CONCEPTS OF RATAIONAL CHOICE IN CLASSIC AND NEOCLASONIC ECONOMICS
Keywords:
reasonable behaviour, rational calculation, public interest, Pareto optimum, quasi-rationalityAbstract
The paper is devoted to the consideration of the concepts of rational choice in the classical political economy and early and late neoclassical economics. On the basis of conducted analysis, we can conclude that theoretical holism or socio-economic pluralism "fell" in favor of economic reductionism in defining rationality. In the paper, we point out that the traditional (enlightened) conceptualization of rationality (or rational choice) in the categories of "reason" ("reasonable behaviour") " drastically reduced" in relation to the utilitarian-economic definition that based on the assumption of maximizing utility or profit. As the economy developed, so rationality (or rational choice) became a narrow or reduced concept. Rationality was created as an extensive, holistic and complex socio-economic conception. Then, it was "condensed" in utilitarianism, "shortened" in instrumentalism, and any relevant psychological content disappeared in World War II. In the paper, we, also, discuss a kind of random discovery of the functioning of an irrational "residual" in socio-economic life, as well as a paradox in the form of irrationality of extreme rationality within traditional economic theory.
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