NARRATIVE CONCEPT PERSONAL AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITY
Keywords:
„животна прича“, услов артикулације, услов реалистичности, доживљај вредности, криза смисла.Abstract
The paper considers the structure, dynamic potential and practical value of the narrative theory of identity as it was espoused by Marya Schechtman and others, focusing on the narrative theory’s ability to cast the ‘life story’ in a fundamentally communicative light. Hence, when it is removed from its communicative context, the life story becomes blurred. At the same time, the communicative nature of the narrative means that it is variable over time and, crucially, that it is able to be influenced by changed or deliberately tailored modes of communication and social context.
The pre-requisite for an effective communicative role of the narrative is transparent meaning: at least transparent to the person whose narrative it is. The narrative theory allows us to conceive of mental life as fundamentally communicative, and consequently, of mental issues as ones arising from a distorted or impaired ability to communicate with oneself and with others. The constraints that define a healthy narrative are in fact the pre-requisites for effective communication both on the intra-psychic and on the interpersonal level. Schechtmann identifies two such constraints: a basic consensus on what essential facts define the world that connects us, and a basic consistency and intelligibility of the narrative both within the narrative and between the narrative and the salient facts of the world. The paper discusses these and other facets of the narrative theory and suggests that all of the practical advantages of the narrative theory are readily reflected on any attempts to address issues in the collective political narratives of social groups and political communities.
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