KEY CONCEPTS OF SERBIAN RULERS ON THE ISSUE OF THE ALLIANCE OF THE BALKAN STATES AND PEOPLES FROM 1860 TO 1912

Summary : Since the middle of the 19th century, ideas related to the mutual rapprochement of the Balkan states and the creation of their broader associations have appeared within the ruling circles in Serbia. In that sense, the author analyzes the concepts of the Balkan unions of the rulers from the Serbian dynasty Obrenovi ć (Prince Mihailo, King Milan and King Aleksandar), as well as King Petar I Kara-đ or đ evi ć starting from 1860 to 1912. These concepts of the Balkan alliance, whether they were autochthonous or otherwise the result of the influence of the leading political factors of the then European order, did not have a significant foothold in the then public of Serbia. However, at the beginning of the 20th century, the concept of a transient inclusive Balkan alliance aiming to liberate certain parts of the Balkans from the Ottoman Empire prevailed, and after its success in 1912, it was modified by the abandonment of Bulgaria. Also, despite the undoubtedly unfavorable international influences and the aspiration of the Balkan states to round up their ethnic territories, there was no genuine possibility to realize the concept of Balkan interstate solidarity during the second half of the 19th century.


Introduction
The restoration and formation of Serbian statehood in the 19th century were extremely difficult and took place in very complex conditions of an almost utterly hostile environment.Moreover, the new and young Serbian state, renewed after several centuries of discontinuity, tried to position itself to a certain extent in that very unpredictable and hostile environment, but also to strengthen itself through ------------ * dragandjuk@yahoo.comalliances with its neighbors.However, during the 19th century, the Balkan peoples were in a kind of similar position -under the Ottoman occupation or with some degree of autonomy.
The leader of the First Serbian Uprising, Đorđe Petrović-Karađorđe, belonged to the secret organization Society of Friends -Filiki Eteria (Greek: Φιλική Εταιρεία), founded in 1814, which aimed to unite the Balkan peoples based on the traditions of the lost Byzantine Empire (330-1453) (Pavlović 2018, 41-42).However, this concept of liberation from the Ottoman rule and the formation of a special pan-Balkan state was not elaborated in detail, nor was it sufficiently ideologically rounded.The mentioned association believed that by synchronizing the revolts of the Greeks, Serbs and Bulgarians as the foundations of the anti-Ottoman axis, several nation-states could be established, which would unite in a broader Balkan state union.
On the other hand, after the Second Serbian Uprising (1817), Prince Miloš Obrenović was more focused on the necessity of liberating Serbia and its gradual and complete withdrawal from the sphere of influence of the Ottoman Empire.However, he tried to help the Christian population in the Ottoman Empire in many ways, primarily in the Sanjak of Novi Pazar, on the territory of Kosovo and in today's North Macedonia.Therefore, the first half of the 19th century was insufficiently adequate for the emerging of ideas about broader Balkan alliances, mainly because of the necessity of liberating the local peoples from the Ottoman Empire. 10t the same time, there was fear that the Habsburg monarchy would take advantage of the unstable situation in this part of Europe and start penetrating the Balkans again, as was the case several times during the 18th century.

Ideas of the "Yugoslav Empire": Prince Mihailo Obrenović III, the Bulgarians and the Croats
Prince Mihailo Obrenović III intended to establish the "Yugoslav Empire" together with the Bulgarians (Lopandić and Kronja 2010, 34).This idea made considerable progress in realization in the last years of his reign, i.e., during 1866 and 1867 (Skakun 1992, 21-22).Thus, on 27 January 1867, an agreement was concluded between the Bulgarian revolutionaries and Prince Mihailo Obrenović III, according to which the Yugoslav Empire should be formed (Skakun 1992, 22).Moreover, on 5 April 1867, the Bulgarian Revolutionary Assembly accepted it, while the Serbian never did so.
In the History of the Serbs, Vladimir Ćorović claimed that in 1867 it was agreed that the Bulgarians would adopt Serbian legislation, that the community would have one common parliament, government, flag, and that the two "dialects" should be used equally (meaning the Serbian and Bulgarian language -author's note) (Ćorović 2008, 629-633).This was announced in the "Program of the Political Alliance with Serbia", which was adopted by the representatives of the Bulgarian ------------ 10 The Greek uprisings, as well as the uprising in the Danube principalities, began in 1821.
Revolutionary Committee in January 1867 in Bucharest (Skakun 1992, 22).Then, in April, the agreement was amended by a special protocol that determined the way of connecting Bulgaria and Serbia.This protocol also refers to the common "essential" Slavic origin and the same religious affiliation of the Bulgarians and the Serbs (Skakun 1992, 22).Bulgaria-Serbia and/or Serbo-Bulgaria were used as the official names of this country.Prince Mihailo Obrenović III would thus be at the head of this imaginary Balkan state and, at the same time, the supreme commander of its army (Skakun 1992, 22).However, all this did not happen during this decade of the 19th century, but, on the contrary, relations between the Serbs and the Bulgarians gradually deteriorated in the following decades, mainly related to the Macedonian issue.
Prince Mihailo Obrenović III has also developed very good relations with the representatives of the Yugoslav movement in Croatia, and especially with Josip Juraj Strossmayer, who in 1867 founded the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts (JAZU) in Zagreb (Pavlović 2018, 118).Due to his activity, Strossmayer was rather disputed in the Habsburg monarchy.At the same time, he was essentially dissatisfied with the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867.Prince Mihailo, on the other hand, had the idea that Serbia should become via facti a kind of "Piedmont" of unification of all Balkan and South Slavic peoples.
The idea of the Yugoslav Empire, however, did not have a significant foothold among the Serbian people.Prince Mihailo Obrenović III then dismissed Ilija Garašanin, who was one of the proponents of this idea, and Jovan Ristić often said in his memoirs that the prince had gradually become evidently disappointed with the insufficient readiness of the Balkan peoples for mutual cooperation (Ćorović 2008, 628-633).There are also indications that during his reign, Prince Mihailo Obrenović III approached the Hungarian revolutionaries, i.e., the circles around Lajos Kossuth, with the aim of creating a large "Hungarian-Serbian-Romanian Danube Federation" (Gleni 2001, 134).According to some historians, Count Gyula Andrássy, the Hungarian Prime Minister and Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs promised Prince Mihailo Obrenović that Bosnia and Herzegovina would be annexed to Serbia, which was only one of the tempting "lures" (Popović 1940, 112).This was also agreed within the framework of the agreement in Ivanka (near Bratislava) in August 1867, but, in fact, there was no genuine effort and orientation of Austria-Hungary behind it (Popović 1940, 112).
Momir Stojković stated in his co-authored book International Relations and Foreign Policy of Yugoslavia from 1972 that the mentioned ideas of Prince Mihailo Obrenović III failed to come to fruition primarily due to the great powers and their policy towards the Balkans, but also due to revived aspirations of certain countries and primarily Serbia itself (Gavranov and Stojković 1972, 245).There are, certainly, the emergence and actualization of the Macedonian question, which particularly worsened the relations between the Serbs, the Bulgarians and the Greeks, as well as Garašanin's earlier conception from Načertanije (1844) where Serbia was to expand its sphere of interest throughout the Balkans.This referred to the territories of the Balkans, where the Serbs were the absolute or relative majority, i.e., which was considered their ethnic space (see Garašanin 1844).
The assassination of Prince Mihailo in May 1868 fundamentally affected the temporary dying out of these ideas, despite some progress regarding the earlier conclusion of bilateral agreements between Serbia and its Balkan allies (Montenegro -1866, Greece -1867, and with Romania from 1866, which was replaced by another agreement two years later) (Skakun 1992, 21).The agreement with Greece implied that after the joint victory of Serbia and Greece over the Ottoman Empire, Greece would get Thessaly and Epirus, and Serbia, on the other hand, Bosnia and Herzegovina (Skakun 1992, 21/Lopandić 2010, 98).Relations between Serbia and Montenegro became complicated due to the dynastic relations between family Obrenović and Petrović Njegoš, and also the influence of Austria-Hungary and Russia strengthened, which wanted to have complete control over Balkan events.All of these constitute the reasons why the then unstable alliance of the Balkan states essentially disintegrated before it was indeed established.

King Milan Obrenović IV -between the needs of the Balkan (con)federation and his Austrophilism
The book Memoirs of a King, originally published in 1902 in Switzerland in the German language, is a very unusual form of the "memoirs" of King Milan Obrenović IV, who passed away a year earlier. 11Judging by the content of the memoirs, the anonymous author/s of these memoirs was/were certainly close to the court in Vienna, but also certain intelligence structures of the former Austro-Hungary.Nebojša Jovanović, the historian who wrote the preface for the translation of the monograph into the Serbian language (2019), potentially attributed the authorship of these "memoirs" to Philipp-Franz Bresnitz von Sydačoff. 12However, in the book Portrait of a King: King Milan Obrenović IV (1854-1901), Nebojša Jovanović questions this by stating that it may be Milan Bogićević, a distant relative of the late king, or someone from the immediate vicinity of the then Austrian heir to the throne Franz Ferdinand (N.Jovanović 2020, 77-97).In any case, it is apparent that the mentioned "memoirs", which were never used/quoted in Serbia, have described in detail the political and private life of King Milan Obrenović IV.
Only in the last part of the mentioned "memoirs" entitled Milan's political testament, in the first footnote, the author states that after his death on 11 February 1901, King Milan left as his legacy a kind of will, i.e., proposals to his son Aleksandar regarding the formation of the Balkan Federation (Memoirs of a King 2019, 215-216).These plans, as it is stated, date back to the period when Milan was the "ruling king and under the influence of Piroćanac."(Memoirs of a King 2019, 216).In fact, this indicates the period between 1880 and 1883 when Milan Piroćanac was the Prime Minister of Serbia.
- -----------As the author of the "memoir" states, the formation of the Balkan Federation, which would be organized as united Germany (after 1871), would be supported by the leading countries of the then world order -Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, and Great Britain (Memoirs of a King 2019, 215).Only under this condition, the survival of this Balkan common state would be ensured in a very complex period of the second half of the 19th century.In addition to Serbia, the Balkan federation would include Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Romania (Memoirs of a King 2019, 216).This would also mean that the Balkan states, through the existence of smaller contingents of military formations (united if necessary), could focus their budgets on others, and above all development plans (Memoirs of a King 2019, 216).In the political segment of cooperation within the Balkan Federation, a joint parliament was envisaged, which would sit in different capitals of the member states, and which would be composed of an equal number of their representatives (Memoirs of a King 2019, 215-216).This plan failed because the Russian Empire blocked it in every way since it implied tying the Balkan Peninsula to Austria-Hungary.As the idea of the Balkan federation turned unrealistic, Milan Piroćanac later tried to agitate for Serbia's entry into a federal state with Austria-Hungary, which, according to the same source, was supported by King Milan Obrenović IV (Memoirs of a King 2019, 216).
The editor of the memoirs in the Serbian language, Nebojša Jovanović, significantly distanced himself when it comes to this part of the political heritage of King Milan Obrenović IV (N.Jovanović 2019, 44-47).He primarily connected this with the aspiration of the expansion/penetration of Austria-Hungary into the Balkan Peninsula and considered it contradictory that King Milan, as someone who founded and organized the Serbian army, was also interested in reducing its capacities (N.Jovanović 2019, 58-59).Jovanović, therefore, connected all this with the ideas of close Viennese friends of the King of Milan and with the then general policy of Austria-Hungary towards the Balkan Peninsula (N.Jovanović 2019, 59).
Contrary to the formation of a great Serbian state (Ilija Garašanin's Načertanije), the idea of a Balkan federation that would be primarily tied to Austria-Hungary, perhaps even with the state-legal ties, was primarily aimed at curbing the penetration of the potential influence of the Russian Empire in this part of Europe.Undoubtedly, in this idea, one can see a trace of the influence of the friendship of King Milan Obrenović IV with the heir to the throne, Archduke Rudolf von Habsburg.He believed that it was necessary to reconfigure Austro-Hungary and form a kind of "third entity" within it, as Nebojša Jovanović called it, which would be predominantly inhabited by Slavs (Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes) (N.Jovanović 2019, 58).Once again, it should be emphasized that the monograph was published in Zurich in 1902, i.e., during the life of King Aleksandar Obrenović V to whom a political message and a "bequest" of the deceased father with whom he broke off relations after marrying Queen Draga should have been conveyed.It is quite certain that the Serbian secret services of that time had information about this book.
For Nebojša Jovanović, the writer of the preface in the Serbian edition of Milan's "memoirs", the existence of the idea of the Balkan Federation was also disputable due to the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina, which in this period "was not a state", was mentioned as a part of it, while Bulgaria and Serbia were the states in the specified period (N.Jovanović.2019.Preface.In: Memoirs of a King.N. D. 46).Indeed, Bosnia and Herzegovina was a province after the Austro-Hungarian occupation in 1878 with the formal Ottoman rule.However, until the annexation by Austro-Hungary in 1908, it existed as a corpus separatum, which largely confirms its specificity in the considerations of relations within the Dual Monarchy.Even in the later indications and presented plans for the reform of Austria-Hungary, for example, like in the plan of the Romanian politician Aurel Popovici from 1906, Bosnia and Herzegovina was not even taken into account when it came to the internal reorganization of the then Austro-Hungary into the United States of Greater Austria (Đukanović 2014, 219-249).
The idea of the Balkan Federation, which, according to this source was advocated by King Milan Obrenović IV, originated as a reaction to the strengthened Russian political presence in the Balkan Peninsula in the second half of the 19th century.In his "political will" to his son, Aleksandar Obrenović, in one of his letters sent at the end of 1892, Milan said: "Russia can do nothing to us if we are sure of Austria, whose friendship is as valuable and blessed as well as our enmity with it would be fatal" (Memoirs of a King 2019, 222).Here, if the letter is credible, King Milan Obrenović has tried, without any doubt, to secure the support of the German factor (Austria and Germany) to the still fragile Serbian state in relation to the extremely strong neighborhood.Naturally, there are also interpretations that all this is actually part of the Austrian policy related to the penetration to the East (N.Jovanović 2020, 95-97 and 98-101).
It should be mentioned that the plan to ensure the penetration of Austro-Hungarian influence in the Balkans was actually realized through two secret conventions -with Serbia (1881) and with Romania (1883) (Guč 1933, 55-57).This de facto strategically bound the two neighboring countries with Austria-Hungary, so any other binding to this country was not necessary.The idea of Serbia's entry into a kind of triple federation with Austria-Hungary without other Balkan states later became related only to narrow pro-Western intellectual circles in Belgrade, such as law professor Živojin Perić at the beginning of the 20th century (Đukanović 2019, 105-106).
Back in 1880, King Milan offered Bulgaria a kind of customs union (Lopandić and Kronja 2010, 34).In the monograph Serbia and Bulgaria 1886-1896, historian Vladimir Jovanović points to the turning of both countries towards the then West with the aim of consolidating their newly acquired independence and for the sake of eliminating Russian influences in that regard (V.Jovanović 2002, 41-48).Stojan Novaković, on the other hand, claimed that there must be a plan according to which a "cordon of states in the Balkans, which would mutually defend themselves from Russian pressure" would be formed (V.Jovanović 2002, 42).In that context, Vladimir Jovanović also states an almost unbelievable idea of the founding of a Serbian-Bulgarian-Greek-Ottoman alliance, i.e., a confederation of Balkan states with the predominant goal of significantly restraining Russian political influence (V.Jovanović 2002, 42).There was an idea, as Vladimir Jovanović states, for the Turkish sultan to be at the head of this confederation of basically pro-Western states (V. Jovanović 2002, 42).The Ottoman Empire would thus cede its individual European parts to the Balkan states, and the support of Great Britain would be secured through its constant pressure on the sultan (V.Jovanović 2002, 42).Also, the support of Austria-Hungary and Germany would be provided to such a broad Balkan association of states.
Despite the unequivocal aspiration of King Milan Obrenović IV to neutralize Russian influence in the Balkans, Austria-Hungary would certainly find it difficult to support an alliance of Balkan states without its almost complete control (V.Jovanović 2002, 43).Gustav Sigmund Kálnoky, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary, was ready to support this idea of Balkan internal rapprochement, but only as a potential mechanism before the full confrontation with the Russian Empire (V.Jovanović 2002, 43).One should interpret his potential agreement with the ideas of King Milan Obrenović IV about the great Balkan union in this broader context.Almost at the same time, in Austro-Hungary at the end of 1885, Crown Prince Rudolf of Habsburg presented plans for the modernization of this empire, but he also encountered significant resistance in the state apparatus and the extremely conservative circles around the Roman Catholic Church (V.Jovanović 2002, 44).However, there are indications that Archduke Rudolf supported the initiatives for Balkan cooperation with the previous mutual redefinition of the borders of the local states and their interconnection, and due to his constant contacts with Serbian King Milan Obrenović IV (V.Jovanović 2002, 44).
There are, moreover, confirmations that due to internal hesitations and problems in the war with the Bulgarians, King Milan offered the Serbian throne to the Habsburgs in 1885, and a year later (1886), he actually concluded a peace treaty between Serbia and Bulgaria. 13Moreover, during 1886, King Milan spoke of a personal union with Bulgaria and his potential accession to the Bulgarian throne, which did not happen due to the Austrian nobleman Ferdinand Saxe-Coburg (V.Jovanović 2002, 47).Visits of Bulgarian politicians to Serbia also became frequent during November 1886, and ideas about the Serbian-Bulgarian alliance were revived (V.Jovanović 2002, 45).
The President of the Bulgarian Parliament, Zachary Stoyanov (Захарий Стоянов), also proposed the establishment of the Balkan Confederation in early 1888, with the almost identical goal of preventing Russian penetration in this part of Europe (V.Jovanović 2002, 47).The Serbian King Milan accepted this idea also, but it was not successfully realized.Serbian-Bulgarian relations thus became burdened again and, in a way, essentially destroyed due to the Macedonian question from the end of the 19th century.

King Aleksandar Obrenović V -foreign policy wanderings and the absence of a plan for Balkan integration
King Aleksandar Obrenović V faced the takeover of power in Serbia in 1889 unprepared.This is what his entire foreign policy looked like, faced with constant wanderings, approaches and distancing from the then leading actors who had influence in the Balkans, and above all in relation to Austria-Hungary and the Russian Empire.
However, during his reign, the idea of the Balkan connection also became relevant.Thus, in 1891, Harilaos Trikoupis (Χαρίλαος Τρικούπης), the former Prime Minister of Greece, resided in Belgrade, advocating the strengthening of the alliance between Serbia, Greece and Montenegro, and later Bulgaria.This alliance was related to the liberation of Macedonia, that is, that part of the Ottoman Empire (V.Jovanović 2002, 114-115).Trikoupis also negotiated in Sofia with Stefan Stambolov (Стефан Стамболов), the Prime Minister of Bulgaria, for the sake of joint efforts related to the liberation from the Ottoman Empire (V.Jovanović 2002, 115).Moreover, Trikoupis then claimed that an agreement had been reached between Serbia and Montenegro, which included the redistribution of the Ottoman Empire territory, the possibility of Serbia using one port on the Adriatic and the power of the Petrović Njegoš dynasty throughout the alliance (V.Jovanović 2002, 115).At that time, Bulgaria had completely different interests compared to other Balkan countries and did not want to join this initiative.King Aleksandar Obrenović V also asked for support from Petrograd (Saint Petersburg) for his activities in Macedonia, which was not amicably accepted in official Sofia.However, due to the Agreement between Bulgaria and Serbia from 1897, the mentioned problems related to the Macedonian issue were temporarily overcome by preserving the status quo in the East, and the intentions for resolving open issues and mutual assistance in activities in Macedonia were stated.The mentioned treaty was also offered to the Montenegrin prince Nikola I Petrović Njegoš. 14s at the beginning of the century, the idea of the necessary Balkan alliance was revived again by the Greeks within the Society of the Alliance of Balkan Peoples (often called the Society for the Balkan Confederation), which began to receive more attention after its founding in 1892 (Lopandić and Kronja 2010, 34).Naturally, all these ideas have objectively become constrained by numerous problems in the mutual relations of the Balkan states, which in parallel with the process of gaining independence and nationbuilding have only become more complicated.King Aleksandar Obrenović V failed to influence significantly the new vision of the mutual alliances of the Balkan countries in any way until the end of his reign in 1903. ------------

Aspirations of King Petar I Karađorđević towards the Balkan Alliance (1903-1912)
When he came to power after the May coup in 1903, King Petar I Karađorđević, faced with the isolation of Serbia, tried to secure himself through the network of agreements with neighbors from the influence of powerful neighbors, primarily from Austria-Hungary with which he had very troubled political and economic relations.
Having in mind such a situation, King Petar began agreements on an interstate alliance with Montenegro already in 1904, in order to strive for the joint liberation of Christians from the Ottoman Empire.These agreements indicated that the two countries would not base their activities exclusively on peaceful means, i.e., that they would "adjust their attitude according to the nature of the circumstances". 15The Agreement with Montenegro from 28 January 1904 also contained a provision on joint opposition to any third party/state and was an indication of a kind of anti-Austrian pact.However, negotiations on that alliance were very quickly interrupted at the insistence of the Russian Empire, due to constant pressure from Austria-Hungary.
The same year, in 1904, a Secret Political Addendum to the Serbian-Bulgarian Agreement on Economic Cooperation was signed, which emphasized the necessity of reforming the Ottoman Empire, and especially regarding today's North Macedonia and the territory of Kosovo. 16Close Serbian-Bulgarian coordination and cooperation in the field of defense were also planned, as well as the conclusion of a special military convention in that regard.A secret political annex was later added to the agreement.In October 1908, a Secret Agreement between Serbia and Montenegro on friendship and alliance was signed, which determined the defense cooperation between Belgrade and Cetinje against Austria-Hungary regarding the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.This agreement was initiated by the Montenegrin King Nikola I Petrović Njegoš in order Montenegro and Serbia to jointly oppose the actions of Austria-Hungary and at the same time to strengthen the pressure on Russia to enter the conflict potentially.
This type of agreement later represented, in line with a joint struggle against the Ottoman Empire, the basis for concluding many similar, even military agreements, just before the First Balkan War in 1912 between Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Greece. 17 ------------243).Even during the First World War, the Balkan alliances changed so that some actors disappeared (Montenegro), others objectively strengthened (Serbia and Greece), and some were restrained (Bulgaria) (Zundhausen 2008, 243-250).
Evidently, the Balkan alliances during 1912 and 1913 were directed towards the Ottoman Empire and its withdrawal from the peninsula, but very quickly many mutual problems arose, which escalated into bad bilateral relations in the period between the two world wars.Besides, attempts at "Balkan rapprochement" between the two world wars, and within the Balkan conferences from 1929-1932, were accompanied by a lack of essential mutual trust, as well as certain aspirations to essentially change the outcome of the First World War (J.Jovanović 1939, 149-163).It should additionally be noted that these types of potential pan-Balkan cooperation were directed by the then leading international actors.

Four basic concepts of Serbian rulers regarding Balkan alliances from 1860 to 1912
If we look at all the ideas of the Serbian rulers about the Balkan unity from 1860 to 1912, we can clearly see four quite different concepts: 1) Following the ideas of Ilija Garašanin and Načertanije (1844) about Serbia as Piedmont for the unification of the South Slavic and Balkan peoples, this would mean that the formation of a broader community would be based on its supremacy.This would mean the previous unification of Serbian ethnic areas in the complex circumstances of two neighboring empires -the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire.In that sense, the ideas related to the necessary previous homogenization of Serbian ethnic areas before any wider Balkan connection arise.During his reign, these ideas were accepted by King Petar I Karađorđević, who came to power precisely with the support of circles who considered it was an adequate and historic moment for great national unification.
2) The ideas of Prince Mihailo Obrenović IV were based on the needs of the Balkan unity according to the principle of solidarity and real mutual needs, and not as a reflection of the aspiration to strengthen the influence of certain international factors or to prevent them.In that sense, the idea of the Yugoslav Empire/Serbo-Bulgaria/ Bulgaria-Serbia was autochthonous, but it failed to be realized despite a large number of the concluded agreements between Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Romania.A similar idea developed within the Serbian socialist movement, but without striving for dynastic circles to remain the ones determining the emergence of Balkan alliances.In fact, it was considered that a certain form of potential latent hegemony of Serbia was hiding behind that.
3) The concepts of the Balkan Federation of King Milan Obrenović V implied that it was actually the result of striving to get closer to Austria-Hungary, as well as resolutely opposing any kind of Russian influence on the Balkan Peninsula.Such an idea could not have had significant results in some countries that did not pursue Austrophile policies (primarily in Montenegro, but also in Greece), as well as in large part of the Serbian public.Similar ideas were developed by some Serbian intellectuals at the beginning of the 20th century in an attempt to bring the Kingdom of Serbia closer to Austria-Hungary but without the previous formation of a broader Balkan union.4) Understanding of the Balkan alliances as a kind of ad hoc mechanism for the joint struggle against the Ottoman Empire, as a way to conquer through mutual cooperation a significant part of the territory that is understood as "naturally" its own.In that sense, there were differences over certain territories, and above all, about Macedonia between Bulgaria, on the one hand, and Serbia and Greece, on the other hand.In that sense, King Peter I Karađorđević certainly had the intention to expand Serbia to the southwest and south, but with full cooperation with other Balkan states.
It can be concluded that the creation of any Balkan alliance at the end of the 19th century was hampered, both by the international factor and by the elites of these countries who had such political conceptions based on the necessary expansion of their territories.Also, in addition to this, the strengthened nationalisms of the Balkan peoples were the reason that prevented the realistic interest connection of the Balkan countries during the 19th century.There were also the ideas of Panslavism, which in some way was supported by the Russian Empire, primarily through the Orthodox church circles, and at the end of the 19th century through certain political parties.Panslavism actually implied essential Russian domination in this part of Europe, which, especially after 1856, i.e., its withdrawal from the Danube principalities, became less and less realistic (see Panslavism).
Needless to say, Austria-Hungary did not look favorably on these Balkan interstate arrangements, fearing that it would affect its internal situation in the parts that were inhabited by Slavs.Moreover, it did not want in any way to "share" its influence in the Balkans with the newly formed states and/or their potential alliances.