Culture of Polis, Year XVIII (2021), Issue 46, pp. 35-53
ISSN 1820-4589

JOVANKA KUVEKALOVIĆ-STAMATOVIĆ
Institute for International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, Serbia
jovankaks@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs
VANJA GLIŠIN
Institute for Political Studies, Belgrade, Serbia
glisinvanja2@gmail.com

UDC: 327.7/.8:327(4)
DOI: https://doi.org/10.51738/Kpolisa2021.18.3r.1.03

Original scientific work
Received: 2021-08-21
Approved: 2021-09-18
Online: 2021-10-18

PDF
EUFOR ČAD/CENTRALNOAFRIČKA REPUBLIKA: POLITIZOVANI MANDAT EVROPSKE UNIJE I VOJNO UPRAVLJANJE DARFURSKOM KRIZOM
EUFOR CHAD/CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: POLITIZED MANDATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND MILITARY MANAGEMENT OF THE DARFUR CRISIS

SUMMARY
From the moment of its establishment, EUFOR Chad/Central African Republic was a specific military operation, not only from the perspective of the European Union, but the host countries as well. Mutual skepticism emerged already in the first phase of the decision-making process, when the preliminary assessments of its success and implementation were quite pessimistic. The lack of agreement among the EU Member States regarding conducting an intervention conditioned additional efforts of France, as the main initiator, to fulfil its ambitions through the decisions of Common Security and Defense Policy, thus securing its strategic position on the African continent. Equally pronounced critical blade in Chad was also covered up, having in mind that the inevitable fragmentation of ideas was avoided through a one-sided decision passed by the current political leadership. The other specificity is reflected in the fact that, based on numerous parameters, EUFOR Chad/CAR operation was assessed as the biggest intervention of the European Union conducted so far. Despite operative, logistical and financial difficulties that postponed implementation of the mandate, the operation was concluded on March 15, 2009. The logical question emerging regarding the previously stated characteristics is whether they impacted the defining of the mandate, the dynamics of its implementation and the final result of EUFOR Chad/CAR operation? The basic assumption which is the starting point for the authors of this paper states that the pronounced specificities echoed in the form of politization of the mandate and the military management of the Darfur crisis as direct motives of the operation. The lack of political mechanisms supporting the military action in conflict solution concurrently contributed to militarization of crisis management of the EU. The affirmative argument of the previously expressed statements is the impact of permanent shortages to the consistency and effectiveness of the results of EUFOR. An additional insight is expressed in the consent of the host country, the Republic of Chad, which was, in this concrete case, driven by strategic interests and strengthening of the authoritarian rule.

KEYWORDS
EUFOR Chad/Central African Republic military operation, European Union, Common Security and Defense Policy, France

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