection of endangered

intangible assets specific insight into the role of the law]. *Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Novom Sadu*, 45(3), 239–252.

Stepić, M. (2018). Geopolitika: ideje, teorije, koncepcije, [Geopolitics: ideas, theories, concepts]. Institut za političke studije, Beograd.

Trivan, D. (2012). *Korporativna bezbednost* [Corporate security]. Dosije studio.

Problemi i perspektive ekonomske obaveštajnosti danas

Miloš Lončar

Advokatska kancelarija „Lončar”, Novi Sad

Sažetak

Sticanjem znanja, odnosno saznavanjem, dolazi se do obaveštenja o predmetu interesovanja. Time se kreira sposobnost kretanja prema postavljenom cilju, u svakoj oblasti rada, delovanja i aktivnosti, kako pojedinca, tako i organizacije kojoj se pripada, bilo kojeg nivoa, structure i forme organizovanosti (nacije, države i drugih oblika društvenih organizacija). Geneza pojma ekonomska obaveštajnost ukazuje da ona ima izvorište u ukupnoj obaveštenosti, kao rezultatu, svrsi i proizvodu obaveštajne aktivnosti. Takvu aktivnost prate i problemi, koji nastaju njenim sprovođenjem. U odnosu na ovu aktivnost, koja uključuje i špijunažu (nelegalnu delatnost usmerenu na tajne podatke koje neko štiti), ekonomska obaveštajnost je legalna i etička aktivnost, usmerena na javne, otvorene i svima dostupne podatke. Kao i druge obaveštajne aktivnosti, i ekonomska obaveštajnost je usmerena na budućnost, što podrazumeva i posedovanje informacija o nečijim namerama. U tome se ogledaju perspektive ekonomske obaveštajnosti. Zato se, kao predmet istraživanja, primenom metoda sinteze i deskripcije, kao osnovnih, i metode apstrakcije, kao pomoćne, u radu ukazuje na probleme i analiziraju se perspektive ekonomske obaveštajnosti u savremenim ekonomsko-bezbednosnim okolnostima, u nameri da se ostvari cilj ovog rada, odnosno odgovori na pitanje: Da li se na osnovu javnih, svima dostupnih informacija, koje se pretežno tiču sadašnjosti, može dati odgovor o budućim namerama konkurencije?

Ključne reči: obaveštajna aktivnost, špijunaža, ekonomska špijunaža, informacije, konkurencija, tržište

Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility as Part of Criminal Policies

Darko M. Marković and Ivana Spaić

University Business Academy in Novi Sad
Faculty of Law for Commerce and Judiciary in Novi Sad

Article Information*


Review Article • UDC: 343.8:343.91-053.6

Volume: 19 Issue: 3, pages: 131–155

Received: July 5, 2022 • Revised: July 19, 2022 • Accepted: July 27, 2022

<https://doi.org/10.51738/Kpolisa2022.19.3r.131ms>

Author Note

Darko M. Marković  <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9124-6417>

Ivana Spaić  <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6461-4042>

We have no known conflict of interest to disclose.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Darko M. Marković, University Business Academy in Novi Sad, Geri Karolja 1, 21107 Novi Sad, Serbia. Email: darko.markovic@pravni-fakultet.info

* Cite (APA):

Marković, D. M., & Spaić, I. (2022). Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility as Part of Criminal Policies. *Kultura polisa*, 19(3), 131–155. <https://doi.org/10.51738/Kpolisa2022.19.3r.131ms>

Abstract

The increase in peer violence and juvenile delinquency from year to year has kept the question of minimum age of criminal responsibility open around the world. States, not only in different parts of the world, but also within smaller regions territorially connecting them, have been developing various criminal legal responses to this question. Reasons behind such a variety lie in circumstances of economic, social, cultural, religious, political, and even political nature. In theory and practice, two opposing concepts can be distinguished – the so-called repressive and holistic concepts. Advocates of the first concept believe that a strict criminal policy is the safest way toward decreasing criminality among children and minors. On the other side, supporters of the holistic approach believe children in early age cannot understand the meaning of their actions, that is why lowering the age of criminal responsibility would introduce children to the criminal legal system too early when society could take timely measures that would prevent children from adopting a criminal pattern of behaviour. Using the comparative law method, as well as other qualitative and quantitative methods necessary for a productive analysis and deduction of valid conclusions, in this paper we aim to point up key aspects of the differences between the repressive and holistic approach to determining the minimum age of criminal responsibility. The final result is a firmly established belief that it is necessary to give advantage to the approach that does not see the children and minors drawn into the criminal milieu as part of the problem but as part of the solution.

Keywords: juvenile delinquency, peer violence, MACR, penal policy, criminal policy

Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility as Part of Criminal Policies

One of the most important issues for the policy of combating juvenile delinquency is the age at which a child can be considered criminally responsible for acts defined as criminal-by-criminal legislation. There is no unified position on this issue in the world, and often not even within a single country. It is certain that economic, social, cultural, religious, political, and sometimes historical circumstances greatly influence it. Therefore, the lower limit of criminal responsibility is regulated differently from country to country, whereby it is noticeable that European countries lean towards a higher age. With a noticeable increase in family violence (Bjelajac & Merdović, 2019), as well as peer violence in recent years, especially considering the emergence of new forms, such as digital violence (Bjelajac & Filipović, 2021), the number of children is not only increasing as victims but also as perpetrators of criminal acts. That's why, from time to time, thoughts about lowering the minimum age for criminal responsibility appear in the public eye (Shigong, 2020; Tanjug, 2019; UNICEF, 2019; Pill Damm et al., 2017). Such thoughts are supported by the fact that violent behaviour among children is increasingly taking on the characteristics of very serious crimes and that it is, therefore, necessary to lower the age limit of criminal responsibility. Those views are defended with claims that the increasing crime rate among younger and younger perpetrators can only be suppressed by a harsher state reaction. Opponents of such an approach point out that by lowering the age limit, a greater number of children are introduced into the criminal justice system, which only worsens the problem. Accordingly, in many countries, there are numerous initiatives to raise the age of criminal responsibility for children to a higher level than the existing one (Kemp, 2022; Amnesty International, 2022; National Juvenile Defender Center [NJDC], 2020). Through a comparative analysis of applied solutions in different criminal justice systems, we highlight the advantages and disadvantages of a holistic and repressive approach to this problem, to arrive at a valid conclusion on which concept of control of youth behavioural disorders is more

appropriate considering the characteristics of that age.

In the first part of the paper, the approaches of different countries by continents, to this issue are analysed to get a more vivid picture of the diversity of approaches according to the specifics of the economic, political, social and cultural environment. In the following, the arguments of the repressive and holistic approaches are compared, to illuminate the greater justification of one or the other. In the final part, before drawing the conclusion, an overview is given of the situation in Serbia in relation to the region, and the reality of the need to improve juvenile justice in that segment, in order to harmonize it with the standards of the European Union.

Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility Around the World

Already the very fact that the picture of a minimum age of criminal responsibility (MACR) around the world is diverse tells us about different approaches to this issue. For a better insight into this diversity, we will show a brief cross-section of the current situation (June 2022) separately for each continent, according to data from the Child Rights Information Network [CIRN] – international research, policy and advocacy organisation working to advance children's rights. This approach is justified by the fact that cultural differences have a significant impact on the development of criminal policy in a certain state, as well as in a broader region.

MACR in the Americas

Within the most part of the North American continent, the minimum age of criminal responsibility is very low – from the age of a baby to 10 years of age. This is characteristic of most states within the United States, as well as independent countries: Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Belize, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, as well as Trinidad and Tobago. In other countries of this continent, MACR is established between 12 and 18 years of age, and it is most often at the endpoints of this range.

According to the National Juvenile Defender Centre in Washington,

DC, statutes of only 21 of 50 states and one of five inhabited territories of the United States of America have prescribed MACR (NJDC, 2020, January 20). The lower limit of criminal responsibility ranges from 6 (North Carolina) to 12 years of age (California and Massachusetts). Most often (14 states and one territory) the lower limit of criminal responsibility is 10 years. Other US territorial units (29 states, the District of Columbia, as well as four inhabited territories) have a more rigorous attitude since their criminal legislature does not prescribe the MACR. It means that theoretically even a baby can be criminally processed. However, it is quite clear that both, non-prescribing MACR and so low age limit, are subjects of the human rights organizations' critiques, which we will be discussed later.

Outside the USA, the lowest MACR is provided in the Caribbean. Seven-year-old children can be held criminally liable in Trinidad and Tobago as well as in Grenada. In Trinidad and Tobago, this is not regulated by the national legislation but is the result of case law. In the same way, the standard on the criminal responsibility of a child between 10 and 14 years of age has been set. Namely, there is no presumption of criminal responsibility at that age, but it must be proven from the circumstances before and during the criminal act itself (the child's mental state and awareness of wrongdoing), as well as afterwards (the child's behaviour) (Government of Trinidad and Tobago, 2004, para 248). Unlike Trinidad and Tobago, the Criminal Code sets seven years as the minimum age of criminal responsibility in Grenada. Life imprisonment for children between the ages of 13 and 18 cannot be imposed in Grenada. Eight-year-old children can be held criminally liable in Antigua and Barbuda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, as well as in Saint Kitts and Nevis. In Belize, a child cannot be held criminally liable if he/she is under the age of 9, and for a criminal responsibility between the ages of 9 and 12, the child's maturity to understand the nature and consequences of its action is assessed. In the Bahamas, it is determined in the same way whether there are grounds for criminal responsibility of children between the ages of 10 and 12, while children under the age of 10 cannot be held criminally responsible. A similar

principle applies to Barbados for people older than 11.

Various approaches are represented in the rest of the continent, but children in those countries cannot be criminally responsible under the age of 12 years – Dominica, Jamaica, Canada, Panama and Saint Lucia. In the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, and Nicaragua MACR are 13. On the other hand, the MACR is 18 in El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Honduras. There are some circumstances when children between the ages of 13 and 18 years can be criminally responsible, but they cannot be prisoned. Guatemala's Constitution (National Constituent Assembly, 1985/1993, Art. 20) provides engagement of specialized institutions and personnel if the minors violate a penal law and do not allow their imprisonment in adult penitentiaries. In Canada, one cannot be criminally responsible before turning 12 years old. Like in the United States' case, states within Mexico have the discretion to determine the minimum age of criminal responsibility. Article 18 of the Mexican Constitution limits this right to a range of 12 to 18 years, while children under the age of 12 may be subject to certain socialization measures. Cuba is especially interesting because a socialist model of social organization is still present, with a specific approach to the education of children and youth. The Criminal Code of this country stipulates that the lower limit of criminal responsibility is 16 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime (Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular, 2020, Art. 16) and contemplates multiple provisions for differentiated treatment for those between 16 and 18 (Art. 17). Certain mitigations of punishments are prescribed for younger categories of perpetrators of criminal acts.

The situation with MACR is much simpler in South America. There is no country in which criminal responsibility can be attributed to someone under the age of 10. Criminal liability for this age (10 years) is prescribed only in Guyana and Suriname. In Venezuela, when they reach the age of 12, children are subject to punishment for crimes, including imprisonment. MACR in Paraguay is 14, but a child between the ages of 14 and 18 can be held criminally liable only if it is determined that he or she is mature enough to understand the essence of the act and the consequences. In Argentina, a child cannot be

criminally responsible between the ages of 16 and 18. There is a limitation for these ages because someone can be held criminally responsible only if he or she commits a criminal offence punishable by imprisonment for 2 years or more. In Bolivia, MACR is identical, and children between the ages of 12 and 16 can be subjected to social and educational measures, which are regulated by a special law. In other South American countries (Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Peru and Uruguay), no one can be held criminally liable if he or she is under 18 years of age. Special laws regulating the responsibility of children and adolescents for illegal acts prescribe appropriate social and educational measures for ages between 12 (Uruguay – 13) and 18 years of age (CRIN, n.d.).

MACR in Australia and Oceania

In all Australian states and territories, children under the age of 10 cannot be held criminally responsible, while for the age between 10 and 14 years the prosecution may conduct a procedure to determine the child's ability to understand the essence and consequences of his or her act, as a precondition for the child's criminal responsibility. A similar principle has applied in most countries of Oceania – Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. There are some differences in New Zealand since according to the Crimes Act 1961 younger than 18 years can be held criminally responsible only for the most serious crimes (Sections 21(1 and 2) and 272). Thus, children aged 10 and 11 years can be criminally responsible for murder or manslaughter, while children aged 12 and 13 can be prosecuted for “offences for which the maximum penalty is or includes imprisonment for life or where the maximum penalty is 10 years’ imprisonment or more” (CRIN, n.d.). In Samoa, children aged between 10 and 12 years can be held criminally liable if they had the capacity to know that their criminal behaviour had been amoral, or a violation of the law. According to Federal law of the Federated States of Micronesia, there is no lower age limit for the sentence to confinement, but a child cannot be prosecuted as

an adult under the age of 16. As for individual states within this federation, differences exist in Chuuk State Law, which allows for the possibility of challenging the decision that children between the ages of 10 and 14 cannot be criminally liable (CRIN, n.d.). The largest deviations in the direction of lower MACR exist in the Solomon Islands and Tonga. The criminal legislation of the Solomon Islands stipulates that the lower limit of criminal responsibility is the age of 8, whereby in the case of it is about the ages between 8 and 12, the ability of a child to understand the act he has committed is determined. When it comes to Tonga, the same principle applies, except that the lower limit has been lowered to the age of seven.

MACR in Africa

Africa consists of 56 independent states, so explaining how the lower limit of criminal responsibility is determined in each of them would exceed the goal and projected scope of this work. Therefore, we will point out the most specific examples, according to the data at the Child Rights International Network disposal (CRIN, n.d.). In most countries, MACR is linked to the age between 12 and 14, but there are also a significant number of countries where the age limit is lower than 12, with a few countries raising the criminal responsibility age limit to more than 14. A child cannot be held criminally responsible at the age of under 7 (the existence of criminal responsibility at a certain age is conditioned by the assessment of the child's ability to understand the essence and significance of the law violation) in Malawi (7–12), Mauritania, Namibia (7–14), Nigeria, Seychelles (7–12), Sudan, Swaziland (7–14), United Republic of Tanzania (7–12), and Zimbabwe (7–14). MACR is 8 in Kenya (8–12) and Zambia (8–12), while children in Ethiopia cannot be criminally responsible at the age below 9. Children under the age of 10 cannot be held criminally liable in Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Lesotho, and South Africa. Additionally, in some of these countries, boys in age under 12 years cannot be prosecuted for sexual offences because of a presumption that they are not physically capable of sexual intercourse – in Malawi, Seychelles, and Zimbabwe. However,

when it comes to Zimbabwe, this presumed physical incapability may be challenged in court. MACR is higher than 14 in only six countries, as follows: 15 – Burundi; 16 – Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and Sao Tome and Principe.

MACR in Asia

Asia is the most populous continent in the world. The oldest cultures in the history of the world had developed on this continent, so it is quite logical that the tradition is most present in the countries of that area. The most conspicuous mixture of the old and the new is on this continent, which is also reflected in the diversity of legal systems. Sharia law is applied in many countries, and this has also an impact on the establishment of a minimum age of criminal responsibility. According to Sharia rules, a child can be held criminally liable when reaching puberty. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, this is a basic rule applied in judicial practice. At the same time, there is a noticeable inequality in the treatment of male and female children, because it is considered that boys reach maturity at 15 lunar years (14 years and 7 months), while for girls it is the age of 9 lunar years (8 years and 9 months). In the United Arab Emirates, Sharia law takes precedence, but there is also a secular regulation under which a child under the age of seven cannot be held criminally liable. The same principle is in force in Pakistan, and according to secular law, the lower limit is also seven years, but at the age of 7–12 determining the child's ability to understand the circumstances and consequences of his actions is necessary. This applies as well to Brunei Darussalam, India, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mongolia, Qatar, Singapore, and Thailand (the age of checking maturity is 7–14). Next, the MACR in Indonesia is seven, while it is nine in Bangladesh, Iraq and Oman. Children under 10 can be criminally responsible in Bhutan, Hong Kong Special Autonomous Region within China, Nepal (10–13) and Syria, as well as in Malaysia, where sharia rules are also applicable. The MACR is 12 in only five countries – Afghanistan, Israel, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, and Sri Lanka (12–14). Great progress in the holistic direction has

been made in other Asian countries. Thus, for the most serious crimes, a child at the age of 14 can be held criminally liable in Cambodia, Japan, Kazakhstan, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Viet Nam, and Uzbekistan. For minor crimes, in these countries, the MACR is 16, while this age limit is unconditional in Timor-Leste. Criminal responsibility can be attributed between the ages of 15 and 18 in Bahrain, the People's Democratic Republic of Laos, Maldives, as well as the Philippines (CRIN, n.d.).

MACR in Europe

The largest number of countries in Europe is gathered in the European Union (EU), where some standards are established on many legal issues, especially in the field of human rights, which are binding on all member states. However, criminal law is not codified within the EU, so there are different views on the minimum age of criminal responsibility. The United Kingdom withdrew from the EU, but even before it withdrew, a standard was established there that largely deviates from the demands of human rights defenders within the EU regarding the decriminalization of children. MACR in the UK is 10, except for Scotland, where it is 12. In Switzerland, which is not among the EU members, children the age of 10 or older can be held criminally responsible. In Ireland, a child also can be held criminally liable at the age of 10, but for murder manslaughter and rape, while MACR for other crimes is 12. The age of 12 is the lower limit for criminal responsibility in Andorra, Belgium, Hungary (14 for less serious crimes), Netherlands, San Marino, and Turkey (a child between the ages of 12 and 14 can be held criminally liable only if it is determined that he or she is mature enough to understand the essence of the act and the consequences). Monaco is the only country where MACR is 13. The largest number of countries (26, whereby 12 of them are not members of the EU) determined the age of 14 as the lower limit of criminal responsibility. However, in the case of some of those countries, there are certain specifics. Regardless of the severity of the crime, this standard is

applied in Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Germany (14–18), Italy (14–17), Latvia, Malta, Romania (14–16), Slovakia (15 for sexual abuse), Slovenia, Spain, as well as in non-members of the EU – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Liechtenstein, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia. Some countries have a general MACR of 16, except for serious crimes for which children the age of 14 or older can be held criminally responsible – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine. The age of 14 is the lower limit for attributing criminal responsibility in Albania. On the other hand, MACR in Hungary is 14. Still, children in the age of 12 can be held liable for very serious crimes (homicide, voluntary manslaughter, battery, robbery and plundering), previously undergone checking the capability for understanding the importance of the law violation and consequences (CRIN, n.d.). Other countries have a more tolerant approach. Thus, the MACR is 15 in Denmark, Finland (15–18), Greece (educational and therapeutic measures are carried out at a younger age), Iceland, Norway and Sweden; 16 in Portugal; 17 in Poland (15 for the most serious crimes); 18 in Luxembourg (16 for the most serious crimes). The most complex situation is in France, where there is no MACR in general, but it is possible that children aged 13 to 18 years can be prosecuted for crimes, while children aged 16 to 18 can even be undergone sentences for adults (CRIN, n.d.).

Holistic vs. Repressive Approach in a Global Context

In the previous part of the paper, we have seen that there are great differences in the states' attitudes towards the criminal responsibility of children – from those who consider that even a baby can be criminally responsible, to those who take the position that only adults can be held criminally liable. The age of 12 years as the minimum age of criminal responsibility is the median (an equal number of countries have MACR on both sides of this age), so discussions about the advantages and disadvantages of a holistic and repressive approach to this problem most often take that age as a benchmark.

The very fact of the number of countries with a low age limit of criminal

responsibility is an indicator of how much a repressive approach is present in the world. The number of states in which MACR is under 12 is equal to the number of states that have set a minimum age of criminal responsibility at 12 and over. At the same time, supporters of lowering that age limit declare more often, so a repressive approach prevails in the world. This is the approach that takes a view that only a strict penal policy toward young delinquents can deter young people from committing crimes. This is often supported by statistics that show that the number of juvenile offenders is growing, and these data are usually presented when an extreme case related to juvenile criminality occurs. Thus, a tragic event in Canada in which a ten-year-old boy beat a six-year-old on the street and caused his death triggered an avalanche of demands that the minimum limit of criminal responsibility be lowered from 12 to 10 years, and even lower. A boy named Derek, who violently caused the death of another child, was previously known to both the police and social services, and he was involved in the child protection services program. The ineffectiveness of the measures taken was the main argument of those who demanded a more repressive attitude towards the criminal responsibility of children. This argument is further strengthened by the fact that due to the impossibility of initiating criminal proceedings against a child at a certain age, the crime remains unpunished, and in the case of property crimes, a person who suffered damage by a criminal act cannot be indemnified because a child is not subject to criminal responsibility. However, accepting a repressive approach just because some measure was ineffective in a particular case would be to walk the path of least resistance. In a specific case in Canada, it was found that the agency in charge of caring for the boy Derek, the Yorkton Tribal Council Child and Family Services, went through a long history of problems with him not seriously enough, including fetal alcohol syndrome, which he had. The boy is described as a pleasant child, cheerful, who likes to play with other children. However, he came from a troubled family, which did not take care of him, giving him a bad pattern of behaviour. The reports from the school were not adequately responded to, even in the extreme case when he with another boy broke into someone's house and killed a pregnant dog. If it had been reacted at

that moment, the boy who was killed later would probably still be alive today, and Derek would have been given the opportunity to fit into social life. Further analysis led to the conclusion that the relevant Ministry did not exercise adequate supervision over the work of that agency (CBC News, 2014). If we take family circumstances, the omissions of the agency in charge of social care for the boy, as well as the relevant ministry, into account we cannot avoid the conclusion that the problem is actually in adults, and not in children. This tells us that by lowering the age limit of criminal responsibility, we are expanding the limit of abolishing adults, who are actually responsible for the criminal behaviour of children. At the same time, a larger number of children are being introduced into the criminal justice system. At the other end of the planet, in Australia, in one of many similar cases, police arrested a thirteen-year-old boy on charges of stealing a \$ 2.40 match. The arrest was made in the school classroom, and the boy spent three days in detention, from where he was released on bail. Eight months later, the prosecution dropped out due to a lack of evidence. The boy did not go to school for the next seven months (Victoria Legal Aid) due to shame and fear. What society has gained from such a repressive approach? It probably lost a future loyal citizen, and this child was only collateral damage in the children's treatment as criminals. Every year in Australia, about 600 children under the age of 14 are imprisoned, and court records show that most of them are in custody before being found guilty of any crime (Victoria Legal Aid). Most of them are Aboriginal children from the Torres Strait Islands, i.e., children from a poor environment, or from disturbed family backgrounds. Organizations that fight against this approach point out that timely intervention and support for these children would prevent the adoption of permanent patterns of misbehaviour.

A holistic view of the problem of juvenile delinquency, in general, requires looking at juveniles as part of the solution, not the problem. This implies the action of all competent institutions, bodies, and even legislation, in a way that enables the most painless reintegration of minors into society. The goal of this approach is through educational activities to prevent the juvenile from committing criminal acts. With the engagement of experts of different profiles from the community, these educational actions are carried out not only in

the family but also in the social environment in which the minor lives, primarily in school. These include developing communication within the family and peer group, developing various skills in minors (sports, art, etc.) that will fill his free time, enrich the meaning of life and separate him from the criminogenic environment, as well as developing the educational segment of the personality of minors. In the function of these actions, legal solutions are also aimed at re-education of juveniles of delinquent behaviour by special measures, as well as at their sanctioning in serious cases. It is clear from this that a holistic approach advocates determining the older age of the juvenile as MACR. What are the arguments of the holistic approach proponents?

In the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice ('The Beijing Rules'), the starting point is reaching emotional, mental, and intellectual maturity (1985, Rule 4.1). As we have seen in many countries, this condition usually stands out for a certain age, such as the one in Germany:

A youth shall bear criminal liability if, at the time of the act, he has reached a level of moral and intellectual maturity sufficient to enable him to understand the wrongfulness of the act and to conduct himself in accordance with such understanding (Jugendgerichtsgesetz, 1974, Section 3).

The general attitude of the UNICEF is that "lowering the age of criminal responsibility is against child rights" (UNICEF, 2019). This position was emphasized on the occasion of the expressed intention in the Congress of the Philippines to lower the MACR of 15 to the age of 9–12. The attempt was called an act of violence against children. On that occasion, it is emphasized that children are victims of adult conflict, poverty, and exploitation and that it is necessary to protect them from exposure to violence and crimes, and not to punish them. According to the same source, "scientific studies show that brain function reaches maturity only at around 16 years old, affecting children's reasoning and impulse control". On that occasion, it justifiably pointed out

the paradox that the law does not allow marriage before the age of 18, and at the same time prescribes a much lower age limit for criminal responsibility. When you look at the overall picture of the set standards in each of the independent states, it can be seen at first glance that they are influenced by historical, social, religious, and cultural differences. Thus, the International Committee on the Rights of the Child has noted that even 34 countries adopted MACR of 7 years from English common law. As an example of religious influence, we can cite states in which Sharia law is in force, so there are two minimum ages of criminal responsibility – the one prescribed by secular law, and the one determined in accordance with Sharia law. There is considerable agreement among Muslim jurists “that the criminal responsibility of a child begins at the age of seven years and continues to be treated as a child until he attains puberty”, so the punishment imposed must be moderate as well (Mousavi & Nordin, 2012, p. 5).

There is no unique MACR in the world around which spears are broken. It is simply the result of the legislator's will. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child requires signatory states to “determine the minimum age below which children cannot be considered capable of violating criminal law”, without imposing a certain age (1989, Art. 40, para 3(a)). However, the same convention prohibits the exposure of a child to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and emphasizes in particular that the death penalty and life imprisonment without the possibility of release may not be imposed on persons under 18 years of age (1989, Art. 37, para 1(a)). The International Committee on the Rights of the Child is empowered to monitor respecting this Convention, and States Parties are required to report on that, firstly two years after ratification and every five years thereafter. This committee has repeatedly criticized countries whose MACR is 10 years or less. Proponents of a holistic approach insist on considering the age of the child and the desire to improve his reintegration and give him a constructive role in society. Each country individually they are always committed to raising the statutory MACR, regardless of whether it is about the age of six or 12 years. Modern developmental

neuroscience and psychology provide evidence that it would be reasonable to raise MACR to 15 years of age. This opinion is based on the fact that the child's brain has a special phase of development during adolescence, and only in this period does the prefrontal cortex develop, which regulates behavioural control, planning, and risk assessment. In other words, adolescents do not have a physiological basis for rationality and decision-making, unlike the centre associated with seeking sensations and rewards, which is why adolescents are impulsive and subordinate their behaviour to potential rewards (Victoria Legal Aid). Thus, it is clear that the child's inability to understand the significance of his actions at a certain age cannot be interpreted as incompetence, in the way the law defines it. The fact is that excluding the possibility that a child at a certain age can be held criminally liable implies the child's inability to bear the guilt, but this is not about incompetence but about their absolute inability of bearing guilt that is defined completely objectively and is based solely on the age of the perpetrator (Škulić, 2010, p. 202).

Circumstances and Tendencies in Serbia

The cited examples from Canada, Australia, or the Philippines can be found in every country in the world, as well as similar reactions from the public and some lawyers. This is especially present in countries where there is an increase in juvenile delinquency, or only in its individual manifestations, such as peer violence. Reading the media in Serbia it is created a perception of an increase in juvenile criminality in recent years, but it is actually about an increase in peer violence in its broader sense. Due to the way of life, with numerous movement restrictions and reduced social activities during the COVID-19 pandemic, it seems in this case justified to neglect statistical data on the trend of juvenile crime in 2020 and 2021. Comparing the official data on the number of filed criminal charges in the period from 2015 to 2019, there is an increase in juvenile criminality in 2019 by 6% compared to 2018 (SBS, 2020), but it is still smaller than in the first three years of these five years. Also, the participation of juveniles in the total number of crimes is only 3.13%, which is less than

in some previous years, but it is still not a reason for satisfaction because it coincides with the participation of juveniles in the total population of the Republic of Serbia. (Ignjatović, 2014, p. 177). What coincides with the mentioned media perception is the increase in the number of criminal charges for crimes against life and body, as well as against the freedoms and rights of man and citizen. These data refer to the age of 14 to 18 years. The Criminal Code of the Republic of Serbia stipulates those criminal sanctions cannot be imposed on children, and on that occasion, the child is defined by criminal law as a person under the age of fourteen (Narodna skupština, 2005/2019, Art. 4(3) & Art. 112 (9)). The Law on Juvenile Offenders and Criminal Protection of Juveniles provides a more precise definition, prescribing those criminal sanctions may not be imposed, or other measures applied to a person who was not fourteen years old at the time of the commission of the criminal offence (2005, Art. 2). This is significant due to a possible misinterpretation that the legal restriction regarding the imposition of criminal sanctions does not actually mean a ban to declare a child under the age of 14 to be held criminally responsible, which would further give the injured party the right to seek compensation in civil litigation (Bajović, 2017, p. 220). At this point, we conditionally use the term criminal responsibility when we talk about Serbia, because that term has been removed from the valid Criminal Code. In order for a criminal offence to exist, the court must establish the existence of all its obligatory elements determined by the Criminal Code, so that in the absence of guilt, there is no criminal offence (Škulić, 2010, p. 202). In this context, the term minimum age of criminal responsibility (MACR) is also applicable to Serbia, because it explains what is discussed in this paper. As for the region, in other countries that emerged from the disintegration of Yugoslavia, MACR is also 14, and having in mind other similarities arising from decades of sharing the same social and legal environment, the attitude towards this issue is very similar.

The previously mentioned data on the increase of juvenile criminality of a violent character is worrying because it speaks of an increase in aggressivity at that age. What's worse, children between the ages of 10 and 12 are increasingly

making so-called clans for abusing their peers at school, which is why advocates of a tougher course towards juvenile criminality are appearing, including lowering the age limit for imposing criminal sanctions. Proponents of a holistic approach are especially concerned that police officials are joining the demands for lowering the age limit for imposing a criminal sanction in Serbia to 12 years (Tanjug, 2019). In Serbia, a holistic approach is visible in the Law on Juvenile Offenders and Criminal Protection of Juveniles, by classifying juveniles into younger juveniles (14–16 years of age) and older juveniles (16–18 years of age) (2005, Art. 3). Also, adults who turned 18 at the time of the crime and did not turn 21 at the time of the trial were classified as younger adults and the court also can apply some of the educational measures to them (2005, Arts. 3 & 41). The purpose of such classification is to mitigate the penal policy according to these age categories for certain crimes, i.e., to move the age limit of minors and then adults in the early years of adulthood, to impose a prison sentence. There is a relatively small number of juveniles who are criminally prosecuted in relation to the number of crimes committed at that age, which was achieved thanks to the holistic approach of the legislator in passing the Law on Juvenile Offenders and Criminal Protection of Juveniles. Educational orders have been implemented in this law, as an educational measure, which avoids initiating criminal proceedings against a juvenile or suspends the already initiated proceedings, and the condition is that the juvenile admits the commission of a criminal offence and has a positive attitude towards the injured party (Igrački & Ilijić, 2016, pp. 187 & 195). In addition, this law prescribes the following educational measures: warning and guidance measures, measures of intensified supervision, and institutional measures, as the final educational solution that is applied when it is necessary to increase the influence on the minor. The purpose of such legal measures is the reintegration of minors into society, with prior professional engagement in their upbringing, which focuses on strengthening the sense of responsibility. Therefore, there is a strong basis for a holistic approach to prevail in the event of a public debate on lowering the age limit for imposing a criminal sanction, although such debate in the current circumstances does

not seem as likely as it did at the time of the adoption of the Chapter 23 EU Action Plan.

Conclusion

The picture of the minimum age of criminal responsibility (MACR) around the world is diverse. Despite the requirement of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child that States parties set a minimum age below which children cannot be considered capable of violating criminal law, there are states that do not have a prescribed MACR. Theoretically, in these countries, it is possible to hold a baby criminally responsible in a certain situation. It is interesting, that an equal number of countries have established MACR below and above the age of 12. Such division, as well as the demands for lowering or increasing MACR, is a consequence of two diametrically opposed approaches to the problem of child/juvenile crime – repressive and holistic. Proponents of the repressive approach believe that only a strict criminal policy can suppress the criminality of children and minors, for which it is not enough to just implement educational measures or sanction parents, but also to apply detention, i.e., imprisonment. The holistic approach does not look at juveniles who have committed a crime as part of the problem, but as part of the solution, insisting on preventive measures whose planning and implementation will involve professors, lawyers, sociologists, and the medical profession. Insisting that it is necessary for criminal responsibility that a child understands the meaning of his/her actions and the severity of the consequences, which is present in many national criminal codes, is only the starting point of the holistic approach. Namely, the life circumstances of a criminalized child that negatively affected his mental health and caused cognitive impairments, and for which the society did not take timely and adequate care, must not be neglected. Paying attention to early intervention and providing support to those children is more effective than criminal sanctions because it gives greater chances to prevent the permanent adoption of criminal behaviour patterns. It has been scientifically proven that the centre for behaviour control, planning, and risk assessment

in children's brains develops only in adolescence, which is why children before that period are prone to impulsiveness and pliable behaviour that leads to a certain tempting reward. Therefore, children at an early age are not able to understand the significance of their actions. Lowering the age of criminal responsibility leads to the excessive and premature introduction of children into the criminal justice system. Due to insufficient physiological and related to it mental development, such criminal proceedings do not provide a fair and impartial response to criminal behaviour, as children are not able to participate in such proceedings satisfactorily because of limited attention capacity, suggestibility, and propensity to give false confessions. The preference for a repressive approach in different parts of the world is a consequence of specific cultural, religious, economic and social influences. Therefore, the holistic concept is not applicable in such countries until such influences change with the progressive development of society.

We believe that the scientific arguments, which speak in favour of the holistic concept, do not have an adequate response from the representatives of the repressive concept. Therefore, the legislative authorities in the countries where the repressive approaches are applied should respect the competent scientific opinions and raise the MACR to at least 14 years, as is the case in the significant number of developed democracies in Europe.

Bearing in mind that the MACR in Serbia is identical to the countries in the region, of which Croatia, Slovenia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria are members of the EU, and that this corresponds to a holistic approach to this problem, we believe that there are no justified reasons to consider the issue of reducing the MACR below the age of 14. The improvement of the criminal policy with regard to juvenile delinquency should be aimed at expanding the spectrum of the application of educational orders and developing restorative justice to ensure more successful reintegration of juveniles into society and thus reducing the scope of recidivism.

References

- Amnesti International [AI]. (2022, January 25). *Why we need to raise the Minimum age of criminal responsibility*.
<https://www.amnesty.org.au/why-we-need-to-raise-the-minimum-age-of-criminal-responsibility/>
- Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular. (2020). Código Penal. *Gaceta Oficial de la Republica de Cuba*, 2022, July 5.
<https://www.gacetaoficial.gob.cu/es/ley-no-62-codigo-penal>
- Bajović, V. (2017). Nekonzervativni pristup u borbi protiv maloletničke delinkvencije i odgovornost roditelja [The non-conservative approach in the fight against Juvenile delinquency and parental responsibility]. In Dj. Ignjatović (Ed.), *Kaznena reakcija u Srbiji* (pp. 219–234). University of Belgrade: Faculty of Law.
- Bjelajac, Ž., & Filipović, A. M. (2021). Specific characteristics of digital violence and sigital crime. *Pravo – teorija i praksa*, 38(4), 16–32.
<https://doi.org/10.5937/ptp2104016B>
- Bjelajac, Ž., & Merdović, B. (2019). Nasilje nad decom u porodici [Violence against children in family]. *Kultura polisa*, 16(39), 191–202.
- CBC News. (2014, May 14). *Death of Lee Bonneau, 6, allegedly at hands of boy, 10, was avoidable, Report says*.
<https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/saskatchewan/death-of-lee-bonneau-6-allegedly-at-hands-of-boy-10-was-avoidable-report-says-1.2643066>
- Child Rights International Network [CRIN]. (n.d.). *Minimum ages of criminal responsibility around the world*.
<https://archive.crin.org/en/home/ages.html>
- Convention on the rights of the child [CRC]. (1989, November 20). *General Assembly resolution 44/25*.

<https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx>

Government of Trinidad and Tobago [GTT]. (2004, November 15). UN Committee on the rights of the child: Second periodic reports of states parties due in 1999, Trinidad and Tobago. *CRC/C/83/Add. 12*.

<https://www.refworld.org/docid/45377e930.html>

Ignjatović, Đ. (2014). Stanje i tendencije kriminaliteta maloletnika u Srbiji [The state and tendencies of juvenile crime in Serbia]. *Crimen*, 5(2), 173–195.

Igrački, M., & Ilijić, Lj. (2016). Kriminalitet maloletnika – stanje u svetu i u Srbiji [Juvenile crime – situation in the world and in Serbia]. *Strani pravni život*, 60(1), 185–200.

Jugendgerichtsgesetz [JGG] [Youth Courts Law]. (1974). *Federal Law Gazette [BGBl.]*, Part I p. 3427, most recently amended by article 1 of the Act of 8 July 2008 (Federal Law Gazette Part I p. 1212). German Law Archive.

<https://germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org/?p=756#3>

Kemp, C. (2022, March 4). Restorative justice and the Minimum age of criminal responsibility – #RaisetheAge. Queen’s Policy Engagement – QPOL.

<http://qppl.qub.ac.uk/restorative-justice-and-the-minimum-age-of-criminal-responsibility-claire-kemp-clc/>

Ministarstvo pravde Republike Srbije [Ministarstvo pravde]. (2020, July). Akcioni plan: Poglavlje 23 – Pravosuđe i osnovna ljudska prava [Action plan: Chapter 23 - judiciary and fundamental human rights].

<https://mpravde.gov.rs/files/Revidirani%20AP23%202207.pdf>

Mousavi, S., & Nordin, R. (2012). The Minimum age of criminal responsibility in ASEAN: Legal and human rights perspectives. In *Proceeding International conference on harmonizing legal principles toward ASEAN community* (pp. 1–9). Surabaya, 2–4 April 2012.

https://www.youthpolicy.org/library/wp-content/uploads/library/2012_Minimum_Legal_Age_Criminal_Responsibility_ASEAN_Eng.pdf

- Narodna skupština Republike Srbije [Narodna skupština]. (2005). *Zakon o maloletnim učiniocima krivičnih dela i krivičnopravnoj zaštiti maloletnih lica* [The Law on juvenile criminal offenders and criminal protection of juveniles]. (Službeni glasnik Republike Srbije, br. 85/2005).
<https://www.refworld.org/docid/4b56c9952.html>
- Narodna skupština Republike Srbije [Narodna skupština]. (2005/2019). *Krivični zakonik Republike Srbije* [Criminal code of Republic of Serbia]. (Službeni glasnik Republike Srbije, br. 85/2005 – ispr., 107/2005 – ispr., 72/2009, 111/2009, 121/2012, 104/2013, 108/2014, 94/2016 i 35/2019).
https://www.mpravde.gov.rs/files/Criminal%20%20%20Code_2019.pdf
- National Constituent Assembly [NCA]. (198/1993). *Guatemala's Constitution of 1985 with amendments through 1993* [W. S. Hein & Co., Inc., trans.]. Constitutions projects.
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Guatemala_1993.pdf
- National Juvenile Defender Center [NJDC]. (2020, January 20). *Minimum age for delinquency adjudication – multi-jurisdiction survey*.
<https://njdc.info/practice-policy-resources/state-profiles/multi-jurisdiction-data/minimum-age-for-delinquency-adjudication-multi-jurisdiction-survey/>
- Parliamentary Counsel Office. (1961). *Crimes Act 1961*. (Public act 1961 no 43). New Zealand Legislation.
<https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1961/0043/latest/whole.html#DLM327386>
- Phill Damm, A., Østergaard Larsen, B., Skyt Nielsen, H., & Simonsen, M. (2017). *Lowering the minimum age of criminal responsibility: Consequences for juvenile crime and education*. Economics Working Papers 2017-10, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
https://repec.econ.au.dk/repec/afn/wp/17/wp17_10.pdf

- Shigong, L. (2020, October 23). Should the age of criminal responsibility be lowered? Beijing Review.
http://www.bjreview.com/Opinion/202010/t20201023_800224508.html
- Škulić, M. (2010). Starosna granica sposobnosti za snošenje krivice u krivičnopravnom smislu [Age limit for the ability to be guilty in Criminal law]. *Crimen*, 1(2), 202–227.
- Tanjug. (2019, December 17). Profesor Škulić: Ideje o snižavanju godina krivične odgovornosti maloletnika čudne i naopake [Professor Škulić: Ideas about lowering the age of criminal responsibility for minors are strange and wrong]. RTV [Online].
http://www.rtv.rs/sr_lat/drustvo/profesor-skulic-ideje-o-snizavanju-godina-krivicne-odgovornosti-maloletnika-cudne-i-naopake_1076921.html
- United Nations Standard Minimum rules for the administration of juvenile justice ("The Beijing Rules") [Beijing Rules]. Adopted by *General Assembly resolution 40/33* of 29 November 1985.
<https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/beijingrules.pdf>
- UNICEF. (2019, January 18). Lowering the age of criminal responsibility is against child rights. *Press release – Statement attributable to Ms Lotta Sylwander Representative*. UNICEF Philippines.
<https://www.unicef.org/philippines/press-releases/lowering-age-criminal-responsibility-against-child-rights-unicef#>
- Victoria Legal Aid. (2020 May 12). *Lift the age of criminal responsibility to give children a chance to reach their potential*.
<https://www.legalaid.vic.gov.au/lift-age-criminal-responsibility-give-children-chance-reach-their-potential>

Minimalni uzrast za krivičnu odgovornost kao deo kriminalnih politika

Darko M. Marković i Ivana Spaić

Univerzitet Privredna akademija u Novom Sadu
Pravni fakultet za privredu i pravosuđe u Novom Sadu

Sažetak

Porast vršnjačkog nasilja i maloletničke delinkvencije iz godine u godinu širom sveta drži pitanje donje starosne granice za krivičnu odgovornost otvorenim. Države, ne samo u različitim delovima sveta već i u okviru užeg regiona koji ih teritorijalno spaja, razvijaju različite krivičnopravne odgovore na ovo pitanje. Razlozi za takvu različitost leže u okolnostima ekonomske, socijalne, kulturne, verske, političke, pa i istorijske prirode. U teoriji i praksi se izdvajaju dva suprotstavljena koncepta, tzv. represivni i holistički. Zagovornici prvog koncepta smatraju da je oštra kriminalna politika najsigurniji put ka suzbijanju kriminaliteta među decom i maloletnicima. Na drugoj strani, pristalice holističkog pristupa smatraju da deca u ranom uzrastu ne mogu da shvate značaj svojih postupaka, te bi se snižavanjem starosne granice krivične odgovornosti izvršilo prerano uvođenje dece u krivičnopravni sistem, umesto da društvo preduzme pravovremene mere na sprečavanju trajnog usvajanja obrazaca kriminalnog ponašanja. Koristeći se uporednopravnim metodom, kao i drugim kvalitativnim i kvantitativnim metodama neophodnim za produktivnu analizu i izvođenje validnih zaključaka, želimo da ovim radom istaknemo ključne aspekte različitosti represivnog i holističkog pristupa određivanju minimalnog uzrasta za krivičnu odgovornost. Konačni rezultat je čvrsto utemeljeno uverenje da je neophodno dati prednost onom pristupu koji na decu i maloletnike uvučene u kriminalni milje ne gleda kao deo problema već rešenja.

Ključne reči: maloletnička delinkvencija, vršnjačko nasilje, MACR, kaznena politika, kriminalna politika

The Effects of Charismatic Leadership of the Eastern European Cultural Cluster in Crisis Situations

Tatjana D. Janovac¹ and Saša R. Virijević Jovanović²

¹University Business Academy in Novi Sad, Faculty of Applied Management, Economics and Finance, Belgrade

²Modern Business School, Belgrade

Article Information*

Review Article • UDC: 005.3:338.124(4-11)

Volume: 19 Issue: 3, pages: 156–175

Received: June 30, 2022 • Revised: August 15, 2022 • Accepted: August 21, 2022

<https://doi.org/10.51738/Kpolisa2022.19.3r.156jvj>

Author Note

Tatjana D. Janovac  <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7436-0752>

Saša R. Virijević Jovanović  <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4469-381X>

We have no known conflict of interest to disclose.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Tatjana Janovac, Faculty of Applied Management, Economics and Finance, Jevrejska 24, 11000 Belgrade, Serbia. Email: janovac@mef.edu.rs

* Cite (APA):

Janovac, T. D., & Virijević Jovanović, S. R. (2022). The Effects of Charismatic Leadership of the Eastern European Cultural Cluster in Crisis Situations. *Kultura polisa*, 19(3), 156–175.

<https://doi.org/10.51738/Kpolisa2022.19.3r.156jvj>

Abstract

Within the last ten years, the European continent has been strongly affected by three major crises. In addition to the migrant crisis, Covid-19, and the Russian-Ukrainian war, a fourth energy crisis is now on the horizon. All these crises have affected the social changes in European countries, also influencing their leadership which had to adjust to new situations that brought uncertainty and required rapid and radical changes. The goal of this paper is to analyse the effects of charismatic leadership in the cultural cluster of Eastern Europe during the crisis. The cultural cluster of Eastern Europe is characterised by a high degree of collectivism, as opposed to a low degree of future orientation and avoidance of uncertainty. A charismatic leader focused on values, people, and results responds to these characteristics of culture. In addition, charismatic leadership has a specific effect on followers in crisis situations by instilling confidence and making them feel safe. Literature review indicated that the alignment between the characteristics of cultural cluster and leadership style leads to positive effects and a strong relationship between leaders and followers in the crisis management process.

Keywords: charismatic leadership, cultural cluster, Eastern Europe, crisis situations, changes

The Effects of Charismatic Leadership of the Eastern European Cultural Cluster in Crisis Situations

Within the last ten years, the European continent has been strongly hit by three major crises. In addition to the migrant crisis, Covid-19, and the Russian-Ukrainian war, a fourth energy crisis is now on the horizon. All these crises have affected the social changes in European countries, also influencing their leadership which had to adjust to new situations that required urgent and difficult decisions.

According to literature review there is a significant number of scientific papers illustrating the specificities of leader profiles within different cultural clusters (Koopman et al., 1999; House et al., 2004; Bakacsi et al., 2002; Gupta et al., 2002). Furthermore, some scientific studies explore charismatic leadership during the crisis (Tortola & Pansardi, 2019; Bastardo et al., 2022; Levay, 2010). However, there are no concrete scientific results related to the effects of charismatic leadership in the last ten years, in time when the biggest crisis is affecting the cultural cluster of Eastern Europe.

Globalization has helped us to understand how cultural differences can affect leadership performance. In this regard, Adler & Bartholomew (1992) argued that leaders must develop five multicultural competencies. First, leaders must understand the business, political, and cultural environment; they must learn the views, trends and technologies that exist in other cultures. They must be able to cooperate with people from different cultures. Furthermore, they need to know how to adjust their communication to specific cultures. Finally, they must learn to treat people from other cultures as equals, not just from a position of cultural superiority. In accordance with this, Ting - Toomey & Dorjee, (2018) believe that leaders must be trained to create multicultural visions.

Over the past three decades, the research on leadership has been a subject of significant number of social science studies as an interpersonal process of influence and governance were found in almost every aspect of

human civilization. The definition of leadership demands not only theoretical support, but also deeper understanding of existing relations between leaders and their respective groups, along with different levels of meaning and value that are essential for identifying someone as a leader within a given contextual framework (Rivers, 2019). There is a significant number of different leadership definitions that do not represent only the views of theorists but rather the entire society in the context of certain time. Author Bass (1990) considers leadership as a centre of group processes. Starting from this point of view, the leader is the centre of changes in the group activities. Within the second group of definitions leadership is considered from the personality aspect and defined as a combination of special characteristics and traits possessed by an individual, which enable him to influence the others. In that direction, Ralph Stogdill has found that different researchers identified specific traits related to leader's ability, which he categorized as: physical traits, personality traits, work-related traits, social traits, and intelligence (Wehrich & Koontz, 1998, p. 493). Another group of theorists believe that leadership is a set of certain skills (Katz, 2009; Mumford et al., 2000). Furthermore, in some approaches leadership is defined as a behaviour (Lewin et al., 1939), or activities that leaders undertake in order to cause a change within the group. In addition, leadership is defined in the context of leader's power (French et al., 1959). From that point of view, leaders possess the power which they use to make changes. There are also opinions that leadership is a transformational process by which followers are motivated to achieve more than what can be expected of them (Bass & Riggio, 2006). Author Peter Northouse (2008, p.2) defines leadership as a process in which an individual exerts influence on a group to achieve a common goal. Precisely, this definition is in accordance with the discussion in this paper.

In the specific area of culture and leadership, the research conducted by House et al. (2004) is known as the GLOBE project. The researchers from GLOBE have published the findings of their study conducted in 62 countries within regional groups, as an acceptable way to analyse the similarities and

differences between cultural groups and meaningful generalizations on the topic of culture and leadership. To create regional clusters, GLOBE researchers used previous research, common language, geography, and historical facts. Based on these factors, they grouped countries into 10 clusters: Anglo-American, Latin Europe, Nordic Europe, German Europe, Eastern Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Confucian Asia (House et al., 2004). To test whether the clusters or cultural groups of the countries are valid, the researchers conducted a statistical analysis of data based on surveys of individuals in each of the clusters. The research findings indicated the correlation between the participants' answers within the same cluster, that were not in correlation with the participants from other clusters. These results showed that regional clusters are valid and reliable to differentiate and classify countries into ten different cultural groups (Northouse, 2008, p. 214). When it comes to the European continent, some authors believe that two large clusters can be distinguished, the cluster of north-western and south-eastern Europe. Within these clusters, differences in leadership prototypes reflect differences in culture (Koopman, et al., 1999). Clusters provide important information regarding social variations and are a useful way to summarize intercultural similarities as well as intercultural differences (Gupta et al., 2002).

The aim of this paper is to analyse the effects of charismatic leadership within the cultural cluster of Eastern Europe in crisis situations within the last ten years. The objectives of this research are focused on determining the alignment between the characteristics of the cultural cluster and the leadership style on the example of Serbia, which belongs to the cultural cluster of Eastern Europe.

In accordance with the defined goal, the paper will consider the characteristics of charismatic leadership, the characteristics of the cultural cluster of Eastern Europe, the alignment between the characteristics of the cultural cluster and charismatic style, as well as charismatic style in the crisis management process.

Specifics of the cultural cluster of Eastern Europe

There are many definitions of culture in literature, as many as there are theorists who dealt with this subject. Authors Kroeber and Kluckhohn recognised even 164 definitions of culture. The differences in understanding the concept of culture stem from differences in the use of the term itself (Jahoda, 2012; Cohen, 2009). Generally, the term could refer to intellectual or artistic endeavours known as “high culture”, which is opposite to “popular culture” or folk customs. Edward Tylor (1870) believes that “primitive culture” is related to all the qualities that people have in cultural groups, as such it represents a complex whole that includes knowledge, beliefs, art, moral, law, customs and other abilities that a person acquires as a member of society (Spencer-Oatey & Franklin, 2012). In this regard, Kroeber and Kluckhohn indicate that Tylor’s definition represents a foundation for anthropological studying of culture on which many researchers have built their understanding of culture (Baldwin et al., 2006). It should be noted that the term is defined differently in the context of different aspects of social analysis (Faulkner et al., 2006). From the psychological perspective, differences between “East and West” have been studied in terms of variability of cultural dimensions (Cohen, 2009).

The highest interest for intercultural issues in management, psychology and education have been initiated by Hofstede’s research in 1980. Hofstede was the first who developed the model of culture based on empirical study conducted in more than 50 countries. The author recognised five main dimensions on which cultures differ, such as: individualism versus collectivism, avoiding uncertainty, the distance of power, male – female roles, long-term and short-term orientation (Beugelsdijk, 2017). All of these dimensions have influence on shaping the culture of particular group of countries, or clusters. According to Hofstede, the cluster of Eastern Europe is characterised by high results for perseverance, collectivism in the group and gender equality, great power distance. Poor results are related to avoiding uncertainty (Northouse, 2008, p. 215; Bakacsi, et al., 2002).

Authors Hickson & Pugh (1995) have defined the cluster of Central and Eastern Europe including Russia, Poland, Bulgaria, Ukraine and Latvia, while

Smith et al. (1996) indicated that Eastern European cluster is consisted of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Yugoslavia. While the researchers of the GLOBE program identified Greece, Hungary, Albania, Slovenia, Poland, Russia, Georgia and Kazakhstan within the cluster of Eastern Europe (House et al., 2004). However, Serbia was not included in the GLOBE research program, although according to its position and cultural values, it belongs to the cultural cluster of Eastern Europe. The cluster is a combination of countries with different linguistic, ethnic, religious traditions and economic backgrounds, while sharing many other attributes (Bakacsi et al., 2002). The cultural background of countries that belong to Eastern European cluster is not homogeneous, since there are significant differences in their history, religion, and languages. Van Vlimmeren et al. (2017) consider that differences among the cluster countries might occur in measuring certain values. In addition, the differences may be recognised in term of cooperation, orientation on specific values, and even leadership style. Different cultural groups may have different conceptions of leadership, or different prototypes of leadership (Koopman et al., 1999). For example, there are cultures that support authoritarian style, as opposed to those that are more democratic-oriented. Jung et al., (1995) stated that transformational leadership is more effective in collectivistic than in individualistic cultures. The differences may be seen from the aspect of time as well. With this regard, leadership profile of cultural cluster should be analysed exclusively from the aspect of time and socio-historical circumstances. This is supported by the statement of Kiezun (1991), who showed that in the late 80's. leadership styles in Hungary and Poland were rigid and autocratic (Bakacsi et al., 2002). However, the aim of the GLOBE project was to determine how people belonging to different cultural groups view leadership. In addition, the researchers wanted to determine the ways in which cultural characteristics are associated with culturally accepted leadership behaviour. To describe how leadership behaviours are viewed across cultures, GLOBE researchers identified six global leadership behaviours: charismatic, values-based, team-oriented, participative, humane-oriented, autonomous, and defensive (House et al., 2004).

Based on that analysis, the researchers were able to determine leadership profiles for cultural clusters. Each leadership profile describes the importance and desirability that different leadership profiles correspond to different cultural clusters. According to the results of this research, the cultural cluster of Eastern Europe corresponds to a charismatic leadership style that is value-oriented and team-oriented (House et al., 2004; Northouse, 2008, p. 218). The GLOBE survey is the largest survey to date that analyses leadership in different cultural clusters in all parts of the world. Furthermore, this research points to the complexity of the leadership process. Bearing in mind the time distance when the GLOBE research and the studies of the cited authors were carried out (Hosfede, 1980; Hickson & Pugh, 1995; Smith et al., 1996; House et al., 2004), as well as the social changes that have occurred in the last ten years, it would be necessary to start new research that would analyse the value of cultural clusters as well as the leadership profile. Regarding the profile of leadership in Republic of Serbia, in most situations, team-oriented leadership is emphasized, especially when making strategic decisions. Within the cultural cluster of Eastern Europe, the Republic of Serbia is demonstrating the strong feeling of cultural pride, which is reflected on both internal and foreign political activities. Team orientation, but also an independent relationship when urgency is required in the decision-making process, depicts behaviour that provides security and safety, keeping positions, respecting procedures, willingness to cooperate, integrative action and diplomacy, which indicates charismatic leadership.

The characteristics of charismatic leadership

Charismatic leadership implies a clear vision, emphasizing values that are in line with the vision and establishing strong ties with followers. This type of leadership underlines the leader's influence on group, organisation, or society to "make the world a better place."

Charismatic leadership is most effective and applicable in uncertain, crisis situations that require fast and radical changes. To accomplish their vision, charismatic leaders are willing to take the risk more than others. Therefore,

charismatic leadership is the most suitable in situations when the leader's ideology should be followed in politics, religion, in time of emergencies, or in wars (Janovac, 2020, p. 136). The negative implications of charismatic leadership are related to its application in non-crisis situations when leader could experience repression or rejection by followers who are prone to individualism, self-initiative, independence. In non-crisis situations, a charismatic leader can be burdened by underestimating real problems (Guenzi & Ruta, 2013, p. 43).

The concept of charisma was introduced into the study of politics and society by Max Weber, a famous German sociologist, economist, politician, historian, and lawyer, in the 1950s. According to Weber, charisma is a special characteristic that gives a person "superhuman and extraordinary powers", is possessed by a small number of people and is of "divine" origin. Although Max Weber was the first to define the term, charismatic leadership as a theory is related to Robert House, who developed the concept during the 1970s. Robert House (1976) published *The Theory of Charismatic Leadership*, which is based on the psychological aspect of observing these leaders. House considers that charismatic leaders have special effects on their followers. The author emphasizes dominance, the strong desire to influence, self-esteem and a feeling of moral value as the most important characteristics of charismatic leaders (Northouse, 2008, p. 121). In addition to the stated list, energy, empathy, high degree of emotional intelligence and willingness to take risk could be included as well. Furthermore, charismatic leaders express their feelings openly, which is one of their main characteristics. Moreover, charismatic leaders create many supporters, but they can also have a certain number of enemies (Janovac, 2020, p.136). Max Weber considered charisma to be a great revolutionary force that can change the structure of traditional societies. Weber opposes charismatic leadership and authority with two other forms of government: traditional and rational-legal. While the first one is based on history and tradition and the second on laws, the charismatic leadership depends on the attitude of "veneration" that the leader provokes among followers because of his exceptional abilities. This definition also implies the dependence of charismatic authority on

performance, whereby if the performance of the leader fails, the obedience of the followers disappears (Tortola, & Pansardi, 2019).

Charisma originates from the leader's personality, intelligence, charm, personal power, and potential. The charismatic leader affects people behaviour by his strength of personality and actions. The leader's charisma comes to the fore especially in crisis situations, when he instils confidence in his followers who feel trust and safe beside him and accept his ideas. The influence of charismatic leadership on followers becomes stronger with the increase of leader status, as well as the level of his expertise.

Creating charisma is a process that takes place between leaders and followers and is conditioned by many factors, primarily certain characteristics, abilities and competencies of the leader, his potentials, personality traits, historical and social circumstances. Besides the certain characteristics which define them, charismatic leaders have a specific profile of behaviour, attitudes, and values that they tend to be adopted by the followers. They captivate with their appearance, performance, words, and deeds. Furthermore, they are reliable, competent, eloquent, with strong ideals, future oriented (Janovac, 2020, p. 137). Reforms are the focus of a charismatic leader who creates the support and trust of followers in formulating a new and definable path to success (Rivers, 2019). Charismatic leaders have high ethical standards of behaviour, and articulate ideological goals that encompass moral values. The effects of charismatic leaders are reflected in the followers' trust and loyalty resulting in their willingness to accept the ideas and visions that are promoted by the leader (Northouse, 2008, p.122). Because of their unique relationship with followers, charismatic leaders can be powerful actors of social change (Fiol, et al., 1999).

Charismatic leadership in the process of crisis management

A crisis can be defined as an accompanying or detrimental event with a high level of initial uncertainty that occurs suddenly with little time available to respond. According to Morgeson, et al. (2015) crises have a significant

impact on people, organizations, and society. The crisis intensity is defined by its novelty, criticality, and disruption. In addition, the crisis may differ in term of content and scope. Critical and disruptive events can occur at any hierarchical level. Crises can range from critical situations to extreme crises such as Covid-19. Due to their sudden onset and demanding nature, combined with the immediate need for action, crises can be considered as significant disruptive events (Klebe, et al., 2021). Tucker (1968) & Pillai (1996) believe that crisis situations require charismatic leaders (Levay, 2010), exceptional political actors who can alleviate people's stress and anxiety by presenting inspiring visions and solutions for the future, thus creating conditions for materializing new social rankings (Tortola & Pansardi, 2019). Trice and Beyer (1986) introduced a set of five phenomenological factors associated with charismatic leaders including social crisis: a leader with certain potentials and competencies; a radical set of crisis resolution ideas; affirming the charisma of a leader based on success; followers attracted by the exceptionalism of a charismatic leader (Rivers, 2019).

The European Union, and above all Eurozone, have been in a state of economic, political, and institutional crisis for almost a decade. However, in this situation it is difficult to recognise the specific leadership style that stands out among the European leaders. Particularly, there is a lack of charismatic leadership, which is still underrepresented in EU, resulting in the deficiency of effective leadership within the member states as well (Tortola& Pansardi, 2019). The changes in the leadership of many countries, as well as the deviation in the prototype of leadership among countries, indicate a mismatch that exists between the characteristic of cultural cluster of Easter Europe and the charismatic style that is typical for this cultural group. The case of Serbia can be cited as a typical example of alignment between the characteristics of cultural cluster of Eastern Europe and the charismatic style.

The charismatic leadership in cultural cluster of Eastern Europe is based on values and people oriented (House et al., 2004). This leadership style is focused on followers' motivation in achieving high results, based

on clearly defined key values. Furthermore, charismatic leadership implies vision, inspiration, sacrifice, reliability, determination and focus on results. In the cultural cluster of Eastern Europe, a leader is described as someone who is very independent in the decision-making process, which is an advantage in crisis situations that require urgency in decision-making. At the same time, this leader behaviour reflects conduct that provides security and safety, includes conflict resolution, generosity, and compassion, keeping positions, respecting procedures. In addition, the specific behaviour of charismatic leader within this cultural group includes defining a clear goal and motivation and providing support to followers. It implies willingness for cooperation, integrative action, diplomacy, goodwill, and administrative competence (Northouse, 2008, p. 218). It was charismatic leadership that led to positive effects in crisis management, such as Covid-19 and the migrant crisis, where the leadership of Serbia protected the national interest and successfully overcame the situations. The ability of leaders to solve problems and manage the crisis evokes respect, trust, loyalty of followers as evidenced by the results of the research conducted by ISPOS in 2020. The findings of the survey show that the citizens of Serbia have enormous confidence in the Government and the President. Namely, over 58% of citizens believe that the president is doing his job well and managing the crisis (FoNet, 2020).

The success in managing Covid-19 has brought some benefits for the citizens such as the supply of respirators, medical equipment, medicines, and the provision of vaccines from various manufacturers. The economic measures undertaken by the Government of the Republic of Serbia contributed to the stabilization of the health sector, the economy and provided help to citizens (Ministry of Finance, 2022). In addition, migrant crisis and nowadays energy crisis have indicated the inventiveness and quick response of leaders in unforeseen circumstances. Serbia's GDP growth of 4.3% in the first quarter and 4% GDP growth during the second quarter of 2022 compared to the same period of the previous year (Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, 2022) is the proof of proper implementation of reforms and responsible

management of the crisis situation. The results in the process of implementing reforms, consistency, and principals of leaders in domestic and foreign policy have gained the trust and respect of followers and citizens, resulting in a willingness to fully follow the leader's ideas and vision, as evidenced by the results of the presidential and parliamentary elections held in 2022 with a convincing victory (Republic Electoral Commission, 2022).

All this indicates that followers foster a positive interpersonal relationship within a high-power distance, which positions charismatic leadership among the most effective leadership models within this cultural group and confirms the thesis that the alignment between the characteristics of the cultural cluster and the leadership style leads to positive effects in the process of crisis management.

Conclusion

This study was among the first to analyse charismatic leadership in crisis situations that have taken place in the last ten years in the cultural cluster of Eastern Europe and thus contribute to a deeper understanding of this style in accordance with social circumstances. Literature reviews have indicated that charismatic leadership additionally strengthens the bond between leader and followers in crisis situations based on the results that the leader achieves through his personal commitment. In crisis situations, charismatic leader instils confidence in his followers who feel trust and safe next to him and accept his ideas.

On the example of charismatic leadership in Serbia which belong to the cultural cluster of Eastern Europe, we can see the effects of applying this style in crisis management, as well as alignment between cultural cluster characteristics and leadership style.

This manuscript presents a useful basis for further theoretical and empirical research. However, changes in the leadership of other countries, deviations in the leadership style that is characteristic for this cultural group, as well as the lack of information on the results of leadership in other countries,

are a limiting factor in analysing the effects of leadership in crisis management in the Eastern European cultural cluster. In addition, the limitation of this study is the fact that there is no research related to the study of the value of the cultural cluster in the last ten years, when the biggest social changes are taking place. The challenge in further explorations will be to measure the differences in leadership prototypes between nations or states within the cultural cluster of Eastern Europe.

References

- Adler, N. J., & Bartholomew, S. (1992). Managing globally competent people. *Academy of Management Perspectives*, 6(3), 52-65.
- House, R. J. (1976). A 1976 Theory of Charismatic Leadership. Working Paper Series 76-06. <https://doi.org/10.5465/ame.1992.4274189>
- Bakacsi, G., Sándor, T., András, K., & Viktor, I. (2002). Eastern European cluster: tradition and transition. *Journal of world Business*, 37(1), 69–80. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S1090-9516\(01\)00075-X](https://doi.org/10.1016/S1090-9516(01)00075-X)
- Baldwin, J. R., Faulkner, S. L., & Hecht, M. L. (2006). A moving target: The illusive definition of culture. *Redefining culture: Perspectives across the disciplines*, 3–26. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2021.101590>
- Bass, B. M., & Riggio, R. E. (2006). *Transformational leadership*. Psychology press.
- Bass, B. M., & Stogdill, R. M. (1990). *Bass & Stogdill's handbook of leadership: Theory, research, and managerial applications*. Simon and Schuster.
- Bastardo, N., Jacquart, P., & Antonakis, J. (2022). Effect of crises on charisma signaling: A regression discontinuity design. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 101590. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2021.101590>
- Beugelsdijk, S., Kostova, T., & Roth, K. (2017). An overview of Hofstede-inspired country-level culture research in international business since 2006. *Journal of International Business Studies*, 48(1), 30–47.
- Cohen, A. B. (2009). Many forms of culture. *American psychologist*, 64(3), 194. <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0015308>
- Faulkner, S. L., Baldwin, J. R., Lindsley, S. L., & Hecht, M. L. (2006). Layers of meaning: An analysis of definitions of culture. *Redefining culture: Perspectives across the disciplines*, 27–51.
- Fiol, C. M., Harris, D., & House, R. (1999). Charismatic leadership: Strategies for effecting social change. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 10(3), 449–482. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S1048-9843\(99\)00021-1](https://doi.org/10.1016/S1048-9843(99)00021-1)

- FoNet. (2020, April 22). IPSOS: *U državne mere zbog korona virusa poverenje ima 92 odsto građana* [92 percent of citizens have confidence in state measures due to the corona virus]. Danas.
<https://www.danas.rs/vesti/drustvo/ipsos-u-mere-povodom-korona-virusa-ima-poverenje-92-odsto-gradjana/>
- French, J. R., Raven, B., & Cartwright, D. (1959). The bases of social power. *Classics of organization theory*, 7, 311–320.
- Guenzi, P., & Ruta, D. (2013). *Leading teams: Tools and techniques for successful team leadership from the sports world*. John Wiley & Sons
- Gupta, V., Hanges, P. J., & Dorfman, P. (2002). Cultural clusters: Methodology and findings. *Journal of world business*, 37(1), 11-15.
- House, R. J. (1976). A 1976 Theory of charismatic leadership. In J. G. Hunt & L. L. Larson (Eds.), *Leadership: The cutting edge* (pp. 189–207). Carbondale, Southern Illinois University Press.
- House, R. J. (2004). An overview of the GLOBE research program. In V. Gupta (Ed.), *Transformative organizations: A global perspective* (pp. 483–503). SAGE Publications India.
- House, R. J., Hanges, P. J., Javidan, M., Dorfman, P. W., & Gupta, V. (Eds.). (2004). *Culture, leadership, and organizations: The GLOBE study of 62 societies*. SAGE publications India.
- Jahoda, G. (2012). Critical reflections on some recent definitions of “culture”. *Culture & Psychology*, 18(3), 289–303.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X12446229>
- Janovac, T. (2020). *Savremeno liderstvo* [Contemporary leadership]. Fakultet za primenjeni menadžment, ekonomiju i finansije, Beograd.
- Jung, D. I., Bass, B. M., & Sosik, J. J. (1995). Bridging leadership and culture: A theoretical consideration of transformational leadership and collectivistic cultures. *Journal of Leadership Studies*, 2(4), 3–18.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/107179199500200402>

- Katz, R. L. (2009). *Skills of an effective administrator*. Harvard Business Review Press.
- Koopman, P. L., Den Hartog, D. N., & Konrad, E. (1999). National culture and leadership profiles in Europe: Some results from the GLOBE study. *European journal of work and organizational psychology*, 8(4), 503–520. <https://doi.org/10.1080/135943299398131>
- Klebe, L., Felfe, J., & Klug, K. (2021). Healthy leadership in turbulent times: The effectiveness of health-oriented leadership in crisis. *British Journal of Management*, 32(4), 1203–1218. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8551.12498>
- Levay, C. (2010). Charismatic leadership in resistance to change. *The leadership quarterly*, 21(1), 127–143. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2009.10.010>
- Lewin, K., Lippitt, R., & White, R. K. (1939). Patterns of aggressive behavior in experimentally created “social climates”. *The Journal of social psychology*, 10(2), 269–299. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00224545.1939.9713366>
- Ministarstvo finansija Republike Srbija [MFRS]. (2022). Ekonomske mere za pomoć privredi i građanima. [Economic measures to help the economy and citizens]. <https://mfin.gov.rs/sr/aktivnosti-1/ekonomske-mere-za-pomoc-privredi-i-gradjanima-1>
- Morgeson, F. P., Mitchell, T. R., & Liu, D. (2015). Event system theory: An event-oriented approach to the organizational sciences. *Academy of Management Review*, 40(4), 515–537. <https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2012.0099>
- Mumford, M. D., Zaccaro, S. J., Connelly, M. S., & Marks, M. A. (2000). Leadership skills: Conclusions and future directions. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 11(1), 155–170. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S1048-9843\(99\)00047-8](https://doi.org/10.1016/S1048-9843(99)00047-8)

- Northouse, P. G. (2008). *Liderstvo: teorija i praksa* [Leadership: theory and practice]. Data status.
- Republička izborna komisija [RIK]. (2022). 70. sednica Republičke izborne komisije. [70th session of the Republic electoral commission].
<https://www.rik.parlament.gov.rs/vest/317359/70-sednica-republicke-izborne-komisije.php>
- Republička izborna komisija [RIK]. (2022). 80. Sednica Republičke izborne komisije. [80th session of the Republic electoral commission].
<https://www.rik.parlament.gov.rs/vest/325069/80-sednica-republicke-izborne-komisije.php>
- Republički zavod za statistiku [RZS]. (2022). Kvartalni bruto domaći proizvod u stalnim cenama – fleš procena, I kvartal 2022. [Quarterly Gross domestic product of the Republic of Serbia at constant prices – flash estimate, I Quarter 2022].
<https://www.stat.gov.rs/sr-latn/vesti/20220504-kvartalni-bruto-domaci-proizvod-u-stalnim-cenama-fles-procena-i-kvartal-2022/>
- Republički zavod za statistiku [RZS]. (2022). Kvartalni bruto domaći proizvod u stalnim cenama – fleš procena, II kvartal 2022. [Quarterly Gross domestic product of the Republic of Serbia at constant prices – flash estimate, II Quarter 2022].
<https://www.stat.gov.rs/sr-latn/vesti/20220801-kvartalni-bruto-domaci-proizvod-u-stalnim-cenama-flesh-procena-ii-kvartal-2022/>
- Rivers, M. N. (2019). A review of autocratic, paternalistic, and charismatic leadership in three collectivist cultures. *Emerging Leadership Journeys*, 12(1). <https://www.regent.edu/journal/emerging-leadership-journeys/paternalistic-leadership/>
- Spencer-Oatey, H., & Franklin, P. (2012). What is culture?. A compilation of quotations. *GlobalPAD Core Concepts*.
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/al/globalpad-rip/openhouse/interculturalskills_old/core_concept_compilations/global_pad_-_what_is_culture.pdf

- Ting-Toomey, S., & Dorjee, T. (2018). *Communicating across cultures*. Guilford Publications.
- Tortola, P. D., & Pansardi, P. (2019). The charismatic leadership of the ECB presidency: A language-based analysis. *European Journal of Political Research*, 58(1), 96–116. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12272>
- Van Vlimmeren, E., Moors, G. B., & Gelissen, J. P. (2017). Clusters of cultures: diversity in meaning of family value and gender role items across Europe. *Quality & Quantity*, 51(6), 2737–2760. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11135-016-0422-2>
- Veber, M. (1976). *Privreda i društvo* [Economy and society]. Prosveta.
- Wehrich, H., & Koontz, H.(1998). *Menadžment* [Management]. Mate.

Efekti harizmatičnog liderstva kulturnog klastera Istočne Evrope u kriznim situacijama

Tatjana D. Janovac¹ and Saša R. Virijević Jovanović²

¹Univerzitet Privredna akademija u Novom Sadu
Fakultet za primenjeni menadžment, ekonomiju i finansije, Beograd

²Visoka Škola modernog biznisa, Beograd

Sažetak

U poslednjih deset godina tri velike krize pogodile su najviše evropski kontinent. Pored migrantske krize, Covid-19 i rusko-ukrajinskog rata, na pomolu je i četvrta energetska kriza. Sve ove krize uticale su na mnoge društvene promene evropskih zemalja. To je dovelo i do promene vođstva evropskih lidera i prilagođavanju situacijama koje donose neizvesnost i koje zahtevaju brze i radikalne promene. Cilj rada usmeren je na analizu efekta harizmatičnog liderstva kulturnog klastera Istočne Evrope u kriznim situacijama. Kulturni klaster Istočne Evrope specifičan je po visokom stepenu kolektivizma, nasuprot niskom stepenu orijentisanosti ka budućnosti i izbegavanju neizvesnosti. Ovakvim karakteristikama kulture odgovara harizmatičan lider usmeren na vrednosti, ljude i rezultate. Harizmatično liderstvo ima specifičan efekat na slebenike iz razloga što harizmatični lider u kriznim situacijama uliva poverenje svojim sledbenicima koji se osećaju sigurno pored njega. Teorijskom analizom utvrđeno je da saglasnost između karakteristika kulturnog klastera i liderskog stila dovodi do pozitivnih efekata i čvrstog odnosa između lidera i sledbenika u procesu upravljanja krizom.

Ključne reči: harizmatično liderstvo, kulturni klaster, Istočna Evropa, krizne situacije, promene

Model for Evaluation of Banking Services' Quality

Nina Mitić and Miodrag Brzaković

University Business Academy in Novi Sad
Faculty of Applied Management, Economics and Finance, Belgrade

Article Information*

Review Article • UDC: 336.71:005.6

Volume: 19 Issue: 3, pages: 176–202

Received: July 27, 2022 • Revised: August 16, 2022 • Accepted: August 21, 2022

<https://doi.org/10.51738/Kpolisa2022.19.3r.176mb>

Author Note

Nina Mitić  <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3104-3738>

Miodrag Brzaković  <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6366-1784>

We have no known conflict of interest to disclose.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Nina Mitić,
Faculty of Applied Management, Economics and Finance, Jevrejska 24,
11000 Belgrade, Serbia. Email: nina.mitic58@gmail.com

* Cite (APA):

Mitić, N., & Brzaković, M. (2022). Model for Evaluation of Banking Services' Quality. *Kultura polisa*, 19(3), 176–202. <https://doi.org/10.51738/Kpolisa2022.19.3r.176mb>

Abstract

In modern business, quality is one of the key factors for recognising a product or service on the market. For this reason, quality is becoming a new business paradigm in all spheres of human activities, whether we talk about material products or services. Therefore, increasing attention is paid to quality management that is focused on meeting the requirements of clients in order to keep the old and attract new ones, so that the organisation can survive in conditions of fierce competition. It is evident that nowadays quality management is becoming a leading asset in competitive business in all industries. World companies are focused on quality, so we may often hear that the 20th century was actually the century of productivity, but the 21st century will be, without doubt, the century of quality. Bearing in mind the importance of the quality of services, there were valid reasons to focus the scientific research attention in this paper on defining the model of valuation of the quality of banking services, as a research objective. In achieving this goal, there were valid and scientifically justified reasons to apply the statistical method, as a general method, and the descriptive (Survey-Research) method, as a special one. The model for evaluating the quality of banking services, which is defined in this way, represents an important assumption of contributing to the improvement of relations with clients (Customer relationship management – CRM) with the goal of satisfying their needs and wishes, but also with the realization of business benefits.

Keywords: service quality, quality indicators, quality factors, quality model

Model for Evaluation of Banking Services' Quality

Simultaneously with the origin and evolution of humanity, quality as a concept, view, idea and abstraction has emerged and has been developing since. Accordingly, the quality of products and services, quite reasonably, plays the leading role in attracting new and retaining existing clients. The key to improving competitiveness in the market is quality. Hence, it is understandable that the survival and expansion of business activities, as well as the success of a business, is conditioned by the ability of the quality management system to clearly define and ensure the stability of product and service quality with minimum costs.

Given the growing importance of services and their major participation in national economies, the quality of services is, quite logically, set as a priority in modern business by which organisations will be recognisable in highly competitive environment. In general, in service industry, two trends can be observed in highly developed countries – services become the dominant sector of the economy, and at the same time the products that are offered, to an increasing extent, represent a combination of products and services as a response to greater and more objective understanding of client's needs. Therefore, in modern business, quality becomes a new paradigm in all spheres of human activity, whether it is material products or services.

Modern age and market globalisation put increasing demands on business entities in terms of adaptation to new market conditions, starting from a greater range of banking services, to improving their quality with the purpose of meeting various demands of clients, whose needs expand with the growth of innovations, technology and increasingly competitive market. Authors who address quality of banking services, mostly, not without reason, share an opinion that there is a significant interrelation between the quality of services and the bank performance.

Due to a huge competition on the market, the concept of quality is gaining more and more importance. In order to fulfil the needs and expectations

of its clients and other stakeholders, it is necessary that an organisation use its internal organisational and material capacities and resources purposefully. To achieve those goals, one of the essential effective tools is the implementation of quality management system in accordance with SRPS ISO 9000 standards. Quality management system can help an organisation in improving clients' and stakeholders' satisfaction. Quality management system encourages the organisation to analyse clients' and stakeholders' needs and expectations and to identify processes which ensure the delivery of products according to their demands, and to control and constantly improve those processes.

The operation of banks on the world market leads to competition increase, which makes banks strive for providing new services, which will contribute to clients' satisfaction, both natural persons and legal entities, and particularly to the satisfaction of entrepreneurs and multinational companies, government institutions and economy as a whole. Gaining a global advantage is reflected in the positioning of financial institutions, with the help of improving the quality of services. In present circumstances, this especially refers to the increase in quality and quantity of services, which clients can get at home, like "home banking", or using different internet platforms, mobile applications, or telephone banking. The end result, i.e., the goal, is clients' satisfaction. In this process of rendering services and thinking about the quality of banking services, we may notice that this improvement not only contributes to banks' competitiveness and clients' satisfaction, but also provides guidelines for improving some of the internal capacities and work organisation (human resources, education), and particularly contributes to the impact that increased service quality has on marketing and branding of certain banks and their financial services. In today's conditions of significant monetary changes, and considering the unstable situation on the world stock exchanges, which is a result of the global economic crisis, it is not easy to survive and achieve competitiveness. There is a constant customers' demand for facilitating the performance of banking operations, so that banks, in their operation, should achieve some kind of uniqueness by which their services can be distinguished from those

offered by others, thus ensuring the attraction of new clients. As Radojević and Marjanović (2011) argue, when it comes to Serbian market, it can be seen that most of the new services has already been offered on the market over previous years.

Development of Service Quality Models

Taking into account the previous views, it is quite logical that one of the most common questions to which we seek answer addresses the models and methodologies by which the quality of services can be measured and expressed in the most objective manner, in order to be empirically as accurate as possible and applicable in practice. In order to define a service quality model in banking, it is completely logical to look at models in service industries that exist and have been significantly established, as well as to incorporate this knowledge into research to the extent possible.

When studying bank operations, it can be observed that banks, during the 1980s, began to pay more and more attention to the issue of service quality. Before that, they usually measured the quality of material goods that were offered for sale, while the quality of services was not examined and was ineffective (Parasuraman, A, Zeithaml, V, A. and Berry, L, L, 1985).

One of the leading analysts, who was the first to address the quality of service is Parasuraman. He introduced the following determinants of quality, according to the model that he referred to by its abbreviation *Servqual*.

Determinants of service quality according to this model are:

a) *Reliability*, which includes consistency of performance. This determinant assumes that a certain business entity performs the service in a high-quality and expected manner, and honours the promises made. This includes – accuracy in calculation, orderly record keeping, as well as the performance of services in indicated time.

b) *Responsibility*, which refers to tendency or readiness of employees to provide the service. In fact, this determinant implies timely service, timely

dispatch of the transaction slip, quick notification to the client, fast provision of other services, etc.

c) *Competence* indicates the possession of the necessary skills and knowledge to perform the service. It implies knowledge and the skills of the contact staff, and the knowledge and skills of the staff for providing operational support (e.g. research, i.e. analytical skills).

d) *Access*, includes accessibility and easy contact between clients and service provider. In that sense, the service is easily accessible by phone (the lines are not busy and do not put client on hold), waiting time for receiving the service does not exceed reasonable limits, working hours are "convenient", as well as the location of the service facility.

a) *Courtesy* implies helpfulness, respect, consideration and professionalism of the contact staff. This determinant also includes care for clients' property, clean and neat appearance of public relations staff.

b) *Communication* involves informing clients in language they understand and ability to listen to the client.

c) *Credibility* includes trustworthiness, plausibility, honesty. This determinant implies that the focus is on the best interest of the client. These factors also contribute to credibility: company name, reputation, contact person personality and better interaction with the customer depending on the level of "hard sell".

d) *Security* implies protection from hazards, risk or suspicion. This includes: physical safety, financial security, confidentiality.

e) *Understanding* – knowing the customer, implies investing efforts to recognise the customer's needs. Within this determinant, it is important to timely observe specific customer's requirements, pay individual attention and identify regular customer.

f) *Tangibles* include material evidence of service, such as: physical objects, evidence that serves for staff appearance, tools or equipment used to provide services; a physical representation of the service, such as a credit

card or a bank statement, as well as other customers in the facility that renders the service (Parasuraman, A, Zeithaml, V, A. and Berry, L.L. 1985).

It can be concluded that Parasuraman's service quality model, which is used very often, stresses communication as one of the most important components in measuring the quality of banking services. This model can be used for measuring, quite precisely, clients' satisfaction i.e., users of banking services, and certain psychological processes of the client are very important for that, such as the client's previous experience with other banks, or the bank that is the subject of research.

Contrary to Parasuraman's *Servqual* model, Cronin and Taylor (Cronin and Taylor, 1992) believe that to measure the quality of services, only a statement from the party, i.e., the client is required about the five types, i.e. dimensions of service quality, which is why they propose the application of the *Servperf* model. This model is based, as highlighted, on five service dimensions: tangibles, reliability, responsiveness, assurance and empathy, with two sets of 22 items.

Tangibles refer to the physically visible aspects (cleanliness of toilets, availability of parking, etc.).

Reliability is the ability to provide a service effectively, promptly and accurately.

Responsiveness implies expectations of clients to get an accurate answer when the service will be performed, how fast and whether adequate cooperation of employees with the client can be expected, and to what extent the busyness of employees may affect their ability to respond to clients' demands quickly, accurately and without delay.

Assurance implies that clients trust employees and feel safe in doing business with them. That, of course, also implies the courtesy of the staff, because, otherwise, many doubts would be arisen. That's why it is absolutely reasonable to expect that employees should be adequate support to management in efficient and effective performance of their jobs.

The last dimension – *empathy* – represents good communication, personal attention and understanding of clients' needs. For example, this

can be reflected in the adapted business hours to best suit the clients, in the waiting time to receive service etc. (Rasyida and all, 2016).

The quality of service in this model is measured by multiplying the weights with the perception scores, where SQ_j is service quality of item statement j , W_{ij} is the weighting factor of item statement j to an individual i , and P_{ij} is perception of individual j with respect to the performance on item statement j .

$$SQ_i = \sum_{j=1}^k W_{ij} \cdot P_{ij}$$

The weighting factors is the score:

$$W_{ij} = \frac{I_{ij} - Min}{Max - Min}$$

Where I_{ij} is the importance score obtained from the questionnaire, Min is the minimum score and Max is the maximum score of the importance score.

Bankserv model is also interesting because of its simplicity, which originated in the Australian banking sector (Avkiran, 1994). This model measures the quality of service from the client's perspective, as well as the measurement scales in the previous two cases, but is focused on the bank specificities as a business entity.

Avkiran describes this model as a simple set of easy-to-use items when listening to the perception of clients. In this model, there are four discriminant factors. Those are staff conduct, credibility, communication and access to teller services (Avkiran, 1994).

Avkiran also believes that a visit to the branch is crucial for forming opinion about service quality, and stated:

Client service in banks is characterised by multiple encounters between clients and branch staff. *BANKSERV* is designed to capture the multi-faceted nature of client service quality issues that arise in such environment and allows the client to reflect on perceptions and expectations in a single statement (Coetzee, van Zyl and Tait, 2013).

The mentioned four dimensions consist of 17 individual characteristics: willingness of staff to help customers, providing prompt service, polite greeting by the staff when it is customer's turn to approach the teller, expression of genuine concern always for any mistake, politeness of staff, bank employee's neat dress and professional appearance, ability to apologise for any mistake, keeping customers informed always about the matters of concern to them, rectifying mistake properly, maintaining security for customers dealings, helping customers learn how to keep down their banking costs, having adequate knowledge of bank's services and products, providing good financial advice, notifying customers about different types of available accounts and investments, telling customers about the actual time to perform the services, adequate number of open tellers and staff during the busy hours of the day.

It cannot be said that there is a perfect model for determining the quality of banking services. Each of them has certain advantages and disadvantages, and the one that in given the circumstances can provide the most objective information necessary for making certain conclusions shall be applied.

Method

As in any research, the methodological aspects in this research are determined by the goal of the research, i.e. by the nature of the scientific knowledge that determines it. Given that the goal of this research is to define a model for valuation of the quality of banking services, a methodological path was chosen that enables a deep and versatile insight into the essence, breadth

and complexity of the issue of the quality of banking services from the clients' perspective. Consequently, it is quite logical that in this research, in addition to general scientific methods, special ones are also used.

General scientific methods are inherent in all scientific knowledge, regardless of whether natural or social phenomena are concerned. In this research, among the general scientific methods, the statistical method is the most represented.

Considering the essence of the basic questions posed in this paper, in order to search for the answers, it was quite justified to apply the descriptive survey method (*Survey-Research Method*) as a special research method, because this variant of scientific description represents a combination of descriptive and analytical options, which ensures the active involvement of respondents in providing information about the phenomena being described, on the basis of which it is possible to get to the essence of the basic questions and discover cause-and-effect connections and relations.

In the operational phase of research implementation a *scaling technique* was applied to determine the level of agreement between the opinions and attitudes of surveyed bank clients with the arguments related to their satisfaction with the quality of provided services.

As a research instrument we used a scale of attitudes about bank clients' satisfaction with the quality of provided services. A list of 24 manifestations of the quality of banking services is offered on the scale that should be evaluated with marks from 1 to 5; at which for each manifestation of the quality of banking service grade 1 meant total disagreement, grade 2 implied general disagreement, grade 3 indecisiveness, grade 4 mostly agreement and grade 5 complete agreement.

The reliability of the scale was determined by the classical methods (Spearman-Brown-Cronbach alpha coefficient, Guttman Split-half coefficient) and it ranges from 0.7379 to 0.9369, namely:

Based on the obtained reliability coefficients it can be concluded that the applied tool has satisfactory reliability given the number of items

(manifestations of the quality of banking services) that are covered by it and that it can be applied in this research.

It is necessary to emphasize that this research was carried out on a convenience sample,¹ which consisted of users of banking services that could be reached most easily during the period of conducting the research (which were "at hand"). A total of 120 of them were surveyed.

This sample is suitable for knowledge gathering in a specific space and time. The selection of sample units outside of that space and time would be inexpedient.

When choosing this sample, the disadvantages that accompany it were not ignored. However, the specificity of the research subject allows even such a sample to be used representatively in such a research endeavour, as it is formed from users of specific banking services that are available at a given moment.

Research Results and Their Interpretation

The initial step in defining the banking services evaluation model from the clients' perspective includes the indicator, i.e. indicators (characteristics) of quality of banking services. In order to properly conduct this, verified ways of reaching the indicators should be applied in order to ensure that they are research-based. While doing this, special attention should be paid to validity, objectivity, reliability and precision of indicators. That, of course, does not mean that other research and methodological principles (norms, criteria) have been ignored, but that attention has been paid more to those that, given the projected methodology, techniques and instruments of research, had primary importance.

The validity of the description or explanation of the investigated phenomenon depends on the validity of the indicators and their number that should be optimal. In this research, 24 indicators were empirically identified

¹ The survey was carried out in a bank that gave the consent to the author for it.

and their validity was verified by the method of factor analysis of the scale of attitudes. At the same time, the communality data (Table 1) range from medium (only in case of two indicators) to high values (at 22 indicators). High communalities in factor analysis imply good internal consistency of the applied scale, and therefore the validity of the defined manifest variables (items), by which the validity of the applied instrument was also confirmed.

Based on the defined indicators, manifest variables were formulated by which attributive characteristics of the quality of the provided banking services were expressed from the aspect of clients' perception. Considering that there are 24 of them in total it was necessary to reduce them to a smaller number, which will represent all the others. This reduction of manifestations of quality of banking services to a smaller number can be carried out by "arbitrary" assessment, which is the simplest procedure, but it is not the most objective one. Therefore, grouping according to a unique criterion is more acceptable that leaves no room for bias and arbitrariness. For this purpose, factor analysis was used that allowed for a greater number of procedures and data, which show the quality of the banking services provided, to be grouped into several basic sets (factors), namely, based on their relation, i.e. correlation of the scores given by clients to evaluate their importance. In that way, a greater number (24) of quality indicators of the services provided from the bank clients' perspective (manifest variables), has been reduced to a smaller number of basic (latent) service quality indicators in banking – factors. PROMAX oblique rotation was used then because it allows hierarchical factor analysis and factors to be correlated. This analysis provides the most stable factorial solution with the minimum secondary saturations on separated components.

Based on the correlation matrix of all manifest variables, as a starting point for determining the factors of customer satisfaction with the quality of banking services, which matrix was subject to significance tests, it was also checked whether it was justified to apply factor analysis. At this point, a sample adequacy index was obtained which is 0.8261, which is considered a

good indicator². The value of Bartlett's Test of Sphericity is also high ($p=0.000$) and represents a reliable basis for application of factor analysis (table 2).

For determining the number of extracted factors, Cattell's "scree" test was used as a criterion, which indicates seven-factor solution, i.e. that *seven factors of clients' satisfaction with the quality of banking services* were identified which represent all manifest variables (24) – indicators of the quality of rendered banking services (Graph 1). According to this criterion, only those factors were retained whose characteristic root value is greater or at least equal to 1.00, i.e. factors with the following values of characteristic roots: 7.654; 2.381; 1.819; 1.372; 1.287; 1.172 and 1.036. They make 69.66% of the cumulative proportion of total variance (Table 3).

Table 4 shows the matrix of the pattern factor, and Table 5 shows the matrix of the factor structure of the quality of provided banking services from the perspective of clients. To define the factors, it was necessary to simultaneously take into account only those indicators of the quality of provided banking services (manifest variables) that have a weight factor above 0.3 and a correlation with the factor above 0.3.

The first factor is determined by the following manifest variables: (1) bank employees are courteous to clients using banking services (3/0.869; 0.796)³, (2) clients are treated with respect (6/0.809; 0.872), (3) bank employees are helpful and always ready to assist (3/0.791; 0.879), (4) clients using banking services are timely provided with necessary information (7/0.731; 0.819), (5) services are adapted to meet the clients' needs (11/0.542; 0.667), (6) bank branch has a pleasant atmosphere (18/0.436; 0.593) and (7) whenever possible certain concessions are made to the client (10/0.412; 0.677).

Manifest variables that cover this factor are mostly related to kindness,

² The following scale is used to evaluate the sample adequacy index: approx. 0.90 – excellent; around 0.80 – very good; about 0.70 – good; about 0.60 – medium; around 0.50 – poor; lower than 0.50 – unacceptable (Fulgosi, 1988, p. 277).

³ The first number in parentheses indicates the serial number of the questions in the questionnaire, the second number represents the factor weight, and the third indicates the correlation coefficient of the variable with the factor.

respect and consideration, which is why it may be reasonable called *kindness and willingness to help the client*.

The second factor is most closely related to the following manifest variables: (1) individual approach to each client (8/0.709; 0.713), (2) personal and financial information of the client is protected (16/0.705; 0.724), (3) price of banking services is affordable (17/0.664; 0.635), (4) clients have a wide range of banking products and services at their disposal (9/0.627; 0.669), (5) whenever possible certain concessions are made to the client (10/0.595; 0.765), (6) services are adapted to meet clients' needs (11/0.564; 0.705) and (7) for credit products, the amount of paperwork has been reduced when filing loan application (15/0.497; 0.578).

It is evident that the individual approach to clients and the possibility of meeting their various needs form the base of this factor, which is why it may be called *adjustment of banking services to meet clients' individual needs*.

It is somewhat expected that this factor should be singled out because it is very important for clients that their requirements and problems are understood and that they are provided with advice how to solve them easily, while at the same time protecting their personal and financial information.

The third factor represents the following variables: (1) the orderliness and hygiene of the branch is at a high level (19/0.875; 0.848), (2) branches are equipped with state-of-the-art equipment (20/0.745; 0.755), (3) bank employees are characterized by a professional appearance (4/0.458; 0.624), (4) there is a pleasant atmosphere in the branch (18/0.445; 0.541) and (5) branches have parking space for clients (21/0.306; 0.379).

In general, it is evident that huge attention is paid to tidiness and hygiene in the branches, both of the staff and the premises. It is particularly important to provide parking space for bank clients. All this affects the formation of a positive image about the branch, as well as the bank staff. That is why we can accurately refer to this factor as *Comfort and visual impression*.

The fourth factor covers the following manifestations of the banking services quality: (1) service availability through ATMs providing payment and

deposit option and mobile applications 24/7 (14/0.805; 0.832), (2) services are adjusted to meet clients' needs (12/0.778; 0.845), (3) location and distribution of branches and ATMs is in accordance with the needs of clients (13/0.499; 0.594) and (4) people from vulnerable categories – pregnant women, disabled, etc. have priority in bank branches as they are first served (23/0.324; 0.370).

From the data presented, it can be seen that this factor is not unambiguous, so it is difficult to define it. However, we can say that such manifest variables are predominant according to which it can be referred to as – *distribution and business hours of bank branches*.

The fifth factor is determined by only three manifest variables: (1) the speed with which bank employees provide services is quite acceptable (2/0.895; 0.869), (2) bank employees are efficient in providing services (1/0.855; 0.861) and (3) creative promotional campaigns are launched on regular basis (24/0.349; 0.397). Accordingly, the most acceptable name for this factor is *efficient service provision*, which makes sense.

The sixth factor is also determined by only three manifest variables, namely: (1) bank branches have a designated children area (22/0.821; 0.791), (2) bank branches have a parking space for clients (21/0.617; 0.657) and (3) the distribution of branches and ATMs complies with clients' needs (13/0.518; 0.636).

Given the variables that are most closely related to this factor, it can be called – *bank branch premises and infrastructure are adjusted to meet the clients' needs*.

The seventh factor is "covered" by the manifest variables which are not unambiguously directed, so it is difficult to define it. The following variables are in question: (1) in bank branches priority is given to vulnerable categories – pregnant women, disabled people, etc. (23/0.714; 0.687), (2) creative promotional campaigns are launched on regular basis (24/0.567; 0.585), (3) the bank branch has a pleasant atmosphere (18/0.481; 0.606) and (4) the price of banking services is affordable (17/0.320; 0.468). However, it could be said that this factor can be defined as – *in banking business, priority in service is given to*

categories of clients who need it.

Overall, the factor analysis identified a smaller number of latent dimensions (factors) which are manifested in a larger number of manifest variables, that is factors were identified empirically, which objectively express the satisfaction of clients with the quality of banking services provided, which created the conditions for rational *defining of the model for determining the quality of banking services.*

As emphasized, the key factors of banking service quality should constitute the basis for defining this model from the perspective of clients identified in this research. In that way, the level of satisfaction of clients using banking services can be quantified in a simple, affordable and exact manner and the basic reasons for their satisfaction or dissatisfaction can be perceived.

Considering the results of the research, it is evident that this model should be based on seven separate factors of client satisfaction with the quality of banking services. This methodological procedure was also used in some earlier researches that were not strictly aimed at banking services.

Designs of this model, from a technical point of view, can be quite different, and this paper presents one of the possible designs (Table 6).

Of course, it should be borne in mind that there are great differences in needs, interests, desires and personality traits among bank clients. However, this does not mean that the presented model for determining the quality of services in banking business does not provide enough space for adaptation to specific economic, social, psychological and other characteristics of banking clients.

Conclusion

It can be realistically expected that the final opinion on banking services quality shall be given by clients, but also by the bank itself that provides the service should have a defined quality management system for its business, so that it could provide adequate service. In this respect, in order to improve

the bank management, i.e., the operation of a bank branch certain frameworks have been introduced for measuring the quality of services. Accordingly, it is a very delicate task, out of all possible indicators, to determine the optimal scope of those indicators that give a complete picture of bank i.e. bank branch operation. If the number of indicators is higher than optimal, the efficiency of the managerial decision-making mechanism can be reduced which can cause the so-called "paralysis of analysis". On the other hand, a small number of indicators can jeopardize the effectiveness of measurement and monitoring of overall quality factors of delivered services.

Therefore, banking business inevitably imposes the need to theoretically analyse the existing practice of measuring the quality of services, and to empirically identify exactly the key indicators of the quality of provided services from clients' perspective and their classification, according to the predetermined mathematical and logical model, into appropriate representative groups (factors). This provides the basis for development of a quality model of banking services that enables easier assessment of factors that are most relevant to clients, faster identification of possible problems in the supply chain of banking services and efficient response of the bank management, i.e., bank branch.

Banking service models can be designed differently. In this paper, we presented a model defined on the basis of key factors from the clients' perspective that have been identified empirically, starting from defining the indicators of the quality of banking services (the first task of the research) as a basis for formulation of manifestations (24 of them) that express clients' opinion on the quality of services in the most objective manner, to classifying factors according to predetermined mathematical and logical conditions (the second task of the research). The research results convincingly demonstrate that the banking services quality evaluation model from clients' perspective should be based on seven separate factors, which ensures efficient, sophisticated and exact recognition of the level of satisfaction of clients using banking services (the third task of the research).

References

- Avkiran, N, K. (1994). Developing an Instrument to Measure Customer Service Quality in Branch Banking. *International Journal of Bank Marketing*, 12(6), 10–18. <https://doi.org/10.1108/02652329410063223>
- Coetzee, J., van Zyl, H., & Tait, M. (2013). Perceptions of service quality by clients and contact-personnel in the South African retail banking sector. *Southern African Business Review*, 17(1), 1–22.
- Fulgosi, A (1988). *Faktorska analiza* [Factor analysis]. Školska knjiga
- Heleta, M (2009). Upravljanje kvalitetom [Quality management]. Beograd: Univerzitet Singidunum.
- Kilibarda, M. (2008). *Upravljanje kvalitetom u logistici* [Quality management in logistics]. Univerzitet u Beogradu: Saobraćajni fakultet.
- Kršev, B . (2012, August 16). *U avgustu se navršava 150 godina od osnivanja prve bankarske ustanove u Srbiji – Uprave fondova* [August marks the 150th anniversary of the establishment of the first banking institution in Serbia – the Fund Administration]. Vreme, br. 1128. <https://www.vreme.com/dodatno/u-avgustu-se-navrsava-150-godina-od-osnivanja-prve-bankarske-ustanove-u-srbiji-uprave-fondova/>
- Nešić, T. (2005). *Uloga kvaliteta u poboljšanju profitabilnosti*. Boneks inženjering.
- Parasuraman, A., Zeithaml, V. A., & Berry, L. L. (1985). A conceptual model of service quality and its implications for future research. *Journal of Marketing*, 49(4), 41–50. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1251430>
- Radović-Marković, M, & Hanić, H. (2018). *Metodologija istraživanja u ekonomskim naukama* [Research methodology in economic sciences], Beogradska bankarska akademija, Fakultet za bankarstvo, osiguranje i finansije, Institut ekonomskih nauka.

- Radojević, P., & Marjanović, D. (2011). Kvalitet usluga u bankarstvu: nesaglasnosti, odrednice i istraživačke tehnike za unapređenje kvaliteta [Service quality in banking: discrepancies, determinants and research techniques for quality improvement]. *Bankarstvo*, 40(7–8), 34–59.
- Rasyida, D. R., Ulkhaq, M. M., Setiowati, P. R., & Setyorini, N. A. (2016). Assessing Service Quality: A Combination of SERVPERF and Importance – Performance Analysis, MATEC Web Conf., 68 [online].
<https://doi.org/10.1051/mateconf/20166806003>
- Shanin, A. (2006). SERVQUAL and model of service quality gaps: a framework for determining and prioritizing critical factors in delivering quality services. In *Delivering quality services – An introduction* (pp. 117–131). ICFAI University Press, Andhra Pradesh.

Appendix

Table 1.
Communalities

Variables (items)	Initial	Extraction
1.	1.000	0.800
2.	1.000	0.824
3.	1.000	0.738
4.	1.000	0.542
5.	1.000	0.799
6.	1.000	0.806
7.	1.000	0.733
8.	1.000	0.636
9.	1.000	0.499
10.	1.000	0.792
11.	1.000	0.729
12.	1.000	0.770
13.	1.000	0.670
14.	1.000	0.756
15.	1.000	0.441
16.	1.000	0.670
17.	1.000	0.684
18.	1.000	0.767
19.	1.000	0.773
20.	1.000	0.639
21.	1.000	0.652
22.	1.000	0.736
23.	1.000	0.624
24.	1.000	0.639

Note. Source: Author

Table 2.

Assessment Test for Verifying Factor Analysis Data Adequacy

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin "Sample Adequacy Index"		0.826
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Chi - square Approximation Test	1416.248
	Number of degrees of freedom	276
	Significance	0.000

Note. Source: Author

Table 3.

Matrix of characteristic values and explanation of total variance

Manifest variables (components)	Initial Eigenvalues (characteristic values)			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% variance	Cumulative % of variance	Total	% variance	Cumulative % of variance
1.	7.654	31.890	31.890	7.654	31.890	31.890
2.	2.381	9.919	41.809	2.381	9.919	41.809
3.	1.819	7.578	49.387	1.819	7.578	49.387
4.	1.372	5.719	55.106	1.372	5.719	55.106
5.	1.287	5.363	60.468	1.287	5.363	60.468
6.	1.172	4.882	65.350	1.172	4.882	65.350
7.	1.036	4.315	69.665	1.036	4.315	69.665
8.	0.876	3.649	73.314			
9.	0.807	3.361	76.675			
10.	0.765	3.188	79.863			
11.	0.656	2.734	82.597			

12.	0.604	2.518	85.115
13.	0.496	2.067	87.182
14.	0.460	1.916	89.098
15.	0.420	1.750	90.848
16.	0.359	1.494	92.342
17.	0.346	1.440	93.782
18.	0.325	1.356	95.138
19.	0.247	1.030	96.168
20.	0.242	1.010	97.178
21.	0.229	0.955	98.132
22.	0.179	0.744	98.876
23.	0.143	0.596	99.472
24.	0.127	0.528	100.000

Note. Source: Author

Table 4.
Pattern and structure matrix

Service quality indicators	PATTERN FACTORS						
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
1.	0.095	0.040	-0.040	0.025	0.855	-0.109	0.160
2.	0.184	-0.017	-0.182	0.092	0.895	-0.011	0.095
3.	0.869	-0.287	0.121	-0.060	0.155	0.124	-0.002
4.	0.258	0.152	0.458	0.030	0.137	-0.107	-0.039
5.	0.791	0.100	0.066	0.015	0.046	-0.122	0.014
6.	0.809	-0.008	0.185	0.028	0.058	-0.049	-0.066
7.	0.731	0.214	-0.128	-0.033	0.113	0.083	-0.005
8.	-0.053	0.709	0.236	0.016	0.107	-0.062	-0.229
9.	-0.021	0.627	0.091	-0.078	0.165	0.061	-0.022
10.	0.412	0.595	-0.174	0.189	0.052	0.009	-0.182
11.	0.542	0.564	-0.166	-0.106	-0.181	0.109	-0.103

12.	0.049	0.166	0.022	0.778	-0.042	-0.005	0.114
13.	0.034	-0.071	0.247	0.449	-0.041	0.518	-0.112
14.	-0.099	0.082	0.103	0.805	0.144	-0.002	0.118
15.	-0.004	0.497	-0.081	0.117	0.040	0.278	0.073
16.	-0.147	0.705	0.228	0.181	-0.035	-0.253	0.161
17.	0.003	0.664	-0.255	0.107	-0.254	0.005	0.320
18.	0.436	0.021	0.445	-0.094	-0.176	-0.030	0.481
19.	0.134	-0.112	0.875	0.053	-0.133	-0.032	0.128
20.	-0.049	0.127	0.745	0.107	-0.085	0.158	-0.060
21.	-0.160	0.350	0.306	-0.206	0.009	0.617	-0.012
22.	0.121	-0.128	-0.146	0.064	-0.097	0.821	0.243
23.	-0.105	-0.158	-0.010	0.324	0.153	0.130	0.714
24.	-0.120	0.305	0.044	-0.226	0.349	0.150	0.567

Note. Source: Author

Table 5.

Struktura matrix

Service quality indicators	STRUCTURE FACTORS						
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
1.	0.384	0.307	0.359	0.069	0.861	-0.018	0.160
2.	0.419	0.283	0.256	0.141	0.869	0.078	0.089
3.	0.796	0.211	0.367	0.143	0.394	0.083	0.091
4.	0.508	0.415	0.624	0.175	0.427	-0.019	0.090
5.	0.879	0.496	0.343	0.222	0.313	-0.089	0.189
6.	0.872	0.430	0.442	0.242	0.362	-0.020	0.100
7.	0.819	0.565	0.198	0.208	0.330	0.113	0.158
8.	0.353	0.713	0.432	0.175	0.362	0.102	-0.051
9.	0.333	0.669	0.315	0.103	0.353	0.179	0.115
10.	0.677	0.765	0.145	0.398	0.257	0.155	0.033

11.	0.667	0.705	0.060	0.155	0.055	0.153	0.104
12.	0.341	0.402	0.195	0.844	0.041	0.218	0.248
13.	0.156	0.181	0.323	0.595	0.119	0.636	-0.050
14.	0.238	0.322	0.289	0.832	0.198	0.238	0.211
15.	0.266	0.578	0.119	0.304	0.155	0.393	0.189
16.	0.326	0.724	0.385	0.304	0.164	-0.064	0.342
17.	0.260	0.635	-0.127	0.260	-0.201	0.104	0.468
18.	0.593	0.394	0.541	0.128	0.116	-0.030	0.606
19.	0.341	0.197	0.848	0.194	0.229	0.024	0.225
20.	0.227	0.328	0.755	0.270	0.256	0.265	0.050
21.	0.050	0.417	0.379	0.041	0.226	0.657	0.046
22.	0.048	0.087	-0.079	0.271	-0.080	0.791	0.226
23.	0.072	0.095	0.111	0.370	0.081	0.193	0.687
24.	0.188	0.448	0.270	-0.066	0.397	0.183	0.585

Note. Source: Author

Table 6.

Structure of the model for determining the quality of service in banking business

FACTORS	Service quality indicators	Score (1 to 5)	Σ (sum of scores)	MV (mean value)
1	2	3	4	5
1. Kindness and willingness to help the client	1. Bank staff is kind to clients using banking services		$\Sigma_1 =$	$MV_1 = \frac{\Sigma_1}{7}$
	2. Clients are treated with respect			
	3. Bank staff is helpful and always willing to assist			
	4. Clients timely receive necessary information			
	5. Services are adjusted to meet clients' needs			
	6. Bank branch has a pleasant atmosphere			
	7. Whenever possible certain concession are made to a client			

2. Adjustment of banking services to meet clients' individual needs	1. Individual approach to each client		$\Sigma_2 =$	$MV_2 = \frac{\Sigma_2}{7} =$
	2. Personal and financial information of the client is protected			
	3. Price of banking services is affordable			
	4. Clients have a wide range of banking products and services at their disposal			
	5. Whenever possible certain concessions are made to the client			
	6. Services are adjusted to meet clients' needs			
	7. For credit products, the amount of paperwork has been reduced when filing loan application			
3. Comfort and visual impression	1. Orderliness and hygiene of the branch is at a high level		$\Sigma_3 =$	$MV_3 = \frac{\Sigma_3}{5} =$
	2. Branches are equipped with state-of-the-art equipment			
	3. Bank employees are characterized by a professional appearance			
	4. There is a pleasant atmosphere in the branch			
	5. Branches have parking space for clients			
4. Distribution and business hours of bank branches	1. Service availability through ATMs providing payment and deposit option and mobile applications 24h		$\Sigma_4 =$	$MV_4 = \frac{\Sigma_4}{4} =$
	2. Services are adjusted to meet clients' needs			
	3. Location and distribution of branches and ATMs is in accordance with the needs of clients			
	4. People from vulnerable categories – pregnant women, disabled, etc.			

	have priority in bank branches as they are first served			
5. Efficient service provision	1. Speed with which bank employees provide services is quite acceptable		$\Sigma_5 =$	$MV_5 = \frac{\Sigma_5}{3} =$
	2. Bank employees are efficient in providing services			
	3. Creative promotional campaigns are launched on regular basis			
6. Bank branch premises and infrastructure are adjusted to meet the clients needs	1. Bank branches have a designated children area		$\Sigma_6 =$	$MV_6 = \frac{\Sigma_6}{3} =$
	2. Bank branches have a parking space for clients			
	3. Distribution of branches and ATMs complies with clients' needs			
7. In banking business, priority in service is given to categories of clients who need it	1. In bank branches priority is given to vulnerable categories – pregnant women, disabled people, etc.		$\Sigma_7 =$	$MV_7 = \frac{\Sigma_7}{4} =$
	2. Creative promotional campaigns are launched on regular basis			
	3. Bank branch has a pleasant atmosphere			
	4. Price of banking services is affordable			
Calculation of mean value of banking services quality indicators		$\Sigma = \Sigma_1 + \Sigma_2 + \dots + \Sigma_7$	$MV = \frac{\Sigma}{33} =$	
		$\Sigma =$	$MV =$	

Note. Source: Author.

Model vrednovanja kvaliteta bankarskih usluga

Nina Mitić and Miodrag Brzaković

¹Univerzitet Privredna akademija u Novom Sadu
Fakultet za primenjeni menadžment, ekonomiju i finansije, Beograd

Sažetak

U savremenom poslovanju kvalitet predstavlja jedan od ključnih činilaca za prepoznavanje nekog proizvoda ili usluge na tržištu. Iz tog razloga kvalitet postaje nova paradigma poslovanja u svim sferama ljudske delatnosti, bilo da se radi o materijalnim proizvodima ili o uslugama. Samim tim, upravljanju kvalitetom se posvećuje sve značajnija pažnja koja je usmerena na zadovoljavanje zahteva korisnika kako bi se oni zadržali i pridobili novi, a organizacija opstala u uslovima oštre konkurencije. Evidentno je da menadžment kvaliteta danas postaje vodeća poluga konkurentnog poslovanja u svim delatnostima. U fokusu interesovanja svetskih kompanija jeste kvalitet, pa se često može čuti da je XX vek ipak bio vek produktivnosti ali XXI vek će biti sigurno vek kvaliteta. Imajući u vidu značaj kvaliteta usluga, postojali su valjani razlozi da se naučno-istraživačka pažnja u ovom radu usmeri na definisanje modela vrednovanja kvaliteta bankarskih usluga, kao cilju istraživanja. U ostvarivanju ovog cilja postojali su valjani i naučno opravdani razlozi da se primeni statistička metoda, kao opšta, i deskriptivna (Survey-Research) metoda, kao posebna. Model vrednovanja kvaliteta bankarskih usluga, koji je ovim putem definisan, predstavlja bitnu pretpostavku doprinosa unapređenju odnosa sa klijentima (Customer relationship management [CRM]) u cilju zadovoljavanja njihovih potreba i želja, ali i uz ostvarivanje poslovne koristi.

Ključne reči: kvalitet, usluga, kvalitet usluga, indikatori kvaliteta, faktori kvaliteta, model kvaliteta

Serdarships as Protoregions of Central Serbia

Dušan Ilić

Institute of European Studies, Belgrade

Article Information*

Review Article • UDC: 342.26(497.11)"1834"

Volume: 19 Issue: 3, pages: 203–224

Received: June 30, 2022 • Accepted: August 21, 2022

<https://doi.org/10.51738/Kpolisa2022.19.3r.203i>

The article is part of project 179014 funded by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia.

Author Note

Dušan Ilić  <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2913-5075>

I have no known conflict of interest to disclose.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Dušan Ilić,
Institute of European Studies, Trg Nikole Pašića 11, 11000 Beograd, Serbia.

Email: dusan.ilic@ies.rs

* Cite (APA):

Ilić, D. (2022). Serdarships as Protoregions of Central Serbia. *Kultura polisa*, 19(3), 203–224.
<https://doi.org/10.51738/Kpolisa2022.19.3r.203i>

Abstract

Since the restoration of Serbian statehood in 1804, throughout the nineteenth and most of the twentieth century, the area of modern Central Serbia has been territorially fragmented into a number of local (self)government units of the third degree, which were initially called nahiyas and later districts. The only exception during the existence of the modern independent state of Serbia was made in 1834 with the formation of five larger regions composed of several districts, which were named serdarships. The paper aims to determine, above all, the territorial scope of the then established serdarships, as well as to provide an answer to the question of whether these regions could be considered protoregions of Central Serbia. Given the short duration of this administrative-territorial division, which lasted less than a year, the lack of studies that would address specific issues, which means the lack of basic data on the geographical distribution of these regions, in this study we will try to locate the space and boundaries of these five serdarships. We will also try to determine their historical foundation, as well as the potential practical use value in today's context of the process of political decentralization and statistical regionalization.

Keywords: Serdarship, regions, decentralization, district, Serbia

Serdarships as Protoregions of Central Serbia

Restored Serbia, whose liberation process lasted throughout the 19th century, inherited a territorial organization from the Ottoman Empire. It meant the division into villages, *knežinas*, *nahiyas* and sandjaks. Thus, before the beginning of the First Serbian Uprising, the Smederevo Sanjak, as the nucleus of the renewed Serbian state, was divided into twelve *nahiyas*, which consisted of several *knežinas*. This territorial division was maintained during both uprisings, as well as during the so-called dual powers, until 1830. At the time of receiving Hatisherif, the *knežinas* were renamed captaincies, and after a few years, the captaincies were renamed *srezes* (Ljušić, 2004, pp. 236–238). However, during the entire 19th century, until the formation of the Yugoslav state, the Serbian state did not know territorial entities of a larger geographical scope than the *nahiyas*, ie districts. The only exception was made during the reign of Prince Miloš Obrenović in 1834. At the Assembly convened in 1834 on the occasion of the proclamation of the Hatisherif from 1833, Prince Miloš achieved the division of Serbia into serdarships, i.e. large regions. Each serdarship included three to four districts.²

At that time, five serdarships were established: Raška, Podunavlje, Mačva, Timok and Rasina. Great serdars came to their foreheads. Their powers were twofold. At the same time, they supervised the work of the district as part of their serdarship, but they were obliged to send a report to Prince Miloš every week on what was happening in serdarship and on its border. The great serdars were the highest representatives of the central government in the local government. They were appointed personally by the prince, and they exercised police, administrative and judicial power. After the assembly decision on the establishment of serdars, the serdars received the so-called solemn diplomas on the dignity of great serdars (Svirčević, 2011, pp. 97–

² The *nahiyas* will later become districts, and the captaincies will be called *srezes* (Ljušić, 2004, pp. 238–240).

98). Jovan Obrenović was appointed Serdar of Raška, Joksim Mihailović was appointed Serdar of Podunavlje, Vule Gligorijević became Serdar of Mačva, Steva Stojanović of Timok became Serdar, and Mileta Radojković became Serdar of Rasina (Petrović, 1901, pp. 645–646). This administrative division of the country lasted a very short time. These serdarships were abolished as early as 1835, when the Sretenje Constitution was adopted. There were no people's self-government bodies in the districts and captaincies. *Ispravnicestva* was established in the districts, which aimed to strengthen the centralization of local government in order to prevent any attempt to disturb public order. Former nahiya's elders were most affected by this local government reform. With them, Prince Miloš completely diminished the importance, position, rights and duties (Svircević, 2011, p. 98).

Although the formation of large regions was supposed to aim at a stronger centralization of the country, as well as diminishing the importance of prominent district elders, it seems that it ultimately produced an opposite effect. Namely, Prince Miloš tried to maintain his authoritarian position through his trusted people, whom he appointed as great serdars. However, one of the mentioned serdars, Mileta Radojković, was the leader of one of the biggest revolts against Prince Miloš. This revolt, which was initially launched as a struggle against administrative centralism, eventually gained importance in the struggle for the adoption of the constitution (Jovanović, 1991, p. 65). However, regardless of the short duration of the existence of these large regions, and the motives that led the Serbian prince to form them at that time, we will pay special attention in this paper to the territorial scope of serdarships in the Principality of Serbia. The reason for dealing with this phenomenon lies in the fact that our official science did not deal at all with the issue of geographical distribution of the mentioned regions, which in their scope could certainly represent the embryo of future regions.

Serdarships of the Principality of Serbia

As there have been no serious attempts at cartographic reconstruction

of the then serdarships so far, we will try for the first time in Serbian science to do so on the basis of available data. Namely, it is not known from the available material what the territorial scope of the mentioned serdarships was. Having in mind, first of all, their names, which have a geographical and historical foundation, as well as the planned administrative centers, we can roughly sketch the then territorial organization of the Principality of Serbia. In this process, it is worth looking back at the previous administrative division, but also the one that replaced the division into serdarships. As we have already mentioned, the then Principality of Serbia included twelve nahiyas of the former Sanjak of Smederevo in addition to the territory,³ that is, the Pashalik of Belgrade and the area of the so-called *Six nahiyas*, which were formally returned to her by the Hatisherif from 1833. At the time when Serbia was granted autonomous status within the Ottoman Empire in 1830, its borders coincided with the borders of the Pashalik of Belgrade. However, after the second Hatisherif in 1833, the first territorial expansion of the Principality of Serbia took place. Then, the so-called *Six nahiyas*, which had previously become part of Revolutionary Serbia during the First Uprising.⁴ In that way, the Serbian autonomous principality definitely shaped its territory, which will remain unchanged until the formal acquisition of independence at the Berlin Congress in 1878 (Svirčević, 2011, p. 98). As for the internal organization, as we have already mentioned, the country was divided into nahiyas and knezinas, which were later renamed districts and captaincies /srezes. The only exception was made in 1834 with the formation of five larger regions. If we keep in mind that in the same year, 1834, the Principality was divided into fifteen districts, then we can determine the boundaries of the regions with respect to their borders, with considerable precision. Namely, based on the census conducted that year, we know that Serbia was organized

³ These were the following nahiyas: Sabac, Valjevo, Belgrade, Smederevo, Pozarevac, Soko, Uzice, Cacak, Rudnik, Kragujevac, Jagodina and Cuprija, while Grocka and Porec nahiyas were abolished just before the uprising (Stojancevic, 1981, pp. 67, 136).

⁴ These were the following nahiyas: Krajina, Crna Reka, Paracin, Krusevac, Stari Vlah and Podrinje.

in the mentioned fifteen districts and sixty-one captaincies. Having in mind the number of serdarships, it is clear that on average one serdarship had to cover three districts.

The districts at that time were: Šabac, Valjevo, Podrinje, Užice, Rudnik, Belgrade, Podunavlje, Požarevac, Kragujevac, Jagodina, Čuprija, Kruševac, Krajina, Crna Reka and Banja. Only a little later, in 1836, the Čačak District was formed, which was separated from the Rudnik district, while the former Banja District will be divided into the Aleksinac and Gurgusovac districts. Taking into account the fact that in the same year there were districts (recorded in the census) and serdarships, which were personally formed by the Prince himself, it is clear that the borders of the former conditioned the territorial scope of the latter. Analyzing the names of serdarships, we can assume which districts were part of which serdarship. First of all, the Serdarship of Mačva had its headquarters in Šabac, and we can say with certainty that it included the territory of three districts, Šabac, Valjevo and Podrinje, which had its center in Loznica. Then, the Serdarship of Podunavlje with its headquarters in Belgrade, in addition to the Belgrade one, had to include the neighboring districts. Next to the Smederevo District, which was almost certainly part of this region,⁵ the question arises as to which other neighboring district would be part of this region. Having in mind the geographical determination, the size of the then Rudnik District, Kragujevac as the capital of Serbia, which would disqualify both districts in this case, the only candidate would be the Požarevac District. This conclusion is derived from the fact that at that time there was almost no serious connection between the Braničevo and Timok historical regions, so it is difficult to assume that the Požarevac District was part of the Serdarship of Timok. Also, it is even harder to assume that this district was part of the Serdarship of

⁵ The reason for this assumption lies in the fact that for almost the entire second half of the 19th century, there was an hour of merging of the Belgrade and Smederevo districts, and an hour of their separation.

Rasina, having in mind that the latter was named after the main river of the Krusevac District, and the center was in Jagodina. Therefore, primarily for geographical reasons, this possibility would be eliminated. That is why we concluded that the Serdarship of Podunavlje also included the Požarevac District, which fits into the scheme where one region includes three districts.

The Serdarship of Timok was named after the river Timok, and the seat of this region was in Negotin. Therefore, it is not difficult to determine that the Krajina and Crna Reka districts were part of this region, with the centers in Negotin and Zaječar, respectively. Having in mind the circumstances at the time, the geographical connection, but also the importance of Gurgusovac (today's Knjaževac), which was located in the Banja District, to assume that this district was also part of the Serdarship of Timok. However, if you look at the territorial scope of the Banja District, whose spread coincided with today's municipalities of Ražanj, Aleksinac, Sokobanja, Knjaževac, Svrlijig and partly Boljevac, the option of belonging to this district is much more likely than the neighboring Serdarship of Rasina. Thus, this serdarship follows the previously presented unwritten rule according to which three districts form one region. However, it seems that the most problematic in this case is to determine the territorial scope of the remaining two serdarships, Raška and Rasina, as well as their mutual border.

In order to solve the previous dilemma, it is necessary to first establish the facts that we can take as indisputable. First, as we concluded earlier, the Serdarship of Rasina had to include the area after which it was named, and that is the Rasina region, which coincides with the then Kruševac District. Also, it had to include the Jagodina District, for the simple reason that Jagodina was marked as the center of this region. Taking into account the geographical position of the then Ćuprija District, and its leaning on Jagodina, it can be said with almost certainty that this district was also part of the Serdarship of Rasina. On the other hand, when it comes to the Serdarship of Raška, it is clear that it included the Rudnik District, which at that time included Čačak, as the designated seat of the serdarship. Having in mind the geographical

position of the Užice District, its lack of connection with the Macva region, the only remaining possibility is that this district was also part of the Serdarship of Raška. However, the most headache for our research was the determination of the territorial affiliation of the Kragujevac District. Namely, at that time, Kragujevac was the capital of the Principality of Serbia, where Prince Miloš Obrenović himself was sitting. Therefore, it is worth bearing in mind the potential possibility that the extremely centralist Prince kept this area under direct control, and that it did not belong to any serdarships. On the other hand, two more options come into play. Either the Kragujevac District was part of the Raška or Rasina serdarship. Regardless of the affiliation of this district, and if the relations between the prince and the great serdars are taken into account, the most probable conclusion would be that Kragujevac District was only formally part of one of the two serdarships, and that the ruler excluded direct power over it. The reason to think that the Kragujevac District was part of the Serdarship of Raska starts from the assumption that each of the five serdarships was composed of three districts. In that case, Raška would be composed of Užice, Rudnik and Kragujevac, while Rasina would consist of Jagodina, Čuprija and Kruševac districts. However, such an assumption cannot be supported by a valid argument. There is no available document to support this assumption. On the other hand, the demographic and geographical aspects are more in favor of the thesis about the affiliation of this district to the Serdarship of Rasina. At that time, the Kragujevac District had 49.981 inhabitants. Užice and Rudnik together have 123.579, while Jagodina, Čuprija and Kruševac together have only 109.537 people (Cvijetić, 1984, pp. 110–114). Therefore, it is demographically more logical that the Kragujevac District belonged to the Seradrship of Rasina as a demographically weaker, but also geographically smaller area.

Serdarships as protoregions

When we look at the then serdarships as the embryo of the protoregion of Central Serbia, it should be reminded that the term Central Serbia does

not mean the territory of today's Republic of Serbia outside its autonomous provinces, but a rather smaller area. At the time when Prince Miloš formed these five regions, the Principality of Serbia covered only half of today's national territory. Namely, after the annexation of the *Six Nahiyas* in 1833 (Ćorović, 2005, p. 579), The Principality of Serbia stretched between the Drina in the west and Timok in the east, the Sava and Danube in the north and Aleksinac in the south. It still did not include the regions of Southern Serbia, which will be liberated in 1878, as well as parts of the Raska region and Kosovo and Metohija liberated in 1912–1913, i.e. Vojvodina and parts of Sopluk, which joined it only after the victory in the First World War. Specifically, it is about 43.555 km² (Dva veka razvoja Srbije: Statistički pregled, 2008, p. 42), which included the areas of today's twelve administrative districts: Mačva, Kolubara, Podunavlje, Braničevo, Bor, Zaječar, Pomoravlje, Šumadija, Rasina and Moravica as a whole, as well as Zlatibor and Raška for the most part. To this should be added a part of the territory of the capital Belgrade, as well as the municipality of Aleksinac and the Mačva part of the City of Sremska Mitrovica, which is located south of the Sava. Today, this territory is administratively divided into twelve districts and the territory of the City of Belgrade, and in 1834 it was divided into fifteen districts, ie five serdarships.

The Serdarship of Mačva is named after the historical Serbian land of Macva, which has its roots in the thirteenth century and the formation of the Banate of Mačva in 1247, whose territory was completely indefinite, but which stretched between the Sava, Drina and Kolubara (Hardi, 2009, p. 66). For most of its existence, this banate covered the area of the later Serdarship of Mačva. These are the three districts of that time, Šabac, Valjevo, and Podrinje. Today, this area is organized in two administrative districts, Mačva and Kolubara, with centers in Šabac and Valjevo. Therefore, we can observe the historical continuity of the existence of the Mačva mesoregion through Miloš administrative reform. The Serdarship of Podunavlje included those historical Serbian lands that were marked as Kučevo and Braničevo

throughout the Middle Ages (Andrejić, 2011a, pp. 38–41). This area almost completely coincides with the borders of the Podunavlje and Braničevo administrative districts, and for the most part the City of Belgrade.⁶ Serdarship of Timok, although named after the most important river in this area, in a broader context, has its roots in the medieval Principality of Timok, which was inhabited by the Serbian tribe of Timocani. That is why it is not surprising that the area of this region covered the present territory of the Bor and Zaječar administrative districts, with the exception of the two then captaincies, Ražanj and Aleksinac (Cvijetić, 1984, pp. 28 & 32), which almost completely coincide with the area of the two present-day municipalities of the same name, and which then only by chance became part of the said serdarship, bearing in mind that they were part of the wider, Banja District. The remaining two serdarships were formed on somewhat different grounds. Namely, although the Serdarship of Raška was named after the central medieval Serbian country, its territory differed somewhat from the former scope of Raška, but also from the modern understanding of this historical country.⁷ In addition to parts of the Raška land, the Serdarship of Raška also spread to the territories of the former land of Moravica (Andrejić, 2018b, p. 78) and the Rudnik part of Šumadija. In today's framework, the Serdarship of Raška would include the entire Moravica administrative district, as well as the predominant parts of the Zlatibor and Raška administrative districts.⁸ And finally, the Rasina Serdarship included somewhat smaller mesoregions, Rasina, Resava and the central and southeastern parts of Šumadija. Specifically, these areas were part of the Principality of Moravia in the early Middle Ages (Andrejić, 2017, p. 23), but later almost always belonged to different territorial

⁶ With the exception of today's urban municipalities that stretch north of the Sava and Danube.

⁷ In recent times, during the 19th and the very beginning of the 20th century, it marked the territory that separated the two Serbian states, Serbia and Montenegro, and which remained part of the Ottoman Empire until the First Balkan War in 1912.

⁸ But without the municipalities of today's municipalities of Priboj, Prijepolje, Nova Varoš, Sjenica, Novi Pazar and Tutin. On the other hand, today's Municipality of Gornji Milanovac was part of this serdarship.

entities, i.e. administrative areas. In modern terms, it would be the approximate territory of the Pomoravlje, Rasina and Šumadija administrative districts, with the exception of the municipalities of Gornji Milanovac, Ražanj, and Ćićevac.

When we compare the then and current administrative division of these areas, it is clear that a large number of captaincies, later renamed srezes, territorially coincide with today's municipalities and cities, while the then districts largely coincide with the areas of today's administrative districts. Of course, after almost two hundred years, there are partial differences, both in the atriums of individual villages and in the municipal borders, but they are not drastic. Also, Loznica, Ćuprija and Sokobanja are no longer district centers. However, if we analyze the specific areas of the territorial entities in administrative terms, for the past two centuries there have been no major deviations in the observed part of Central Serbia.

However, what particularly attracts our attention in this research is the question of the importance of serdarships for the further development of the concept of administrative–territorial division of Serbia in the later period. Namely, in the above-described area of Central Serbia throughout the existence of the Serbian state, ie. until 1918, there were no larger units of local (self)government than the district. That is, during the entire existence of the modern Serbian state until its drowning in the wider, Yugoslav community, the district was territorially the largest unit of the vertical organization of state power. After the formation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, as early as 1922, the entire country was divided into areas, but those in the mentioned area of Central Serbia almost completely coincided with the earlier districts. After the introduction of the dictatorship on January 6, the mentioned areas were abolished and much larger entities were created, which were called banovinas.⁹ Finally, after the Second World War, Serbia was renewed as a federal unit of the new socialist Yugoslavia, with many

⁹ Some authors see the beginning of the regionalization of Yugoslavia in the formation of banovinas (Pavlović, 2012, pp. 503–512).

changed borders. In the new circumstances, a territorial reorganization was carried out to further centralize the state (Ivančević, 2021, p. 166). At the beginning of 1949, a decision was made to form an area, ie to introduce a new, regional level of administration on the entire territory of the FPR of Yugoslavia. The reform was initiated by a decree of March 24, passed by the Presidium of the National Assembly of the FPRY, and was implemented through the adoption of new laws and other regulations in federal units, including Serbia, which in addition to AP Vojvodina areas in its central area. Specifically, it was about Belgrade, Titovo Užice, Kragujevac, Timok and Niš regions (Petranović, 1998, p. 230). When we compare the map of the then established regions with the map of Milos era serdarships, we can state the following. First, the territory of the Belgrade Region included almost completely the territories of the two former serdarships, Mačva and Podunavlje. The Timok Region mostly coincided with the area of the former Timok Serdarship, but it was somewhat smaller. The Kragujevac Region included the territory of the former ubicated Rasina Serdarship, but also parts of the Raška Serfarship, while the Titovo Užice Region mostly coincided with the said Serdarship of Raška.

After only two years, the areas were abolished, and with the adoption of the General Law on the Organization of Municipalities and Srezes from 1955, the phase of building a new – *communal system* of local self-government began (Djurdjev, 2007, pp. 13, 16). Only in 1963, the number of srezes was reduced to fourteen, of which nine in the territory of Central Serbia, so they somehow replaced the former regions. The communal system allowed for the possibility of regionalization at the republican and provincial levels, primarily in terms of cooperation and connecting municipalities. Forms of regionalization have developed through inter-municipal cooperation and the association of municipalities into urban and regional communities. The 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia unites municipalities into regional and urban communities in order to achieve lasting cooperation, planning, development and harmonization of their own and to adopt joint

plans and programs, as well as to achieve other common interests. The association of municipalities into new communities in the province is regulated by their constitutions. Eight inter-municipal regional communities were formed in Central Serbia at that time, Podrinje–Kolubara with 14 municipalities, Podunavlje with 11 municipalities, Titovo Užice with 10 municipalities, Šumadija and Pomoravlje with 12 municipalities, Kraljevo with 15 municipalities, Zaječar with 8 municipalities, Niš with 15 municipalities and South Moravia with 13 municipalities (Djurdjev, 2007, p. 17). Inter-municipal regional communities had a self-governing character, and on the territorial level, they were to some extent limited by the old borders of the serdarships. Thus, the Podrinje–Kolubara IRC almost completely covered the area of the former Mačva Serdarship, while the Podunavlje IRC, together with the territory of the capital, spread in the area of the Serdarship of Podunavlje. IRC Zaječar mainly covered the area of Timok Serdarship. The only serious changes were seen in the area of Raška and Rasina serdarships, where three inter-municipal regional communities were formed, Šumadija and Pomoravlje, Kraljevo and Titovo Užice.

Conclusion

Based on the previous analysis, we can report the following conclusions. Namely, on the basis of available data, we tried to locate the position and territorial distribution, as well as the borders of the five serdarships, which were formed by Prince Miloš in 1834. Without a doubt, we have shown the size and borders of the Mačva, Podunavlje and Timok serdarships, and after confronting various arguments, we managed to define the areas of the Raška and Rasina serdarships. We also presented the later division into areas from the socialist period, which was very reminiscent of the serdar's territorial organization from Miloš era. It seems that the later territorial regionalization of Central Serbia in the socialist era was largely conditioned by the short-lived administrative-territorial exception from the period 1834–1835. Therefore, we should keep in mind these historical facts in the context of the debate on the territorial reorganization of Central Serbia, above all, in the context

of its eventual regionalization. Although it did not leave a deeper mark in the development of the territorial organization of Serbia, Miloš administrative division into the above-mentioned serdarships had its historical foundation, but also practical application. However, in the conditions of the legacy from the Ottoman period, as well as the tradition of the French Revolution, such a division in a relatively small, but extremely egalitarian state, such as Serbia at the time, could not take deeper roots. However, in today's circumstances of the development of the concept of territorial decentralization, it is worth recalling such traditions of administrative-territorial organization among Serbs.

References

- Andrejić, Z. (2011). Zemlja Kučevo, Jasenica i Nekudim [Land Kučevo, Jasenica, and Nekudim]. In *Jasenica i Nekudim, Mitološki zbornik 25*. Centar za mitološke studije Srbije.
- Andrejić, Z. (2017). Srpska srednjovekovna župa Morava, episkopija Morava i turska nahija Morava [Serbian medieval county Morava, episcopate Morava and Turkish nahiya Morava]. *Zbornik radova Narodnog muzeja*, XLVII.
- Andrejić, Z. (2018). *Srednjovekovna Kneževina i Kraljevina Srbija – zemlje i župe VII–XV vek* [Medieval principality and Kingdom of Serbia – lands and counties of the VII–XV century]. Centar za mitološke studije Srbije.
- Ćorović, V. (2005). *Istorija Srba* [History of Serbs]. Publik Praktikum.
- Cvijetić, L. (Ed.). (1984). Popis stanovništva i imovine u Srbiji 1834. godine, Mešovita gradja, knj. 13 [Census of Population and Property in Serbia in 1834, Mixed materials, vol. 13]. Istorijski institut, Beograd.
- Djurdjev, A. (2007). Lokalna samouprava u Srbiji, od 1804. godine do tranzicije [Local self-government in Serbia, from 1804 until the transition]. *Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Novom Sadu*, 1–2, 7–20.
- Dva veka razvoja Srbije: Statistički pregled [Two centuries of Serbian development: Statistical review]. (2008). Republički zavod za statistiku Srbije.
- Hardi, D. (2009). Gospodari i banovi Onostranog Srema i Mačve u XIII veku [Lords and bans of the Other side of Srem and Mačva in the 13th century]. *Spomenica Istorijaskog arhiva Srem*, 8, 70–79.
- Ivančević, G. (2021). Razvoj lokalne samouprave u Srbiji [Development of local self-government in Serbia], *Kultura polisa*, 18(46), 157–168.
- Jovanović, S. (1936/1991). Miloš i njegovi protivnici [Milos and his opponents]. In *Iz istorije i književnosti I*. Sabrana dela Slobodana Jovanovića / tom 11, BIGZ – Jugoslavijapublik – Srpska književna zadruga.

- Ljušić, R. (2004). *Kneževina Srbija 1830–1839, drugo izdanje* [Principality of Serbia 1830–1839, second edition]. SANU.
- Pavlović, M. (2012). *Jugoslovenska kraljevina: prva evropska regionalna država* [The Kingdom of Yugoslavia: Europe's first regional state]. *Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene nauke*, 4, 503–521.
- Petranović, B. (1998). *Istoriografske kontroverze* [Historiographical controversies]. Javno preduzeće Službeni list SRJ.
- Petrović, M. (1901). *Finansije i ustanove obnovljene Srbije* [Finances and institutions of renewed Serbia]. Državna štamparija Kraljevine Srbije.
- Stojančević, V. (1981). *Srpska nacionalna revolucija i obnova države od kraja XVIII veka do 1839* [Serbian National Revolution and State Renewal from the End of the 18th Century to 1839]. In V. Stojančević (Ed.), *Istorija srpskog naroda. Od Prvog ustanka do Berlinskog kongresa 1804–1878, knjiga V, tom 1*. Srpska književna zadruga.
- Svirčević, M. (2011). *Lokalna uprava i razvoj moderne srpske države: od knežinske do opštinske samouprave* [Local government and the development of the modern Serbian state: from knežina to municipal self-government]. Balkanološki institut Srpske akademije nauka i umetnosti.

Appendix

Map 1.

Division of the Principality of Serbia into captaincies in 1834



Note. Authors: Dušan Dačić and Dušan Ilić

Map 2.

Division of the Principality of Serbia into districts in 1834



Note. Authors: Dušan Dačić and Dušan Ilić

Map 3.


Division of the Principality of Serbia into serdars in 1834



Note. Authors: Dušan Dačić and Dušan Ilić

Map 4.

Division of the People's Republic of Serbia into srezes and redions 1949–1951.



Note. Author: Vladimir Varjačić,

<https://sr.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%94%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%B5%D0%BA%D0%B0:AdminSRB49.PNG>

Map 5.

Division of SR Serbia into Inter-municipal Regional Communities 1974–1990



Note. Author: Vladimir Varjačić,

<https://sr.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%94%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%B5%D0%BA%D0%B0:AdminSRB75.PNG>

Serdarstva kao protoregioni Centralne Srbije

Dušan Ilić

Institut za evropske studije, Beograd

Sažetak

Od obnove srpske državnosti 1804. godine, tokom čitavog XIX i u većem delu XX veka, prostor savremene Centralne Srbije teritorijalno je bio fragmentisan na veći broj jedinica lokalne (samo)uprave trećeg stepena, koji su u početku bile nazivane nahijama, a kasnije okruzima. Jedini izuzetak tokom postojanja moderne samostalne države Srbije učinjen je 1834. godine formiranjem pet većih oblasti sastavljenih iz više okruga koji su dobili naziv serdarstva. Rad ima za cilj da utvrdi, pre svega teritorijalni opseg tada ustanovljenih serdarstava, kao i da pruži odgovor na pitanje da li bi se navedene oblasti mogle smatrati protoregionima Centralne Srbije. Imajući u vidu kratkotrajnost ovakve administrativno-teritorijalne podele, koja se zadržala nešto manje od godinu dana, nedostatak studija koje bi se bavile konkretnom problematikom, što podrazumeva nedostatak elementarnih podataka o geografskom prostiranju navedenih oblasti, u ovom istraživanju ćemo pokušati da lociramo prostor i granice ovih pet serdarstava. Takođe, pokušaćemo da utvrdimo njihovu istorijsku utemeljenost, kao i potencijalnu praktičnu upotrebnu vrednost u današnjem kontekstu procesa političke decentralizacije i statističke regionalizacije.

Ključne reči: serdarstvo, regioni, decentralizacija, okrug, Srbija

Veljko Blagojević:
Moć i sila – Srbija i vojni faktor u međunarodnoj politici
Institut za strategijska istraživanja, 2021.

[Review of the book *Power and Force – Serbia and Military Factor in International Politics*, by V. Blagojević]

Petar S. Ćurčić
Institute of European Studies, Belgrade

Article Information*

Book Review
Volume: 19 Issue: 3, pages: 225–230
Received: July 14, 2022 • Accepted: July 25, 2022
<https://doi.org/10.51738/Kpolisa2022.19.3r.225c>

Author Note

Petar S. Ćurčić  <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1392-4427>

I have no known conflict of interest to disclose.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Petar Ćurčić,
Institute of European Studies, Trg Nikole Pašića 11, 11000 Belgrade, Serbia.
Email: petar.pero.curcic@gmail.com

* Cite (APA):

Ćurčić, P. S. (2022). Veljko Blagojević: Moć i sila – Srbija i vojni faktor u međunarodnoj politici. [Review of the book *Power and Force – Serbia and Military Factor in International Politics*, by V. Blagojević]. *Kultura polisa*, 19(3), 225–230. <https://doi.org/10.51738/Kpolisa2022.19.3r.225c>

Review

The phenomena in human history, which have at the same time, as attractive, as destructive power, are rare. Without any doubts, power and force have an incredible potential for creation and destruction. It remains for many scientists to observe changes in power relations very carefully, almost surgically precisely, in order to better understand the past, present and future. With his decades-long engagement in the defense system and its educational and research institutions, Colonel dr Veljko Blagojević has been contributing not only to strategic thinking, but also to better operationalization of state interests. Continuing his research on the army and international relations, Colonel Blagojević recently published the book *Force and Power – Serbia and the Military Factor in International Politics*, published by Institute for Strategic Research in Belgrade..

Taking into account the broad and very demanding field of research, the author divided the book into 17 dynamic units. After the preface and introductory (and essentially theoretical considerations), there are two main currents in the work that chronologically intertwine and complement each other, covering a very long period of general and national history (from the Peace of Westphalia and the emergence of the modern Serbian state).

Starting with introductory considerations with a lucid quote from Blaise Pascal that “justice without force is powerless, force without justice is violence. We must combine force and justice”, the author drew the readers' attention to the main goals of his own research: “1) Description of the evolution of military power in the international context; 2) consideration of its significance in contemporary international politics; 3) defining the basic guidelines for development and implementation in the foreseeable future”.

Leaving no space for criticism of the lack of a theoretical framework, Blagojević gave definitions of strength, power and strategy, relying on leading, often conflicting, political and military authorities in the research field (Georg Schwarzenberger, Max Weber, Joseph Nye, Hans Morgenthau, John Mearsheimer, Ole Rudolf Holsti, Vladislav Kulski, Kenneth Waltz, Helmuth

von Moltke, Liddell Hart, Andre Beaufre, Gregory Foster, Williamson Murray, Mark Grimsley, Vasily Sokolovsky, and others). The organization of modern states from the early modern period, the technological strengthening and popularization of armies, the industrial and traffic revolution, as well as the emergence of geopolitics, were important factors that had contributed to the complexity of strategic analysis. Without any doubt, power is the central point of international relations, and its military component will undoubtedly be and remain an integral part, thanks to which states will pursue their offensive and defensive goals, but also deter the opponent from hostile intentions.

The history of Serbia and the Serbian people is difficult to understand without the army. A cultivated consciousness of the importance of the military vocation contributed to the establishment of a strong army of a small country that managed to become a factor within the regional framework (despite much stronger and larger empires). Despite the comparative advantages, weaknesses, that affected the negative outcome of the realization of certain strategic goals, were noticed. Author believes that insufficient quality of military equipment, as well as the unacceptably low level of education and training of the Serbian officer corps in the middle of the 19th century had its impact on many Serbian defeats. Only since the reforms of the King of Milan strong innovative impulses could be perceived, because of which the Serbian army was able to achieve much more fruitful results during the Balkans and in the First World War.

Making it easier for readers to follow the complex international relations from the First World War until these days, Veljko Blagojević also described numerous key strategic conceptions of the great powers. The special experience of militarized Germany showed that the transition from offensive to positional warfare in the First, and the complex use of various demographic (German national minority in Central Europe), economic, technological and military factors (blitzkrieg concept) in World War II, did not contribute to Berlin's victory. The importance of proper coordination of resources and manpower in context is very important in deciding the

outcome of a winner. Assessing the performance of the allies, Blagojević concluded that the United States and the United Kingdom had saved a significant part of their people and material resources by postponing the opening of the second front. The Cold War world, however, was defined by the position of two centers – Moscow and Washington. Nuclear weapons have made it possible to refrain from large-scale war, but it has also contributed to the intensification of so-called low-intensity conflicts. Comparing the Soviet and American models of assistance in third-party conflicts, the author noted the deep continuity of American tactics of multi-layered support (moral, political, financial, armed and protective), which is noticeable today with several modifications. In a special chapter titled *Pax Americana*, Blagojević presented the basic theoretical, military and economic settings of the new system in a very striking and well-argued way. There were two approaches which have been considered in Washington after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the study advocated the thesis that the United States had decided to rely on a realistic paradigm that implied consistent monitoring of national interests. In the last volumes, the perspectives of multipolar development of international relations were presented. Globalization has stimulated other large countries to move towards stronger integration and the creation of networks of interdependence. The decline of American power has opened space for many other rivals. Also, there are several scenarios for the world that may be realized in the coming period (Chinese domination, new bipolarity between the West and the BRICS, a concert of several great powers (USA, EU, China, Russia, Japan India) and regionalization with several strong centers). In the new reorganization, the tactics of sounding the terrain carried out by the great powers have a significant role and the author writes about it in detail in the last volumes of the work.

While the wars of 1912–1918 were the result of good planning, the efficiency of Serbian trained officers and commitment to the state, the Yugoslav experience brought about numerous changes that did not contribute to the qualitative strengthening of the armed forces. The abandonment of the concept

of maneuvers and the adoption of French defense doctrines that had no foundation proved to be insufficient for the country's survival. In addition, the existence of opposing military cliques (as well as political interference) resulted in the degradation of command staff. With the April War and the country's entry into World War II, many conflicts became very intense and bloody. As the author concludes, in the mutual struggle, the NOVJ, under the command of Josip Broz, showed greater discipline and communication skills with the allies, through which it gained the favor of the leading countries. Relying primarily on the formative experience of the Second Yugoslavia (until the emergence of the Non-Aligned Bloc), the author showed how instable and complex the position of Tito's regime was in relation to the two centers of power. The inclusion of Yugoslavia in the strategic directions (primarily the Lombardy-Pannonian, Adriatic-Pannonian and Albanian-Bulgarian) of the opposing parties on the planned European battlefield contributed to the importance of the South Slavic state. Due to that position, the imperative goal of the superpowers was to "keep Tito afloat". However, the contradictions of the federal structure and the marginalization of the Serbian factor, in the author's opinion, weakened Belgrade's forces. During the break-up of Yugoslavia, the former Serbian leadership did not pay attention to gaining the support of world centers by fitting into the new ideological patterns of the Western world.

Extremely critical of the Serbian experience after the breakup of Yugoslavia, Veljko Blagojević pointed out that it is necessary to better think about Serbian defense policy and to continuously and systematically develop military potentials which have been largely neglected. Considering the concepts of neutrality and neutralism, the author resolves one misconception that exists in the Serbian scientific and media sphere. Serbia's self-proclaimed neutrality in 2007 has the character of neutralism, but not neutrality, for the reason that it has not been internationally verified. Comparing the experiences of neutrality and neutralism of other European countries (primarily Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, Ukraine, Moldova, but also Belgium and the Netherlands

before reaching NATO membership), the study indicates both the advantages and disadvantages of this model. The concept of total defense applied by Switzerland, Sweden and Finland, with the international participation of neutral countries in international peacekeeping missions, is a combination that represents an expression of deep commitment to their own security in the sense of realpolitik.

Undoubtedly, this book represents an important contribution to understanding the position of the military factor in international relations. By its actions, the army creates politics, but it is also an integral part of it. The main advantage of the monograph *Power and Force. Serbia and the military factor in international politics* is that they are presented in the most concise, and at the same time the most transparent and receptive way. Future readers will receive an overview in which both continuities and discontinuities are clearly visible, and the author's analyzes and evaluations can not only inform them, but also teach them about the correctness of numerous strategic decisions which have been made in past.

AUTHORS GUIDELINES

The journal Kultura polisa [The Culture of Polis] publishes papers resulting from the latest theoretical and empirical scientific research from a wide range of social sciences. When writing papers, authors should refer mainly to the results of scientific research that have been published in scientific journals.

Registration fee

The journal Kultura polisa is an open access scientific journal (OAJ) of both non-commercial and non-profit nature, and for the scientific papers published by the journal to be free for readers, which we consider to be of great interest due to the dissemination of scientific knowledge and results of the latest scientific research, the journal charges a registration fee for publishing papers in the amount of 20,000.00 RSD (twenty thousand dinars). Authors whose papers receive positive reviews and are accepted for publication will be contacted by the editors of the journal with instructions for paying the registration fee.

Language requirements

Papers are published in English, British version (United Kingdom). Domestic authors, in addition to the text in English, should also submit the paper in Serbian, Latin alphabet. On occasion, a paper may be published in Serbian, with the prior explicit approval of the Editor-in-Chief. Papers in both languages must fully meet the standards of proofreading, i.e. grammatical and spelling correctness, which speeds up the process of selection of papers. If the submitted papers do not meet the stated standards, they will not be considered for publication.

Paper structure

The paper should have the following structure: names and affiliations of author(s) (name and surname, address of their organization/institution and e-mail address of the author for correspondence), title, abstract (150-250 words), keywords (4-6), text, list of references. All structure elements must meet the Conditions for editing scientific journals, which are published as

Annex 1 to Pravilnik o kategorizaciji i rangiranju naučnih časopisa [Rulebook on categorization and ranking of scientific journals („Službeni glasnik RS“, broj 159 od 30. decembra 2020).

Name(s) of author(s)

An article for publication in the journal Kultura polisa can have a maximum of two authors. The surname(s) and initial(s) of (all) author(s) should be written in their original form (with Serbian diacritical marks, diacritical marks used in other world languages or diacritical marks in alphabets of national minorities and ethnic groups). The surname(s) and initial(s) of the author(s) name(s) are written without stating one's position and title.

Author's institution name (affiliation)

Full (official) name and seat of the institution/organization where the author is employed at should be stated, and, occasionally, the name of the institution where the author conducted their research. Independent researchers and authors to whom scientific research is not their primary profession should also indicate their status. In complex organizations, the overall hierarchy of that organization is stated. In the hierarchy of organizations, at least one must be a legal entity.

Contact Information

If there is more than one author, only the address of one author who is in charge of communication should be given. ORCID numbers (<https://orcid.org/>) should be stated for all authors.

Title

The title gives the first impression of the work which is why it is important that it describes the content of the article as faithfully as possible, but also attracts attention and provokes interest to read that manuscript. It is in the interest of the journal and the author to use words suitable for indexing and searching. Try to be concise and write the title of your paper in as few words as possible.

Abstract

An abstract is a short informative presentation of the content of an article that allows the reader to quickly and accurately assess its relevance. It is in the interest of journals and authors that abstracts contain terms that are often used to index and search articles. Elements of the abstract are the aim of research, methods, results and a brief conclusion. The abstract may also contain other elements – national, regional, cultural context, the social background of research, national significance of research, etc.

Keywords

Keywords are terms or phrases that thematically, theoretically, methodologically, disciplinary, subdisciplinary and in other relevant ways refer to the content of the article for indexing and searching. In principle, they should be assigned based on an international source (list, dictionary or thesaurus) that is most widely accepted either within the given scientific field (e.g. in the field of medicine, Medical Subject Headings) or in science in general (e.g. Web of Science list of keywords). In identity sciences, keywords also reflect the need to preserve the cultural, scientific and technological heritage of the Republic of Serbia. Keywords are given immediately after the abstract and in the language of the abstract. For papers to be more searchable it is recommended that keywords not be the words used in the title, unless it is a word that does not have an adequate synonymous replacement and is very important for search.

Text of the paper

Text of the paper should be in Word document format, as follows:

- font: Verdana;
- page size: 6.69" x 9.45" (17 x 24 cm);
- margins: Top 0.98" (2.5 cm); Bottom 0.79" (2 cm); Left 0.79" (2 cm); 0.79" Right (2 cm);
- to write the text use font-style normal font (upright), unless otherwise stated;
- line spacing in the text: 1.15 pt;
- line spacing in footnotes: 1 pt;
- font size of the title: 14 pt bold;

- font-size of subtitles: 11 pt bold;
- font-size of body text: 10.5 pt;
- font-size of footnotes: 9.5 pt;
- font size for tables, graphs and figures: 10 pt;
- indentation of the first line of the paragraph: 0.5 (1.27 cm) (option: *Paragraph /Special /First line*);
- text alignment: *Justify*;
- text colour: *Automatic*;
- page numbering: no numbering;
- do not break words by entering hyphens in the next line (*Paragraph /Line and Pages /don't hyphenate*);
- save the paper in Word 97-2003 Document format (*.doc).

A scientific article can have a maximum of 30,000 characters with spaces, including the list of references, written and formatted according to the general guidelines for word processing found at the end of this guide, in the section "Text formatting". On occasion, a monograph study may be larger, but not less than 40 pages per author, in accordance with the provisions of the Rulebook on Procedure, Evaluation and Quantitative Expression of Scientific Research Results („Službeni glasnik RS”, br. 24/16, 21/17 i 36/2017). Book reviews can contain text of up to 1,500 words.

Thank-you note

The name and number of the project financed from the budget, i.e. the name of the program within which the article was written, as well as the name of the scientific research organization and the ministry that financed the project or program, are stated in a special note after the conclusion, before the list of references.

Previous versions of the paper

If the article was presented at a conference in the form of an oral statement in a previous version (under the same or similar title), that piece of information should be stated in a special note at the bottom of the first page of the article. A paper that has already been published in a journal or a collection of papers cannot be published in another journal under a similar title nor in an amended form, in terms of evaluating scientific research results.

Submitting papers

The journal is published three times a year. Deadlines for submitting papers are February 1st, May 1st and September 1st.

The authors are obliged to submit a signed and scanned author's statement when submitting their paper, stating that the paper (wholly or in part) has not been previously published, i.e. that it is not auto-plagiarism or plagiarism.

The statement form can be downloaded from the journal's website:

<https://kpolisa.com/Authorship-statement-the-Culture-of-Polis.pdf>

Submit papers by uploading them on the electronic platform of the journal – click on the Make a Submission button, on the right side of the cover page of the journal, or find the same option in the drop-down menu (About us – Submissions).

Citation rules

The journal Kultura polisa uses the APA citation style, 7th edition, which includes citing bibliographic parentheses according to the author-date system in the text, as well as a list of references with bibliographic data after the text of the paper. If non-Latin alphabet material is cited in the English text, references should be transcribed into the Latin alphabet. In APA style, the list of references must be displayed in alphabetical order, which would not be possible if the references were in another alphabet. When citing sources written in another language, the title of the source (article/book/book chapter, etc.) in the list of references should be translated into English in square brackets immediately after the original title, without using italics in square brackets. The title of a journal or an edited book (collection), as well as the name of the publisher, must also be written in the Latin alphabet, but they do not have to be translated. If there is an official English translation, it can be used, especially in cases where it provides a better understanding of the topic or publication. Below are the rules and examples for inputting bibliographical data in the list of references and in text. For each type of reference, the citation rule is given first, followed by an example of a citation in the list of references and the bibliographic parenthesis. Bibliographic parentheses are usually put at the end of the sentence, before the punctuation mark, and contain the author's

surname, year of publication and the corresponding page number(s), according to the following example: (Bjelajac, 2017, pp. 15-17).

Monograph (Book)

Single author

Surname, initial (s) of the name(s) (if the author uses a middle name, first write the initial of the personal name, space, then the initial of the middle name). Year of publication in parentheses. *Title*. Publisher (without stating the seat of the publisher, unless the seat is an integral part of the name of the publisher, such as the University of Belgrade).

Bjelajac, Ž. (2017). *Bezbednosna kultura – umeće življenja* [Security Culture - the Art of Living]. Univerzitet Privredna akademija: Pravni fakultet za privredu i pravosuđe.

(Bjelajac, 2017, p. 25)

Fukuyama, F. (1992). *The End of History and the Last Man*. Free Press.

(Fukuyama, 1992, p. 65)

Two authors

Author Surname, Initial(s)., & Author Surname, Initial(s). (Year). *Title*. Publisher.

Despotović, Lj. & Jevtović, Z. (2010). *Geopolitika i mediji* [Geopolitics and Media]. Grafomarketing.

(Despotović & Jevtović, 2010, pp. 34–36)

Krastev, I., & Holmes, S. (2019). *The Light that Failed*. Allen Lane.

(Krastev & Holmes, 2019, pp. 23–24)

Three or more authors

Author Surname, Initial(s)., Author Surname, Initial(s)., & Author Surname, Initial(s). (Year). *Title*. Publisher.

Milisavljević, B., Varinac, S., Litričin, A., Jovanović, A., & Blagojević, B. (2017). *Komentar Zakona o javno-privatnom partnerstvu i koncesijama: prema stanju zakonodavstva od 7. januara 2017. godine* [Commentary on the Law on Public-Private Partnerships and Concessions: According to the State of Legislation From January 7, 2017.]. Službeni glasnik & Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu.

(Milisavljević et al., 2017, p. 37)

Editor / compiler / translator instead of author

If there is an editor instead of an author, insert the editor's name in the place of the author's, followed by (Ed.) or (Eds.) for more than one editor.

Kaltwasser, C. R., Taggart, P., Ochoa Espejo, P., & Ostigoy, P. (Eds.). (2017). *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*. Oxford University Press.

(Kaltwasser et al., 2017)

Same bibliographic parenthesis, multiple references

1) *Different authors - References separated by semicolons.*

(Stepić, 2015, p. 61; Knežević, 2014, p. 158)

2) *Same author, different years - State the author's surname, and then the years of publication of different references in the order from earliest to most recent and separate them with a comma, i.e. a semicolon when stating the number of pages.*

(Stepić 2012, 2015) ili (Stepić 2012, p. 30; 2015, p. 69)

3) *Different authors, same last name - Some authors have the same last name, if this happens the initials (s) of the author should be added in all citations, even if the year of publication is different.*

(Subotić, D., 2010, p. 97), (Subotić, M., 2010, p. 302)

(Williams, A., 2009), (Williams, J., 2010)

Book / Proceedings – Chapter

Author of chapter Surname, Initial(s). (Year). Title of chapter. In Editor of book Initial(s). Editor of book Surname (Ed(s).), Title of book (Edition if not first., Page numbers). Publisher.

Stepić, M. (2015). Pozicija Srbije pred početak Velikog rata sa stanovišta Prvog i Drugog zakona geopolitike. In M. Stepić i Lj. P. Ristić (Ur.), *Srbija i geopolitičke prilike u Evropi 1914. godine*. (pp . 55–78). Gradska biblioteka u Lajkovcu i Institut za političke studije u Beogradu.

(Stepić, 2015, p. 61)

Lošonc, A. (Ed.) (2019). Discursive Dependence of Politics With the Confrontation Between Republicanism and Neoliberalism. In D. M. Vukasović, & P. Matić (Eds.), *Discourse and Politics*. (pp. 23–46). Institute for Political Studies in Belgrade.

(Lošonc, 2019, p.)

Journal Article

Regular Edition

Author of chapter Surname, Initial(s). (Year). *Title of journal/periodical*, Volume(Number), page range. DOI (if available)

Gaćinović, R. (2020). Sistem kao izraz uređenosti određene delatnosti u društvu [The system as an expression of the orderliness of certain activity in society]. *Kultura polisa*, 17(41), 247–258.

(Gaćinović, 2020, p. 253)

Bjelajac , Ž. Đ., Dašić, D., & Spasović, M. (2011). EU environmental policy and its criminal law framework. *Medjunarodni problemi*, 63(4), 567–582. <https://doi.org/10.2298/MEDJP1104567B>

(Bjelajac et al., 2011, p. 571)

Special Issue or Special Section in a Journal

Editor Surname, Initial(s)., Editor surname, Initial(s)., & Editor Surname, Initial(s). (Eds.). (Year). Title of the special issue [Special issue]. Journal title, volume(issue). DOI broj (if available)

Bjelajac, Ž. Đ, & Filipović, A. M. (Eds.). (2020). Pedofilija – Uzroci i posledice [Pedophilia – Causes and Consequences] [Special Issue]. *Kultura polisa*, 17(1).

(Bjelajac & Filipović, 2020).

Campbell, K., Lustig, C., & Hasher, L. (Eds.). (2020). Aging and inhibition: The view ahead [Special issue]. *Psychology and Aging*, 35(5).

(Campbell et al., 2020)

If you are citing an article within a special section or issue (rather than the entire issue or section), use the format for a journal article. You do not need to include the title of the special section or issue.

Delibašić, V. (2020). Krivičnopravna zaštita dece od seksualnih zloupotreba [Criminal Protection of Children From Sexual Abuse]. *Kultura polisa*, 17(1), 53–67.

(Delibašić, 2020, p. 58)

Blog

Author Surname, Initial(s). (Date in full). Title of blog post. *Name of blog*. URL

Lee, C. (2010, November 18). How to cite something you found on a website in APA style. *APA Style Blog*. <http://blog.apastyle.org/apastyle/2010/11/how-to-cite-something-you-found-on-a-website-in-apa-style.html>

(Lee, 2010)

The author of the blog may use a screen name, if this is the case then use

the screen name in place of the author.

If the author is not indicated on the blog, the name of the blog is used, as well as when quoting a reference with a corporate author.

JCU Library News. (2019, May 28). Reading challenge reviews: Football heroes and tragics. *JCU Library News*.

<https://jculibrarynews.blogspot.com/2019/05/reading-challenge-reviews-football.html>

(JCU Library News, 2019)

Tables and Figures

Tables and figures are attached as an appendix at the end of the article, starting from a new page after the list of references. The title of a table/figure is written above it, and below the word Table/Figure with a number indicating the order in the text, with one space – spacing 1.15, space 6pt Before and After – alignment justify, without indenting the text, according to the following example:

Table 2

Title

Figure 1

Title

Below the table/figure, with one space – line spacing 1.15, space 6 pt Before – a note is added. There are three types of notes – those describing the contents of a figure that cannot be understood from the figure title, an image and/or legend alone (e.g., definitions of abbreviations or explanations of asterisks used to indicate certain values), and those attributing copyright. Examples:

Note. The map does not include data for Puerto Rico. Adapted from 2017 Poverty Rate in the United States, by U.S. Census Bureau, 2017

(<https://www.census.gov/library/visualizations/2018/comm/acs-poverty-map.html>). In the public domain.

Note. Number of studies = 120, number of effects = 782, total N = 52,578. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit.

Note. Lyamouri–Bajja et al. (2012, p. 57).

Tables and figures help authors present a large amount of information to readers in an easier and more understandable way. The tables show numerical values and/or textual information arranged in rows and columns. An image is an illustrative presentation of information using charts, diagrams, infographics, drawings, photographs, etc. In order for the tables and figures to help readers understand your work more easily, the data in them needs to be presented in a way that readers do not need to read the text to understand it.

Use the tables feature of your word-processing program to create a table. Do not use the tab key or space bar to manually create the look of a table. The parameters being compared should not be displayed in the same column. Use the same font type in the tables as in the rest of the article. Do not use vertical borders to separate data. For the necessary clarity of the display, it is enough to use horizontal edges at the top and bottom of the table, below column headings, and if necessary, to separate a row containing totals or other summary information from other rows in the table. Use spacing between columns and rows and strict alignment to clarify relations among the elements in a table. If a table is longer than one page, use the tables feature of your word-processing program to make the headings row repeat on the second and any subsequent pages.

Make sure the axes shown are clearly visible and the images are sharp enough. The legend is entered inside the edges of the figure. Use graphics software to create figures in APA Style papers – the built-in graphics features of your word-processing program (e.g., Microsoft Word or Excel) or special programs such as Photoshop or Inkscape.

Application of spelling rules

Align the papers with the spelling rules of the English language.

Please, pay special attention to the following:

- Some well-known foreign expressions should be written only in the original language in italics, e.g.: *de iure*, *de facto*, *a priori*, *a posteriori*, *sui generis*, etc.
- Do not start a sentence with an acronym, abbreviation or number.
- Always end the text in the footnotes with a full stop.
- URLs among the sources in the list of references should be linked to the hyperlink, without putting a full stop at the end of the link.
- Use quotation marks that are specific to the language (" ", « », etc.).
- Write a hyphen with space before and after or without space, never with space only before or only after. Between numbers, including page numbers, use a dash (–) instead of a hyphen (-).
- Do not use bold or underline to emphasize certain words, but only italics or quotation marks or quotation marks (‘ ’).
- Idem, ibidem, op. cit. – These are not used in APA style. Always use the Author (Year) and (Author, Year) formats.

Remark

This is abbreviated guidance. Detailed instructions for authors are available on the journal's website, or the website of APA:

<https://apastyle.apa.org/style-grammar-guidelines>

CIP – Katalogizacija u publikaciji Biblioteka Matice srpske,
Novi Sad

KULTURA polisa : časopis za negovanje demokratske
političke kulture / glavni i odgovorni urednik Ljubiša
Despotović. – God. 1 , br. 1 (2004) – . – Novi Sad :
Udruženje za političke nauke SCG Ogranak u Novom
Sadu; Stylos, 2004-.- 21 cm

Povremeno

ISSN 1820-4589

COBISS.SR-ID 199568391



MEMBER OF



Central and Eastern European Online Library



ISSN 1820-4589



9 771820 458005